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ABSTRACTS

The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure

By P. W. SCHROEDER

Conventional accounts of the 19th-century international system describe it as a conservative restoration of the 18th-century system and account for the general stability of the 19th century primarily on the basis of the actors' peaceful dispositions. They fail to recognize or explain the profound structural changes in 19th-century politics. Problems that could not be successfully dealt with in the 18th century were solved or managed by 19th-century statesmen by means of three new systemic arrangements: a system of intertwined guarantees and duties for the great powers; arrangements for shielding European politics from extra-European quarrels; and a network of intermediary bodies, separating and linking the great powers, to serve as buffers and spheres of influence.

Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System

By F. KRATOCHWIL

The author explores the changing functions of boundaries in territorially and nonterritorially based social organizations. By focusing on the exchanges that boundaries mediate, a fuller account can be given of the systems characteristics in which the units interact than is afforded by traditional systems theory. Two case studies demonstrate that imperial boundaries differ significantly from those in the state system. Boundaries are shown to be the major means for conflict management in the international system. The author also investigates shifts in the location of the boundary, characteristics of balance-of-power systems, and the restriction and expansion of the exchanges that boundaries allow through the bundling or unbundling of territorial rights. Most of the latter devices that gave rise to spheres of influence, buffer states, suzerainties, and so forth have been overtaken by events, but functional regimes and spheres of influence based upon tacit rather than explicit rules remain important.

The State and Strategies of International Adjustment

By G. J. IKENBERRY

All states are continuously in the process of adjusting to change in the political economy of international and national systems. Problems inherent in this adjustment process are a basic source of national behavior and international conflict. The heuristic model presented in this paper provides systematic explanations for the strategic choices that states make in the adjustment process. Through the specification of the range of strategic options and of the formal interests of states, new insights are gained concerning the articulation between national and international political economy. Empirical cases are drawn from the politics of energy adjustment in the 1970s.

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Culture and Decision Making in China, Japan, Soviet Russia, and the United States

By F. GAENSLEN

Implicit in most recent social science explanations of human behavior is a conception of man as universal *homo economicus*. Although such a conception is capable of giving a powerful account of a great deal of human action, its account of the nature and variety of human values is inadequate. Cultural assumptions about the meaning of "self" and "others," and about relations between human beings, are likely to vary from one society to another. These assumptions affect the collective decision processes of political elites under conditions of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. The author first addresses the question of how to construct a compelling cultural explanation, and then offers evidence which suggests that, because Chinese, Japanese, and Russians tend to hold somewhat different conceptions of "self" and "others" than do Americans (the former tending to be more collectivist than the latter), these different conceptions have implications for collective decision making.

International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions

By O. R. YOUNG

The current burst of work on regimes or, more broadly, on international institutions, reflects an emerging sense—especially among Americans—that the international order engineered by the United States and its allies in the aftermath of World War II is eroding rapidly and may even be on the verge of collapse. But is the resultant surge of scholarly work on international regimes any more likely to yield lasting contributions to knowledge than have other recent fashions in the field of international relations? The jury will remain out until a sustained effort is made to evaluate the significance of regimes or institutions more broadly, as determinants of collective behavior at the international level.

Elections and the Democratic Class Struggle

By R. W. JACKMAN

It is commonly believed that elections in the industrial democracies reflect a democratic class struggle, according to which lower-income voters support parties of the Left while higher-income voters protect their interest by voting for parties of the Right. This interpretation hinges critically on a series of implicit assumptions. First, the class-struggle thesis assumes that most industrial democracies have majoritarian political institutions. Second, it assumes that the typical form of political competition follows the responsible-parties model, which implies, among other things, that parties are fundamentally programmatic, adopting distinctive positions along a left-right continuum. When these assumptions are evaluated in light of the available evidence on the nature of party systems, political competition, and voting behavior, they are judged to be largely implausible. Thus, the democratic-class-struggle thesis constitutes a seriously flawed interpretation of elections.

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THE 19TH-CENTURY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: Changes in the Structure

By PAUL W. SCHROEDER*

I

THE problem to be posed in this essay is a central one in the history of international politics. Having dealt with it intensively in the 19th and early 20th centuries, historians of international politics have long regarded it as basically solved. The question is how to account for the overall peaceful stability of 19th-century European international politics from 1815 on. The phenomenon in question is a familiar one, and the conventional answer is firmly established in the historical literature. In describing in unavoidably oversimplified fashion the phenomenon and the normal explanation, I hope to show that a real question remains and that a different kind of broad answer is more satisfactory.

Most scholars would agree that Europe was more stable from 1815 to 1854 than during any equivalent era in the entire 18th century, and that, taken as a whole, the 19th century was more peaceful than the 18th. Various explanations have been offered: the widespread exhaustion, war-weariness, fear of revolution, and desire for peace produced by a generation of war and upheaval from 1787 to 1815; a moderate peace settlement, a stable balance of power, a system of diplomacy by conference, a Concert of Europe, and other diplomatic devices; the prevalence of monarchial conservative ideology; international cooperation to preserve the existing social order; and prudent, skillful statesmanship. The explanations are complementary rather than conflicting, so that historians can disagree on emphases while tacitly accepting that the phenomenon can be explained adequately by some combination of these factors.

The explanations involve an explicit or implicit denial of any systemic change in international politics in this more peaceful, stable era. They do so in three general ways. First, the 1815 settlement is commonly interpreted as a restoration of an 18th-century-style balance of power, a con-

* This article is an outgrowth of a colloquium paper presented March 19, 1984, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC. I am grateful to Professors Enno Kraehe of the University of Virginia and Peter Krüger of Marburg University for their comments, and to the Wilson Center for the Fellowship that allowed me to work on the study. A different, shortened version containing part of this material was presented on February 21, 1985, at the Consortium for Revolutionary Europe at Baton Rouge, La.

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scious return to classical 18th-century political principles.[1] Second, most if not all historians see the post-1815 change in the character of international politics as temporary, with stability and harmony beginning to fade by 1820 and in definite decline by 1830, and normal political competition back in force after 1848.[2] Third, peace and stability are usually explained as volitional and dispositional rather than structural—i.e., a matter of what statesmen chose to do and were inclined to do in international politics, rather than what the prevailing system constrained them from doing or permitted them to do.

On these particular counts, this essay disputes the general consensus. It is not exactly wrong, but it leaves important things out. Nineteenth-century international peace and stability derived mainly from systemic change, reflected in major institutionalized arrangements and practices divergent from the 18th-century norm. The 1815 settlement did not restore an 18th-century-type balance of power or revive 18th-century political practices; the European equilibrium established in 1815 and lasting well into the 19th century differed sharply from so-called balances of power in the 18th. The systemic change, moveover, proved enduring; it lasted into the latter part of the century, despite the upheavals of 1848-1850 and the wars of 1854-1871. Furthermore, 19th-century political patterns of conduct differed from their 18th-century counterparts not so much because of the more pacific, conservative dispositions, aims, and desires of most statesmen—this difference, if it existed, tended to disappear quickly—but because the two prevailing systems afforded different systemic constraints and possibilities for action.

Much of the argument involved in this counter-thesis cannot be presented here, much less demonstrated. To show, for example, how the typical 19th-century conception of the European equilibrium differed from the prevailing 18th-century ideas of balance of power, and how it worked differently, or to explain how new rules and practices of politics emerged in the crucible of the Napoleonic Wars, would require lengthy historical analyses. In this essay, I intend only to present a plausible argument that systemic changes really occurred, and to identify certain ways in which they show up.

[1] E.g., Edward V. Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1955); Peter R. Rohden, *Die klassische Diplomatie von Kaunitz bis Metternich* (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1939).

[2] F. Roy Bridge and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1815-1914* (London: Longman, 1980).

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II

To start with, the most impressive aspect of post-1815 European politics is not simply the virtual absence of war. More notable is an array of positive results achieved in international politics in this era, of problems settled and dangers averted by diplomacy. Leaving the remarkable record of the Vienna Congress in this respect aside entirely, a short list of the accomplishments would have to include the following: the speedy evacuation of Allied armies from France and France's quick reintegration into the European Concert; the completion and implementation of the federal constitution of Germany; the suppression of revolutions in Naples, Piedmont, Spain, and the Danubian Principalities by international action, without serious European quarrels; the recognition of Latin American independence; the prevention of war between Russia and Turkey for seven years (1821 to 1828), and a moderate end to that war after it did break out; the creation of an independent Greece; the prompt recognition of a new government in France after the revolution of 1830; the creation of an independent, neutralized Belgium, despite major dangers of war and obstacles to a settlement created mainly by quarrels between the Dutch and the Belgians; the prevention of international conflict in 1830-1832 over revolts in Italy, Germany, and Poland; the managing of civil wars in Spain and Portugal without great-power conflict; and two successful joint European rescue operations for the Ottoman Empire.

One need not accept that all these outcomes represented long-range gains for domestic and international peace and stability in Europe; nor would anyone claim that they were reached without crises, tensions, and crosspurposes. Nonetheless, it remains remarkable that such results could be achieved at all—that 19th-century statesmen could, with a certain minimum of good will and effort, repeatedly reach viable, agreed-upon outcomes to hotly disputed critical problems. The 18th century simply does not record diplomatic achievements of this kind. To the contrary, enormous efforts were repeatedly expended by 18th-century statesmen not so much to solve problems as simply to keep them under control and avert breakdown—usually in vain. Consider, for example, how England and France struggled fruitlessly to control Elizabeth Farnese's Spain, and tried not to get into war with each other in 1739-1741 and 1754-1756; how much useless effort Charles VI put into securing the peaceful accession of Maria Theresa in Austria; how Austria and France unsuccessfully attempted to keep Russia from dominating Poland and the Ottoman Empire or from partitioning them. The list could readily be extended.

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Of course, we are told that European statesmen after 1815 were in a different mood. But were they? How much so? Previous European wars, allowing for differences in population and level of economic development, had been almost as costly and exhausting as those of 1792-1815—the Thirty Years' War had probably been worse[3]—and had left behind comparable legacies of war-weariness and fear of revolution. After the conclusion of every great war, in 1648, 1713-1714, 1763, 1783, 1801, 1807, and 1809, there had been statesmen who desperately yearned for peace, wanting not just peace treaties but durable peace settlements. The results achieved in this direction in the early 18th century alone by George I, Stanhope, the Abbé Dubois, Baron Münchhausen, Carteret, Cardinal Fleury, Townshend, Walpole, Bernstorff, and others in no way compare with the will and energy expended, or with the record of 1815-1848. The presence or absence of good will and peaceful intentions clearly does not suffice to explain this phenomenon.[4]

Moreover, the conservative "Holy Alliance" spirit of 1815 cannot mainly account for 19th-century international stability, for this spirit, never universal in Europe, clearly did not survive the revolutions of 1848, while the structural changes in the states system established in 1815 largely did. The upheavals of 1848-1850 affected European international politics in three main ways. First, the revolutions discredited the so-called Metternich system, the attempt to repress liberalism, nationalism, and revolution purely by authoritarian preventive measures. After 1850, even governments that were still basically authoritarian, such as those of Austria, Prussia, and Louis Napoleon's France, tried to deal with national discontent and revolution by active policies of modernization and economic development directed from above; these policies tended to promote rivalry between states, especially in the economic arena.[5] Second, the Holy Alliance between the three Eastern powers was undermined. Prussia and Austria once again became open rivals in Germany, and Russia and Austria were concealed rivals in the Balkans, while France under

[3] Josef V. Polišensky, *War and Society in Europe, 1618-1648* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Theodore Rabb, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

[4] Heinz Duchardt, *Gleichgewicht der Kräfte, Convenance, Europäisches Konzert* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976); Ragnhild Hatton, *George I, Elector and King* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); David B. Horn, *Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); Paul Langford, *The Eighteenth Century, 1688-1815* (New York: A. and C. Black, 1976); Derek McKay and Hamish M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815* (London and New York: Longman, 1983); Gaston Zeller, *Les temps modernes*, 2 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1953-55).

[5] Helmut Böhme, *Deutschlands Weg zur Grossmacht*, 2d ed. (Cologne and Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1972); Harm-Hinrich Brandt, *Der österreichische Neoabsolutismus*, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978).

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Louis Napoleon and to some extent Britain under Palmerston looked for chances to exploit and widen the rifts. Third, European conservatism itself made long strides away from the pacific, legalistic internationalism of Metternich's generation, and toward its own union with nationalism. The new generation of leaders, though often almost as conservative in domestic politics as Metternich had been, hoped to defend the existing order not so much by preserving international peace and monarchial solidarity as by maintaining a strong army and an active foreign policy that would attach the masses to the regime.

In other words, the events of 1848 generally undermined the old monarchial-conservative spirit of 1815 and liberated new forces of nationalism and liberalism, even in Eastern Europe, thereby changing the tone and character of international politics. With the old motives for a peaceful, stable international system in decline or in disrepute, the system itself should presumably have been overthrown. Yet, despite revolutions in 1848-1850 more widespread than those of 1789-1793 and almost as radical; despite clashes between insurgents and police or armies almost everywhere in Central and Southern Europe, and serious civil conflicts in France, Prussia, Saxony, Southwest Germany, Naples, Lombardy, Venetia, Lower Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Croatia, Transylvania, and the Rumanian Principalities; despite two wars in strategically vital areas, one in Northern Italy, the other in Schleswig-Holstein, each involving one major power in combat and other major powers in political complications, what actually happened in international politics was that, when everything was over, not one war between Great Powers had broken out, not one international boundary had been altered, and not one treaty had been torn up. In short, though all the factors that were said to have produced peace and stability after 1815 had been suspended or destroyed, peace had been maintained, and the international crises had been managed.

But, the critic will reply, not for long. When the Crimean War (1853-56) broke out, it wrecked the European Concert and paved the way for the greater convulsions of 1859-1871.[6] True enough, but not perhaps the most important truth. A.J.P. Taylor indicates the salient fact, without exactly explaining it, in his essay entitled "Crimea: The War that Would Not Boil."[7] Considering the explosive elements in it, this war should in

[6] Winfried Baumgart, *Der Frieden von Paris 1856* (Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1972); Paul W. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean War* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1972); John S. Curtiss, *Russia's Crimean War* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979); Norman Rich, *Why the Crimean War?* (Hanover, NH, and London: University Press of New England, 1985).

[7] Taylor, *Rumours of Wars* (London: H. Hamilton, 1952), 30-40.

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the normal course of events have become a general European conflict. It was the first war between European great powers in 39 years. Britain and Russia, world rivals and the strongest powers in Europe, were pitted against each other. Public opinion, mass passions, and hostile ideologies figured prominently in the outbreak and conduct of the war. It involved the most complicated, persistent, and dangerous question in European politics, the Eastern Question. And above all, two of the major combatants, Britain and France, persistently employed every means at their command to make it a general war by drawing Austria, Prussia, the German Confederation, and other neutrals into it. The leader in that effort, Lord Palmerston, pursued a typical 18th-century war aim, a sweeping reduction of Russia's territory and power, ostensibly to restore the balance of power in Europe.

And what were the results, after two years of costly fighting and unremitting diplomatic pressure? No neutral joined the war except Sardinia-Piedmont, which came in almost as a mercenary auxiliary for reasons of its own.[8] Despite his great energy and popularity in Britain, Palmerston could not even carry his own cabinet along in his extreme war aims; in the end, Britain was persuaded by France, with Austria's help, to end the war and make peace before it wanted to. The war had some profound domestic and international consequences, without a doubt. Russia was humiliated and weakened internally; Austria was left isolated and vulnerable, and the Italian, German, and Balkan questions were thrown open. But France won only a prestige victory, and Britain not even that, while the map of Europe and the treaty system remained almost unchanged. The only real winners, it turned out, were those who could later exploit the war for their individual purposes: Sardinia-Piedmont, Prussia, and the nationalists in the Rumanian Principalities.

To be sure, the wars of Italian and German unification quickly followed, and profoundly altered the map and the treaty system of Europe. They had significant effects upon the European states system, particularly the long-range impact of the so-called unification of Germany.[9] Yet this very period of upheaval in some ways demonstrates the persistent strength of the European system, showing how even in its decline it continued to inhibit conflict and promote international arrangements and stability in a way that could hardly have occurred in the 18th century.

Two striking features of these wars were the difficulties Cavour and

[8] Ennio di Nolfo, *Europa e Italia nel 1855-1856* (Rome: Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano, 1967).

[9] Paul W. Schroeder, "The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System," *International History Review* 6 (February 1984), 1-27.

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Bismarck encountered in getting them started under the right conditions, and the relative ease and speed with which they were ended. By 1859, Austria and Sardinia-Piedmont had been waging a cold war for a decade; their diplomatic relations had been suspended for a year, and both powers were poised in armed confrontation; Cavour had concluded a conspiratorial agreement for war with Napoleon III; revolutionary nationalist agitation was rife in Italy and tension was high in Europe; and Austria had almost no friends and many enemies. Despite all this, Cavour was at the point of resigning in despair in April 1859 because his quest for war had been foiled by European diplomacy; at the last moment, Austria rescued him with its fatal ultimatum to Sardinia.[10] When Bismarck became Minister-President of Prussia in 1862, Austria's position was even worse and the prevailing conservative restraints upon the exercise of *Machtpolitik* were still weaker. Bismarck matched or possibly exceeded Cavour in skill, daring, and lack of scruple, and he operated from a far stronger base of power. Yet it took him four years before he could maneuver Austria into war under the right conditions. When he chose to confront France four years later, only a combination of amazing luck and French blunders saved him from political defeat and enabled him to conduct a German national war against France without European interference. In other words, in both 1866 and 1870, despite the undoubted decay of the European system, there remained enough residual resistance to the kind of ruthless 18th-century *Realpolitik* Bismarck frankly espoused to make his task difficult.[11]

Like Palmerston's efforts in the Crimean War, the record of 1866 and 1870 illustrates how 18th-century politics worked when tried in the 19th century. Cavour and Bismarck were in many respects 18th-century-style *Kabinettspolitiker*, pursuing the traditional expansionist policies of the Houses of Brandenburg and Savoy. Their 18th-century predecessors, Frederick the Great and the Dukes of Savoy, had had different problems, however: their wars were easy enough to start, but difficult to control and to end. Historians have often noted the remarkably limited extent, duration, and violence of the wars between 1859 and 1871, considering how

[10] Franco Valsecchi, *L'unificazione italiana e la politica europea* (Milan: Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale, 1939); Umberto Marcelli, *Cavour, diplomatico 1856-1859* (Bologna: A. Forni, 1961); Adolfo Omodeo, *L'opera politica del conte di Cavour (1848-1857)* (Milan and Naples: R. Ricciardi, 1968); Friedrich Engel-Janosi, "L' 'Ultimatum' austriaco del 1859," *Rassegna storica del Risorgimento* 24 (September and October 1937), 1393-1425, 1565-1600.

[11] Helmut Burckhardt, *Deutschland, England, Frankreich* (Munich: W. Fink, 1970); Richard Millman, *British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); Dietrich Beyrau, *Russische Orientpolitik und die Entstehung des Deutschen Kaiserreiches 1866 bis 1870/71* (Munich: Osteuropa-Institut, 1974); Heinrich Lutz, *Österreich-Ungarn und die Gründung des Deutschen Reiches* (Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1979).

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much was at stake in them, and have often explained this as resulting from the skill and moderation of Bismarck and Cavour. Leaving aside the question of whether the aims and tactics of either statesman can be called moderate (Cavour's almost certainly were not and Bismarck's only in a limited sense),[12] that kind of explanation is clearly inadequate systemically. Cavour did not end the war in 1859; France and Austria did, in good part because of European pressure. Cavour was not responsible for the European response to his actions in 1860-1861, and was not even alive to see Italian unity completed. As for Bismarck, remarkable though his fertility in expedients was, he clearly was working within a framework of limits and opportunities set by the European system, and he always knew it.

Even more surprising than the limited extent and duration of these wars is the rapid integration of their results into the European system. Two states that had aggrandized themselves by methods widely condemned in Europe, defeating and humiliating other European great powers in the process, now sought recognition and acceptance. One leaped in a decade from last to first place in the European pentarchy; the other, though still essentially a second-class state, now demanded recognition as a great power. One was widely feared as being militarist and ruthless, the other generally despised as weak and unreliable. Yet both were readily accepted into the great-power club and, more important, no effort was ever made to reverse this outcome. For the other powers, this involved not merely coming to terms with accomplished facts and present realities. It meant putting aside deeply rooted traditions and goals, and incurring real risks. Austria, for example, has been accused of hoping after 1859 to reverse the outcome in Italy (which is largely true) and, after 1866, of plotting revenge on Prussia for Sadowa (which is almost wholly false). What needs explanation and ought to catch the attention of historians is instead the astonishing readiness of Austria to come to terms with the new states of Italy and Germany. It involved seeking good relations in the south with a state that was bound to be its rival in the Adriatic and its potential competitor in the Balkans, and that still harbored claims to Austrian territory. At the same time, Austria sought an actual alliance with its historic rival to the north, now expanded into a national state that threatened Austria militarily, jeopardized the loyalty of its most important national group, and undermined its raison d'être as a multinational state and European great power.

[12] Denis Mack Smith, *Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), and *Victor Emmanuel, Cavour, and the Risorgimento* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Lothar Gall, *Bismarck der weisse Revolutionär* (Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1980).

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In a similarly myopic fashion, historians have concentrated their attention on France's refusal to accept the loss of Alsace-Lorraine in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, and the fatal effect this is supposed to have had on Franco-German relations.[13] Actually, while the war was still going on, France accepted something that proved to be vastly more dangerous for French security and power than the loss of Alsace-Lorraine—namely, the union of South Germany with the North under Prussian control; now, a militarily superior Germany would directly face France along a greatly extended Franco-German frontier. Russia, in accepting German unification under Prussia, swallowed the loss of its most important security asset, a defensive glacis to the west, the cornerstone of which had always been a federal, divided structure for Germany and a rivalry between Austria and Prussia that Russia could rely upon and exploit.

The question is not whether the European powers were wise in thus accepting the *faits accomplis* presented to them by Sardinia-Piedmont and Prussia. My own view is that in many ways this was a fatal error, and that Italian and German national unification needed at least to be controlled and legalized by Europe in concert, even if after the fact. The important consideration here is that this kind of peaceful accommodation to drastic changes in the system did not happen, and could not have happened, in the 18th century. One only needs to remember, by way of contrast, how long and determinedly Austria resisted the loss of Silesia to Prussia, and France the loss of colonial supremacy to Britain. Some systemic change is required to account for it.

There is another important and general phenomenon of 19th-century international politics; it is suggested in the title of A.J.P. Taylor's *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918*.[14] Actually, for most of the period covered, up to 1890 or 1900 at least, there was no such struggle for mastery in the sense of a conscious drive to achieve preeminent position and dominant power. Although it makes sense to speak of a struggle for mastery in Germany and Italy, no one state ever tried for, much less achieved, such mastery in Europe as a whole, and it is questionable whether any coalition did. Britain enjoyed command of the seas, and for a long while was preeminent in empire, industry, and commerce. But so far as continental Europe is concerned, what Lord Salisbury said was always true and well known: "We are fish." Russia was the strongest member of the Holy Alliance up to the 1850s, but never dominated Europe as

[13] See, for example, George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismark's European Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Allan Mitchell, *Bismarck and the French Nation, 1848-1890* (New York: Pegasus, 1971).

[14] Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954.

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a whole, or even Central Europe; after the Crimean War, it no longer even led the Eastern bloc. The common view that Russia enjoyed an enormous and growing power and prestige in Europe until the Crimean War broke the bubble is a great exaggeration.[15] After 1815, Russia never was the arbiter of Europe or exercised the dominant influence in Germany that Catherine II or Paul I had enjoyed for a time, and the young Alexander I had aspired to. France, Austria, and Italy were never serious candidates for mastery. That leaves only Bismarck's Germany. What it enjoyed (or rather, possessed without really enjoying it) was, in Andreas Hillgruber's phrase, a labile half-hegemony in Europe, an unintended result of Bismarck's policy.[16] Basically, he had not wanted to control Europe, but to disentangle Prussia and Germany from extraneous European quarrels. Instead, as Lothar Gall's excellent biography shows, he became a sorcerer's apprentice, overwhelmed by his own success, compelled to manage and manipulate European problems he had hoped to be able to ignore.[17]

The same thesis applies to 19th-century coalitions and alliances: in contrast to 18th-century ones, they were not bids for mastery in Europe. The dominant coalition of 1815 was strictly a defensive one against France (and tacitly against one of its members, Russia); it quickly broke down. After 1820, the Holy Alliance could not control events in Western Europe, and the Western powers could not control those in Central and Eastern Europe. Near Eastern alignments frequently crossed and shifted. Britain and France could not create a dominant coalition against Russia in the 1850s. Napoleon III toyed with the idea of a dominant Franco-Russian or Franco-Prussian-Italian coalition, but never seriously pursued it. Bismarck's alliance system after 1879 was a reluctant defensive coalition intended to keep France from seeking revenge, and Austria and Italy or Austria and Russia from fighting each other. The rival alliances of the 1890s were basically blocking coalitions in Europe; they were used as bases to compete for world position.

This is not a quarrel over words, or one of those unavoidable but tiresome disputes by historians over periodization or taxonomy. It involves the fundamental nature of the 19th-century international system, and challenges the overall view of the history of international politics expounded by Ludwig Dehio[18] and many others, who saw it as a succession

[15] E.g., Georg Stadtmüller, "Die russische Weltmacht und ihr Rückzug (1783-1867)," in Stadtmüller, *Grundfragen der europäischen Geschichte* (Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg, 1965).

[16] Hillgruber, *Bismarcks Aussenpolitik* (Freiburg: Rombach, 1972).

[17] Gall (fn. 12).

[18] Dehio, *The Precarious Balance* (New York: Knopf, 1962), trans. Charles Fullman, from *Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie* (Krefeld: Scherpe, 1948).

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of bids by various powers for hegemony or supremacy, met ultimately by defeat and the restoration of a balance of power. That thesis may fit other eras (though even here one can have serious doubts). It does not suit the 19th century, which contains no Charles V, Philip II, Louis XIV, Chatham, Catherine the Great, Napoleon, Hitler, or Stalin. The reason is not that 19th-century statesmen were wiser or more restrained, but that the 19th-century system inhibited bids for mastery in Europe.

Certainly there was serious competition in 19th-century international politics. It was essentially competition for advantage, like the competition for shares of the market in an oligopolistic industry. The main advantage sought was the ability to profit from the international system at little cost, to enjoy freedom and choices others did not, and to escape burdens and payments that others had to bear. "Being the arbiter of Europe," "having a free hand," and "holding the balance" were code terms for this advantageous situation. The critical consideration, in any case, is that in the 19th century, unlike in others, the competition for advantage went on for a long time without degenerating into a struggle for mastery.

Some evidence even exists to satisfy those who would like quantifiable data to support the supposed qualitative difference between 18th- and 19th-century international politics. This evidence lies in the numbers of battlefield deaths in European wars in the two centuries. It should not be pressed too hard, of course. Statistics are not very reliable, calculations are inexact and hard to interpret in this area, and there are many variables, such as the size of the respective armies, the effects of different weaponry, tactics, and strategy, different standards of hygiene and care of the wounded, and so forth. Nonetheless, the contrast between the two centuries is revealing enough as an indicator of the scale and frequency of warfare to be meaningful even if large margins are allowed for error. If one takes the total number of deaths for 1715-1792 (1,858,000, according to a recent assessment) and compares it to that for 1815-1914 (635,000), and then figures in the growth in the population of Europe between the two centuries (not quite double) and the greater number of years in the 19th-century sample, the ratio of 18th- to 19th-century battlefield deaths per year is somewhere between 7:1 and 8:1.[19]

[19] Jack S. Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1983), 88-89. I have omitted the wars of 1792-1815 from the calculations, even though historically they belong to the 18th century, to meet the objection that World War I should then be included for the 19th century. In any case, the discrepancy between the two centuries is no statistical quirk caused by a preponderance of deaths in one particular war or period. Each century shows a comparable pattern of initial stability (1715-40 and 1815-53), followed by upheaval (1740-63 and 1853-71) and a return to relative stability (1763-92 and 1871-1914). In each period the ratio of battlefield deaths is roughly the same.

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III

Thus, a prima facie case exists that a profound, durable change occurred in international politics after 1815. Three features introduced into international politics in 1813-1815, which became constitutive elements of the system, help to account for this change, and make it systematic in character. They made it possible for 19th-century statesmen to manage three central and perennial problems of international politics in the face of which the 18th century system had been relatively helpless. The three problems were: how to assure a reasonable amount of mutual security and status for all the great powers; how to insulate Europe from extra-European sources of conflict; and how to reconcile the legitimate requirements of smaller states for a secure independence with the equally legitimate and unavoidable quest of great powers for spheres of influence beyond their frontiers.

The three new elements of international politics that served to meet these problems were the treaty system of 1815 and the European Concert; the "fencing off" of the European state system from the extra-European world; and the establishment of a system of intermediary bodies between the great powers. I will make no attempt here to show how these elements arose, on what new bases of collective outlook they rested, how they worked in most individual cases, what led to their gradual breakdown and supersession, and how this affected the system. That sort of historical exposition must be done if the argument is to hold up in the long run, but to attempt it here would shatter the bounds of this essay.

The treaty system of 1815 and the European Concert are the best-known elements, and the easiest to define and illustrate. Beginning with the Vienna settlement, the 19th-century international system guaranteed the existence, security, status, and vital interests of all the European great powers. Between 1813 and 1815, the members of the final coalition against France worked out Europe's boundaries in a way mutually tolerable to all the important powers, including France, and then guaranteed these territorial arrangements by a series of interlocking treaties and a general great-power alliance, from which France was initially excluded, but which it soon joined. A variety of procedures and devices strengthened this network of treaty guarantees, including a system of diplomacy by conference and some general principles of a European Concert. The latter protected the rights, interests, and equal status of the great powers above all, but they also committed these powers to the performance of certain duties connected with those rights—respect for treaties, noninterference in other states' internal affairs, willingness to participate in the Concert's decisions and actions, and a general observance of legality and

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restraint in their international actions.[20] This system of guarantees for the rights, status, and existence of the great powers, though egregiously violated and badly strained in the mid-century wars, managed to make something of a comeback and to endure after a fashion till the turn of the century.

By contrast, though 18th-century statesmen and theorists had often talked about such a system,[21] the rights, status, vital interests, and very existence of great powers were never safe at that time, and were often deliberately attacked. Attempts to partition the territory of other major powers and to reduce them to second- or third-rank status were a normal part of 18th-century politics[22]—constitutive and necessary features of the system rather than its accidental products.[23] Thus, the total destruction of the European balance during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars represents merely the climax of a process begun much earlier, rooted in the conviction shared by all great powers and many smaller ones that, in order to preserve their status and security, they not only needed to aggrandize themselves but also to eliminate the threats posed by the existence of their rivals.

The second major element is not as obvious. In the 19th-century system, international politics within Europe was essentially separated from colonial, maritime, and commercial competition between European powers in the non-European world. In Gustav Adolph Rein's phrase, Europe was hedged in, fenced off from the rest of the world.[24] The most striking evidence of this change from the 18th century is what happened to maritime and colonial questions in the peace settlement and after it. Like the major 18th-century wars, the wars of the Revolution and Napoleon were world contests fought around much of the globe. The main stakes in the struggle between France and Britain were maritime and colonial su-

[20] Karl Griewank, *Der Wiener Kongress und die europäische Restauration*, 2d ed. (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1954); Maurice Bourquin, *Histoire de la Sainte Alliance* (Geneva: Librairie de l'Université Georg, 1954); Richard B. Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," *World Politics* 28 (January 1976), 159-74.

[21] Duchardt (fn. 4).

[22] For good discussions of how and why this happened, with particular reference to the Seven Years' War, see Walther Mediger, *Moskaus Weg nach Europa* (Braunschweig: G. Westermann, 1952); Johannes Kunisch, *Staatsverfassung und Mächtepolitik* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1979); and Michael G. Müller, "Russland und der Siebenjährige Krieg. Beitrag zu einer Kontroverse," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 28 (No. 2, 1980), 198-219.

[23] For example, Klaus Zernack shows how Russia's expansion in its northern wars and the first partition of Poland were in a sense system-preserving actions: "Das Zeitalter der nordischen Kriege von 1558 bis 1809 als frühneuzeitliche Geschichtsepoche," *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* (No. 1, 1974), 55-79, and "Negative Polenpolitik als Grundlage deutsch-russischer Diplomatie in der Mächtepolitik des 18. Jahrhunderts," in *Russland und Deutschland. Festschrift für Georg von Rauch* (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1974), 144-59.

[24] Rein's comments are quoted in Wolfgang von Groote, ed., *Napoleon I und die Staatenwelt seiner Zeit* (Freiburg: Rombach, 1969), 198-99.

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premacy which, after 1807, became almost the only reason for continuing the war. While France's most effective propaganda weapon in Europe was to denounce Britain's tyranny on the seas, Napoleon's attempt to counter British seapower through the Continental System may have done more than anything else to hasten his ultimate downfall. The maritime and colonial conflict had enormous world-historical results. Among other things, it brought the United States into the war and helped confirm its independence, led to the revolutionary liberation of Latin America, and laid the foundations of Britain's territorial empire in India. Moreover, maritime and colonial issues were heavily involved in European international politics; a good part of the diplomacy of the various allied coalitions, including the final one, consisted of efforts by various continental powers to get Britain to make colonial and maritime concessions to France and its allies in the interests of continental peace. Yet before the war was over, this intimate, seemingly indissoluble connection between European and overseas wars and politics had been severed. Britain flatly barred the issue of maritime law from discussion at the peace table and firmly rejected any Russian or allied mediation of its war with the United States. As to the colonial settlement, the British insisted that though they would be generous (and on the whole they were), in principle they would not make colonial concessions in return for France's agreement to continental peace terms. First Britain's major allies, then France, and finally its client Holland accepted the terms Britain offered, and that ended it. The only overseas issue discussed at Vienna concerned the slave trade, which involved morality and prestige more than power or material interests. In other words, Europe accepted British naval and colonial supremacy, choosing to live with it and, so far as strictly European politics was concerned, to ignore it.

Something similar happened with regard to the Ottoman Empire, which had become a major zone of European conflict in the late 18th century and the Napoleonic wars. Proposals were made to include it in the general settlement and its guarantees, but they were not pursued. Russia had unsettled grievances against the Turks which it did not want to submit to European control; Metternich—who viewed the Balkans as part of Asia, and Austria's southeastern border with Turkey as equivalent to a sea frontier—wanted the Ottoman Empire left as it was. Other parts of Asia (India, Persia, the Middle East) also underwent major changes in the Napoleonic wars; some historians have traced the origins of Anglo-Russian world rivalry back to 1815 or earlier.[25] But even if certain roots of the

[25] See, for example, Jacques-Henri Pirenne, *La Sainte-Alliance, organisation européenne de la paix mondiale*, 2 vols. (Neuchâtel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1946-49); Edward Ingram, *Commitment to Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

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later struggle can be detected at this stage, the British government as a whole did not begin to see Russia as a serious menace to India and the empire until the 1830s; even then, British policy remained Europe-centered overall.[26] The post-Vienna period, in fact, witnessed the abatement of both rivalry and intimacy in Anglo-Russian relations. Before 1815, Catherine II, Paul I, and Alexander I had each at various times been avowed enemies and close allies of Britain. After 1815, the two powers were neither one nor the other—never enemies until 1853, and never close allies, despite the efforts of Nicholas I and his advisers to reach a partnership with England on European and Near Eastern questions.[27] In the typical post-Vienna manner, each power saw the other as a potential rival to be managed by ostensible friendship. In any case, the Eastern powers—especially Austria and Prussia, but Russia as well—did not let extra-European questions seriously affect their policies in Europe.[28]

Nor, in the main, did the English and French. Their rivalry overseas never disappeared entirely after 1815, and flared up on occasion over various issues, such as the slave trade, Britain's right of search, Latin America, Madagascar, Tahiti, and Algeria. But this was more an irritant than a serious danger; it kept the two powers from genuine entente but never threatened the peace. In Europe, Britain and France were able to cooperate in a wary fashion in the Iberian Peninsula, Belgium, Greece, and the Near East. The only serious crisis between them, in 1840, arose over a European Concert issue, the Eastern Question, where a perceived insult to France's honor was deemed more important than any blow to her interests.[29] In a similar way, Britain and the Netherlands remained friends in Europe despite their commercial and colonial rivalries and disputes in the Far East.[30]

To dismiss this shielding of European politics from extra-European quarrels as unimportant, or to attribute it simply to Britain's unchallenged superiority overseas, is to ignore or underrate the sharp contrast between the 18th and 19th centuries in this respect, as well as the change

[26] David Gillard, *The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914* (London: Methuen, 1977); Kenneth Bourne, *Palmerston: The Early Years, 1784-1841* (New York: Macmillan, 1982); Malcolm E. Yapp, *Strategies of British India* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

[27] Harold N. Ingle, *Nesselrode and the Russian Rapprochement with Britain, 1836-1843* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

[28] *Ibid.*; Manfred Kossok, *Im Schatten der Heiligen Allianz* ([East] Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1964); Russell H. Bartley, *Imperial Russia and the Struggle for Latin American Independence, 1808-1828* (Austin: Institute for Latin American Studies, University of Texas, 1978).

[29] Roger Bullen, *Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale* (London: Athlone, 1974); Raymond Guyot, *La première Entente Cordiale* (Paris: F. Rieder, 1926); Douglas Johnson, *Guizot: Aspects of French History, 1787-1874* (London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1963).

[30] Nicholas Tarling, *Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1780-1824* (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962), and *Imperial Britain in South-East Asia* (Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

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in outlook that made it possible. The 18th century was filled with wars in North America, the West Indies, India, and on the high seas, which spilled over into Europe, and vice versa. Eighteenth-century statesmen had often tried, without success, to separate European from extra-European quarrels—witness Walpole's failure in 1739-1740, and Newcastle's in 1754-1756.[31] Nineteenth-century statesmen not only could separate the two if they wished, but found it relatively easy and normal to do so. Europe's acceptance of British maritime and overseas domination does need explanation; it was not automatic. During the latter part of the 18th century and the Napoleonic Wars, British naval practices aroused much resentment of Britain on the continent, as British statesmen were well aware; several major efforts at united action were promoted against them (the Leagues of Armed Neutrality led by Russia in 1780 and 1800-1801, and the Continental System). No such anti-British continental combination was ever contemplated in the 19th century until Russia proposed one during the Boer War, and then it came to nothing. One major reason was that Britain made its maritime and colonial supremacy far more tolerable to other powers, and even advantageous to them in some respects, than it had been in the 18th century. Thus the position advanced by Friedrich von Gentz and other defenders of Britain during the Napleonic wars—that the anti-British arguments about maritime law and neutral rights were spurious and that Britain's control of the seas, though vital to Britain's existence, threatened no one else—was made good in the postwar era. With the gradual transition from a mercantilist to a free-trade empire, British maritime supremacy became at worst only an irritant and a latent threat to others, and in some ways even an asset. British naval vessels cleared out pirates in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to the advantage of all nations,[32] guarded sea lanes all could use, and held colonies with whom all could trade. Moreover, while expanding its own empire, Britain did not for most of the century seriously interfere with imperial expansion and consolidation by other states, especially France and the Netherlands. Nineteenth-century Britain is often praised for maintaining peace and the balance of power within Europe, and criticized for greedy imperialism outside it. So far as the European states system is concerned, the verdict could well be reversed. Britain, in my view, did not really

[31] John H. Plumb, *Sir Robert Walpole*, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1956-61); Reed Browning, *The Duke of Newcastle* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975); Patrice Higgonet, "The Origins of the Seven Years' War," *Journal of Modern History* 40 (March 1968), 57-90; T. R. Clayton, "The Duke of Newcastle, the Earl of Halifax, and the American Origins of the Seven Years' War," *Historical Journal* 24 (September 1981), 571-603.

[32] John B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1800* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968); Thomas E. Marston, *Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area, 1800-1878* (Hamden, CT: Shoestring Press, 1961).

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maintain the European balance and more than once endangered the peace of Europe, but the way Britain ran its empire contributed much to making the 19th-century system work.

IV

The third element is the least recognized, but quite possibly the most important. The settlement of 1815 established a broad system of intermediary bodies in Europe: smaller states situated and organized to serve as buffers and spheres of influence. While they separated the great powers, making it more difficult for them to fight, they also linked them by giving them something in common to manage. The importance of intermediary bodies in the 19th-century system has been little recognized—not because the facts about them are unknown, but because these facts have been interpreted in a different framework. The arrangements made concerning smaller powers in the Vienna settlement have traditionally been viewed in terms of balance-of-power politics, or a barrier system designed to contain France, or territorial deals and compensations negotiated to meet rival state and dynastic claims. None of these explanations is wrong. Statesmen thought and acted according to these ideas, as the documents show, though they also talked about intermediary bodies and their uses. But here is where one must distinguish between what the leaders intended to do and what they actually did. The system of intermediary bodies emerging from the Vienna settlement was less a product of deliberate planning than it was the ultimate outcome of arrangements reached mainly for other, more immediate purposes. The most important historic results are often unintentional. Mazzini once said of the Italian *Risorgimento*, "We aimed for ten and achieved two." In 1815, European statesmen aimed for two and achieved six or seven.

The Kingdom of the United Netherlands, formed of the Dutch provinces, Belgium, and Luxemburg, is a good case in point. It was of course designed to be the keystone of the proposed defensive barrier against France. In its actual role and function, however, it was no more simply a barrier state than Poland or Czechoslovakia after World War I were simply part of the French *cordon sanitaire* against Germany and Russia. King William I intended his kingdom to be an independent power playing a meaningful general role in European politics; that is the main reason he fought so stubbornly against the loss of Belgium after 1830.[33] Metternich specifically called the Netherlands an intermediary body linking Austria

[33] Gustaaf J. Renier, *Great Britain and the Establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1813-1815* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1930).

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to Britain, through South and West Germany, forming a conservative phalanx to keep the restless powers, Russia and France, from weighing on the European center.[34] Prussia, once its own conflicts with the Dutch were settled, considered the Netherlands a sphere of influence to be shared with England, linking Prussia and Britain. The other German princes looked at William, a member of the German Confederation as Grand Duke of Luxemburg, as their ally in preserving the independence of middle-sized and small states against Austria and Prussia.[35] Even Russia considered its influence in the Netherlands important and for this reason promoted a marriage between the Dutch Crown Prince and a Russian Grand Duchess. In short, the United Netherlands served a number of functions as an intermediary body; most of these survived when its role as a barrier against France disappeared with the Belgian revolt of 1830. Belgium itself became an intermediary body with various important functions aside from that of being a neutral barrier against France.[36]

Scandinavia (Denmark and Sweden-Norway) represents another intermediary body after 1815, but one to which balance-of-power and barrier-system considerations hardly apply at all. Once the territorial struggle between Sweden and Denmark over Norway was settled in 1814, the Baltic was opened to general, peaceful trade. None of the three neighboring great powers, Russia, Prussia, and Britain, tried to dominate it exclusively, but all were anxious to maintain free access through the straits and preserve the status quo. Scandinavia was thus effectively removed from great-power politics, ending the centuries-old Northern Question, which had been a major arena of conflict throughout the 18th century and the Napoleonic wars.[37]

Neutral Switzerland is the clearest and most familiar example of an intermediary body in the peace settlement. It is important to correct an impression fostered by some Swiss historians that, in restoring and neutralizing the Swiss Confederation in the Vienna settlement, the great powers merely reestablished a traditional Swiss arrangement, with the intention of removing Switzerland entirely from European politics. Although the allies certainly based their work on Swiss tradition, the Swiss Confederation of 1815 was distinctly a great-power accomplishment—

[34] Wolf D. Gruner, "Die belgisch-luxemburgische Frage im Spannungsfeld europäischer Politik 1830-1839," *Francia* 5 (1977), 316.

[35] Johan C. Boogman, *Nederland en de Duitse Bond, 1815-1851*, 2 vols. (Groningen: C. Wolters, 1955).

[36] See, for example, Hermann von der Dunk, *Der deutsche Vormärz und Belgien 1830/48* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1966).

[37] Zernack (fn. 23); Otto Brandt, "Das Problem der 'Ruhe des Nordens' im 18. Jahrhundert," *Historische Zeitschrift* 140 (No. 3, 1929), 550-64; Claude Nordmann, *Grandeur et liberté de la Suède (1660-1792)* (Paris: Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1971).

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something the cantons themselves, riddled by internal rivalries, could never have achieved on their own.[38] Moreover, in guaranteeing the Swiss federal constitution, the allies were not attempting to remove Switzerland from the European states system, but to ensure that the Swiss played certain important roles within it. An independent, neutral, loosely federated Switzerland was intended to be part of the barrier system, to hold the Alpine passes, to provide a bulwark against revolution, and to afford a safe sphere of influence for its neighbors. Including the Swiss constitution in the Final Act of Vienna did not mean that no power could say anything about Swiss affairs, but that no one power could have an exclusive say; all had the right to hold Switzerland to the performance of its international obligations. From 1815 to 1848, Switzerland's neighbors made considerable use of their right of intervention in Switzerland, sometimes illegitimately, sometimes with good reason.

The German Confederation (*Deutscher Bund*) was an even more important intermediary body than Switzerland. The conventional textbook view is that the *Bund* represented a good way of organizing Germany for external defense against France and Russia without making it a threat to its neighbors. For internal purposes, however, it was considered unsatisfactory, since it kept the German territory divided into many small states dominated by Austria and Prussia, who used their control to repress liberalism, constitutionalism, and nationalism. This liberal-nationalist view contains some truth, but also considerable distortion, as scholars have long recognized. For one thing, the main foreign policy problem of Germany was not the external threat from France or Russia, but the internal rivalry between Austria and Prussia. Their 18th-century conflicts and wars had devastated Germany, destroyed all chances for reform in the old Empire, promoted both French and Russian influence in German affairs, and ultimately led to conquest by the French.[39] The partnership between Austria and Prussia and their joint victory in the War of Liberation and the final campaign against France temporarily overcame this rivalry, but did not itself solve the problem. It remained alive during the Congress of Vienna, reaching a climax in the Polish-Saxon question; in 1814-1815, both French and Russian leaders still entertained ideas about regaining their former influence in German affairs by exploiting Austro-Prussian differences. Thus, from the standpoint of the European system, the main function of the German Confederation was to make the problem of Aus-

[38] William Martin, *La Suisse et l'Europe 1813-1814* (Lausanne: Payot, 1931).

[39] Karl O. von Aretin, *Heiliges Römisches Reich 1776-1806*, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1967), and *Vom Deutschen Reich zum Deutschen Bund* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980).

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tro-Prussian rivalry manageable, which it did for almost half a century—a remarkable achievement. The whole of Germany became an intermediary body for Europe generally and for Austria and Prussia in particular. It was neither divided into separate Austrian and Prussian spheres, as Prussia wanted, nor was the Empire restored under Habsburg leadership. Instead, Germany was united into a princely confederation of independent states which Austria and Prussia had to manage jointly. This same approach served to make Germany's other foreign policy problems, also internal in origin, similarly manageable—it settled rivalries and territorial disputes between various smaller states, between estates and princes, between the beneficiaries and the victims of Napoleonic rule, between Catholics and Protestants, and even between different factions of Catholics and Protestants.[40]

It is equally mistaken to assume that the main forces that the German Confederation of 1815 needed to accommodate, but chose instead to repress, were liberal and nationalist ideas and movements stimulated by the French Revolution and the War of Liberation. These ideas were indeed repressed, especially in 1819-1820 and after; but they had only a narrow following in Germany anyway—among some students, intellectuals, and enlightened state officials. The prevailing political sentiment among rulers and masses alike was much more conservative in 1815 than in 1792. The War of Liberation was fought and won overwhelmingly by regular standing armies; as for the people (i.e., the peasants), they either did not rise at all in 1813 or did so mainly for God, king, and local country—not for a free and united Germany.[41] Therefore the main realities of 1792-1813 in Germany with which allied statesmen had to deal—aside from considerable destruction, residual Francophobia, and a heightened aversion to revolution[42]—were the results of the destruction of the old Empire and Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine. The princely revolution of 1803 and after, not the French Revolution of 1789 or the German uprising of 1813, represented the dominant political fact of post-Napoleonic Germany. Lacking even the rudimentary bond of the old Empire and its ideal of government based on law rather than power, Germany now included centralized, territorially integrated states, run by new bureaucra-

[40] Ernst R. Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789*, I, 2d ed. (Stuttgart: E. Kohlhammer, 1967); Enno E. Kraehe, *Metternich's German Policy*, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963-83).

[41] Rudolf Ibbeken, *Preussen 1807-13* (Cologne: Grote, 1970); Jacques Droz, *L'Allemagne et la Révolution française* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1949).

[42] Timothy C. W. Blanning, *The French Revolution in Germany* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).

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cies and supported by a new state-consciousness. These states had already swallowed up the ecclesiastical principalities, mediatized and absorbed the small semi-independent princes, incorporated most free cities, and were working to uproot old estate, religious, local, and tribal loyalties.[43] This not only cleared the stream bed of German history (as German historians say); it also created divisions more than unity, and promoted state patriotism more than German nationalism, at least in the short run.[44] The main task of German statesmen in 1813-1815, rather than satisfying a popular cry for German unity, lay in bridging conflicts, not merely between states, but especially between the old dispossessed and the new *beati possidentes*.

A further problem: although Germany was intended to be the main component of the defensive system against France, neither Austria nor Prussia wanted that direct responsibility. Both tried to put other states on the front line, distancing themselves from France as much as possible. Witness Austria's refusal to take back its former holdings in the Netherlands, its readiness to shed its old Southwest German territories, and its steady rejection of new territory or obligations on the Rhine; recall also Prussia's effort to annex the whole of Saxony and to compensate the King of Saxony with a new kingdom made up partly of Prussian territory on the Rhine. The rest of Germany, in other words, was supposed to be a buffer and intermediary body between France and Austria and Prussia.

As a result, while the *Bund* was certainly designed to hold France in check, it did not take sensible Frenchmen long to realize that it might be penetrated politically, thereby restoring France's old influence. For years after 1815, French diplomats continued to consider Bavaria as France's natural ally, for example; some leading Bavarians, including the King, agreed with them.[45] To be sure, France failed to exploit the opportunities

[43] Karl-Georg Faber, *Die Rheinlande zwischen Restauration und Revolution* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1966); Elisabeth Fehrenbach, *Traditionelle Gesellschaft und revolutionäres Recht* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978); Eberhard Weis, "Der Einfluss der französischen Revolution und des Empire auf die Reformen in den süddeutschen Staaten" *Francia* 1 (1973), 569-83, and "Bayern und Frankreich in der Zeit des Konsulats und des Ersten Empire (1799-1815)" *Historische Zeitschrift* 237 (December 1983), 559-95.

[44] See, for example, Wolfgang Quint, *Souveränitätsbegriff und Souveränitätspolitik in Bayern* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1971); Karl O. von Aretin, *Bayerns Weg zum Souveränen Staat* (Munich: Beck, 1976); and Erwin Hölzle, *Württemberg im Zeitalter Napoleons und der deutschen Erhebung* (Stuttgart and Berlin: W. Kohlhammer, 1937). For evidence of a countervailing force, see Mack Walker, *German Home Towns* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971).

[45] Anton Chroust, ed., *Gesandtschaftsberichte aus München, 1814-1848. Abteilung 1: Die Berichte des französischen Gesandten*, 5 vols. (Munich: Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1935-41); Karl Hammer, *Die französische Diplomatie der Restauration und Deutschland, 1814-1830* (Stuttgart: A. Hiersemann, 1930).

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it had, and German public opinion even in formerly pro-French circles turned nationalist and Francophobe, as proved by the crisis of 1840.[46] Yet, even after France lost its chance to regain its former influence and friends, the *Bund* never threatened France, and actually contributed to its security. Certainly it was a safer arrangement than a Germany united under either German great power, or under both of them. If Frenchmen resented the Confederation, it was for the same reasons they resented the whole settlement of 1815: not because it was a danger to France, but because they somehow considered it an insult and a humiliation.

When all this is added up, it becomes clear that the *Bund* really functioned as a great multipurpose intermediary body in Central Europe. It both linked and separated all the parts of Germany, preserving their individual independence while enabling them to exist in the same space. It separated Germany as a whole from the rest of Europe, preventing the sort of outside intervention common in the 18th century, while linking it to Europe in various ways—to the other great powers, guarantors of the federal constitution through the Final Act of Vienna; to the Netherlands and Denmark, who were part of the *Bund* as owners of Luxemburg and Holstein; to Italy (Istria, Trieste, and the South Tyrol were members); and even to the Slav world (Bohemia and Carinthia). The Prussian and Austrian territories that were not part of the historic Reich (East and West Prussia, Posen, Galicia, Hungary, Dalmatia, Illyria, and Lombardy-Venetia) were not included, however, so that Austria's and Prussia's roles as European great powers were consciously separated from their functions as leaders of Germany. The *Bund* did not unify Germany; that would have been impossible in 1815, and dangerous at any time. But it did a reasonable job of providing for Germany, in Metternich's words, "*Einigkeit ohne Einheit*," concord without union.

In three areas of Europe—Italy, the Balkans, and Poland—the intermediary body interpretation of the 1815 settlement does not seem to work. Even here, however, closer examination alters the initial impression. Italy supposedly came under direct Austrian control in 1815. True, Austria gained Lombardy-Venetia and enjoyed strong dynastic and treaty links to much of the rest of Italy. Metternich used all his diplomatic skill, both in 1814-1815 and later, to try to exclude French and Russian influence. At the same time, Italy was deliberately organized to separate France and Austria, and Austria's leading influence never developed into exclusive control. Various attempts by Metternich to make it so (for ex-

[46] Raymond Poidevin and Heinz-Otto Sieburg, eds., *Aspects des relations franco-allemandes 1830-1848* (Metz: Centre de recherches relations internationales de l'Université de Metz, 1978).

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ample, his efforts to create a *Lega Italica*, an Austrian-led Italian Confederation) failed in the face of Piedmontese and papal resistance.[47] British influence and naval power remained important. The fact that Austria retained the lead in Italy for two decades after 1815 was due not so much to the peace settlement or Austrian power as to the fact that most Italian governments were even more conservative and fearful of revolution than Austria, and sought Austria's help in time of trouble. France had chances to compete successfully, but threw them away. Had Napoleon not come back from Elba and overthrown Louis XVIII in March 1815, the Bourbons would have been restored at Naples under royal French sponsorship, giving France the lead in southern Italy. In this and other ways, Napoleon's last adventure set back French policy in Italy for a generation. In any case, independent entities such as Sardinia-Piedmont and the Papal States functioned as intermediary bodies, separating France and Austria, making it harder for them to go to war (which was of considerable importance in 1831-32), and giving them common problems that they somehow had to approach jointly. By 1831, France and Austria were involved in an international conference over the Roman question. By the mid-1830s, Metternich was trying to limit French influence rather than to exclude it; and by the mid-1840s, he was actively trying to work with France in Italy.

Although the Ottoman Empire in southeastern Europe was not formally included in the peace settlement, it functioned as an intermediary body between Austria and Russia. It is clear why no formal arrangement was reached: after three generations of growing rivalry in the Balkans[48]—a rivalry that reached its most dangerous stage for Austria in 1809-1812 with Russia's attempt to annex the Rumanian Principalities—both great powers found it wiser to leave the issue alone, since their relations were strained enough by other questions. Besides, any formal arrangement, such as a guarantee of Turkish territory, would run afoul of Russia's residual territorial claims on Turkey, as well as of traditional Russian interests, ambitions, and claims to a protectorate over the Orthodox Church in the Balkans. Moreover, throughout the first half of the 19th century, Russia's position vis-à-vis Turkey was far stronger than Austria's—militarily, strategically, and on ethnic and religious grounds. Thus, the only possible basis for general Austro-Russian cooperation in

[47] Karl Grossman, "Metternichs Plan eines italienischen Bundes," *Historische Blätter* 4 (1931), 37-76; Paul W. Schroeder, *Metternich's Diplomacy at Its Zenith, 1820-1823* (Austin; University of Texas Press, 1962); Alan Reinerman, *Metternich and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich*, I (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1980).

[48] Karl A. Roider, Jr., *Austria's Eastern Question, 1700-1790* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

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Europe (wanted by both sides) was conservative nonintervention in Turkey. So long as Russia was content to preserve the Ottoman Empire as a weak, inoffensive neighbor (which was most of the time), and to accept Austria as a junior partner in this, the two got along well. Whenever Russia seemed headed toward destroying Turkey or dominating it exclusively, it caused an Austro-Russian breach which, as in 1853-1855, could lead to the brink of war. The Balkans served as an intermediary body for other powers as well. In the new kingdom of Greece after 1830, Britain, France, and Russia competed and cooperated as supervisors,[49] while internal Ottoman crises in the 1830s and 1840s made Turkey the central object of Concert diplomacy.

Poland does not fit the general pattern of 1815, of intermediary bodies separating and linking great powers. It was partitioned in 1772-1795 by Russia, Austria, and Prussia, although these powers knew this would cause trouble by giving them long common frontiers; in 1814-1815, it was re-partitioned in an even more dangerous way, bringing Russia deep into Central Europe. Everyone knew that the partition of Poland violated the rules and made Poland a problem for Europe. Many Austrian leaders admitted privately that the original partition had been a great mistake, and Castlereagh and Talleyrand argued in principle for restoring an independent Poland. But no one really believed in this possibility, and for good reasons. The weaknesses that had promoted Poland's demise in the 18th century had grown worse through war, devastation, and internal divisions. More important still, in 1815 an independent Poland would not have been a barrier to Russian expansion, but an integral part of it, just as an independent Ukraine would have served German imperialism if Germany had won the First World War. The plan Prince Adam Czartoryski presented to Alexander I in 1813 proposed, in fact, to join the kingdom of Poland permanently to Russia and to make it Russia's junior partner in dominating Central Europe.

Poland thus was not restored for much the same reasons as those for which the Holy Roman Empire was not restored: the attempt could not have succeeded, and would have constituted a dangerous power play by one state against the others. What Russia and Prussia actually tried to do in relation to Poland and Saxony was bad enough. The only way the Polish lands could serve intermediary functions after 1815 was the one actually employed: each of the partitioning powers promised to respect Polish nationality and culture and to grant its Polish territories a separate

[49] John A. Petropoulos, *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

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administration and institutions. The arrangements made for this purpose were unsatisfactory from the outset, and the situation became worse with time and Polish insurrections. Yet the provisions were not worthless, at least at first, and contributed something to the survival of Polish nationality.[50] So far as international politics was concerned, while Poland represented a European problem and a danger to peace, especially in the revolts of 1830-1831 and 1863, in a curious and tragic way it was also a source of stability—the cement that helped hold the Holy Alliance powers together while simultaneously keeping them potential rivals.

Even apparent exceptions like Poland, then, show how the 1815 settlement involved a network of intermediary bodies in Europe, designed to inhibit great-power conflict and to promote flexible interaction. The system did not make the smaller powers of Europe simply the tools and pawns of the great ones, as some have believed. One of the more striking aspects of the 1813-1815 negotiations is the genuine concern of the allies to ensure the independence of all states, including the smaller ones. The charge of greedy expansionism fits some smaller states (the United Netherlands, Bavaria, Sweden, Sardinia-Piedmont) better than any of the bigger ones. Nor did the European Concert and great-power solidarity, when they existed, mean that the desires and interests of small states could be ignored. Small states could get away with much resistance and obstruction, even in the face of united European pressure. Witness how Bavaria and Württemberg resisted the great powers in 1814-1816 with regard to the *Bund* and territorial questions, and how Holland and Belgium did so from 1831 to 1839. There has never been an era in European history before 1815-1848 or since that time when a small state could feel so confident that it would not be the target of conquest or annexation by some great power. This respect for small-state independence was not based on legitimist dogma, self-denial, or moral sentiments, but on a healthy realism—the recognition that buffers and barriers were needed all round, not just against France, and that the independence of great powers was intertwined with that of lesser states. In the 18th century, by contrast, smaller states had been pawns on the great-power chessboard, continual objects of compensation, exchange, and conquest, while those intermediary bodies that were in existence (the Holy Roman Empire, Scandinavia, Poland, Italy, Turkey) were spongy, riddled with internal weaknesses and rivalries, and thus were vulnerable targets for takeover or arenas of all-out conflict.

[50] Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795-1918* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974).

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V

If this essay has succeeded in showing that real systemic change occurred in international politics between the 18th and 19th centuries and in identifying some of its structural elements, it still affords no basis for hard conclusions or sweeping generalizations. Historians and political scientists will undoubtedly want to have many questions answered, challenges met, and details clarified before they accept the *prima facie* case made here. Still, if this thesis adds something to the political scientists' fund of concepts and models for analyzing international politics, and encourages diplomatic historians to concentrate more on systemic factors and systemic change, it will not be useless. Moreover, the central problems with which the 19th-century system had to cope are not unique to its time; they may be irreducible constitutive elements of international politics in any era. How to ensure the security and status of great powers while curbing great-power hegemony and imperialism; how to shield the overall system and its central power-political relationships from shocks emanating from peripheral conflicts; how to reconcile the independence and security of smaller states with the inevitable determination of great powers to exercise influence beyond their borders and to protect their wider interests—these are problems that statesmen still face every day, and presumably always will. More light on the reason for the 19th century's relative success may not be irrelevant to today's concerns.

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OF SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES, AND TERRITORIALITY:
An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System

By FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL*

I. Introduction

CHANGES in the function of boundaries throughout history help to illuminate differences in the nature and patterns of interactions of different domestic and international systems. Such a clarification has become important for the analysis of international relations at a time when the world system appears to be characterized by two conflicting trends. On the one hand, we observe the virtually universal recognition of territorial sovereignty as the organizing principle of international politics. On the other hand, because of the growth of transnational relations and interdependencies, there is a tendency toward erosion of the exclusivity associated with the traditional notion of territoriality. This disjunction between the organizing principles and social reality creates dilemmas for conflict management. An investigation of these tensions and of the varying patterns in which they manifest themselves in different international systems is therefore of historical as well as analytical interest.

In this article, I intend to lay the groundwork for such a historical and comparative analysis of international systems. An examination of shifts in the functions of boundaries is particularly helpful for a better understanding of the origins and evolution of the present territorial state system. Without intending to bring back the old controversy of whether such changes can be taken as indicators of either the demise or the revival of the territorial state,[1] I maintain that territoriality, like property, is not

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[1] See, for example, the debate in the late sixties focusing on the probable consequences of various integration efforts in Europe and Latin America. For a critical appraisal, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete, The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe," in Joseph Nye, ed., *International Regionalism* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), 177-230.

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a simple concept, but comprises a variety of social arrangements that have to be examined in greater detail. For that purpose, I first investigate the function of boundaries in nonterritorial and territorial social organizations and give reasons for the transition from one form of organizing societies to the other. Second, within the class of territorial orders, I distinguish between empires and the concept of territoriality in a state system. Finally, I will examine changes in the relationships and exchanges between international systems and their environment by contrasting the function of boundaries in territorially based orders with those based on functional regimes.

For purposes of analysis, I shall focus on three types of exchanges that are mediated by boundaries. On the most basic level there is the exchange between the unit and its environment. (The concept of environment serves as a residual category in that it comprises all the relevant factors that have not been subsumed under the concept of unit.) Significant shifts in the function of boundaries occur with the differentiation of the environment. A second type of exchange is that between the unit and other units (inter-unit exchange). The nature and scope of inter-unit exchanges is decisively influenced by the actor who maintains the boundaries of the unit. Consequently, there is a third type of exchange—that between the center of a unit and its periphery. By tracing the nature of these exchanges and by analyzing the various interaction effects among them, we can appraise the role of boundaries in different social systems—domestic as well as international.

Section II deals with territorial and nonterritorial social organizations and the function of boundaries in each. Within the territorial category, those systems that are based on the mutual recognition of rights and acknowledged common practices are distinguished from "imperial" orders. The importance of these conceptual distinctions is shown by two brief case studies. The first examines Mongol society, which allows us to trace the changes in the function of boundaries when societies move from a nomadic (nonterritorial) to a sedentary (territorial) form of social organization. The second case study is a comparative examination of imperial boundaries, exemplified by the relations of the Chinese, Roman, and British Empires with outsiders who were never accorded equal status. By contrasting the patterns of interaction in imperial orders and in the state system, we can show that the function of boundaries is significantly different.

In Section III, the conceptual distinctions developed thus far are used to discuss techniques of conflict management in the state system. Two strategies are examined in particular. One is the movement of the *location*

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of the boundary; the other concerns the manipulation of the *function* of boundaries through untying the bundle of rights conventionally associated with full territorial sovereignty. The first strategy or technique was characteristic of territorial adjustments during the classical balance-of-power period; the untying of sovereign rights through imposed neutralization, the creation of suzerainties, buffer states, spheres of influence or preponderance, and so forth, was used primarily by European powers in order to manage competition in the colonial world.

In Section IV, I investigate the creation of spheres of special responsibility in the contemporary system. I argue that the impossibility of reviving spheres of influence under modern conditions was one of the contributing causes of the cold war, and that the failure to agree on the meaning of spheres of abstention led to the demise of détente. In addition, I discuss transborder resource arrangements and functional regimes and their implications for a theory of international relations.

Finally, in Section V, I draw some preliminary conclusions as to the power and parsimony needed in a systems approach to international relations.

II. Territoriality and the Social Formation of States

In contemporary social science, groups are often classified either as communities based on kinship or as communities built upon the recognition of mutual rights subject to a common law within a given territory. This distinction between tribal and territorial communities may be empirically and conceptually difficult to make, however.[2] After all, even nomads do not wander aimlessly without fixed territory.

> The primitive nomad who depends for survival on what he can find . . . must know the territory in which he roams: locales of water holes, where certain plants grow, the habits of game, etc. . . . Thus, each nomadic band establishes rights over the territory within which it migrates although its members may visit bands of other territories.[3]

In such nomadic communities, the right to move prevails over the right to camp, and "ownership means in effect the title to a cycle of migration."[4] Lattimore studied the implications of these forms of allocating

[2] On kinship or "primitive" societies see, e.g., Henry Sumner Maine, *Ancient Law* (London: John Murray, 1866); Lewis Henry Morgan, *Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization* (New York: Holt, 1877). For a critique of this dichotomy, see Robert Lowie, *Primitive Society* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949).

[3] T. S. Murty, *Frontiers, a Changing Concept* (New Delhi: Palit & Palit, 1978), 50.

[4] See, e.g., the extensive discussion of "nomadism" in Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), chap. 4; quote at 66.

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territorial rights of use for the social formation of the Mongols.[5] He followed the change of territorial use from common, tribally owned land administered by a prince to the establishment of fixed private ownership through the introduction of the monastic rule of Lamaism. The social consequences were startling. The original Mongol tribes were never static because disputes over the right of movement led to the splitting and coalescence of small clan-like groups. This allowed an exceptional leader like Genghis Khan to gather into his tribe those who, in search of protection, had fled from their abusive or ineffective overlords. Fundamental changes in the balance of power could be effected through such a gathering of followers by a leader.

The allocation of fixed property, on the other hand, prevented the process of agglomeration and led to the parceling and repartitioning of tribal territory. The emphasis on fixed property first introduced by Lamaist monasteries led to further important internal as well as external changes. The former tribal customs emphasized mobility and forbade the digging of wells and intensive agriculture in order to adjust the Mongol way of life to the steppe rather than to the marginal areas that could have sustained a mixed form of economy. Exclusive property titles, however, led to the ascendancy of wealth over mobility and drew the Mongols closer to China through trade. This development brought them under the influence of the Manchus, whose vassals virtually all of them became—especially when the Chinese intervened successfully in church affairs and divided northern from western Mongols.

Most Western travelers in the 19th century commented on the peaceful character of the once warlike Mongol people; Chinese official writings and Western observers attributed this development to the teachings of Lamaism. Matters were more complicated, however: some of the bloodiest wars between northern and western Mongols had been conveniently neglected in these accounts.[6] Lamaism had not only divided the Mongols and broken their ability to invade the Chinese Empire, but the settlements following the introduction of fixed property had also abolished the mobility that had been one of the strategic assets for raiding the border. The development of territoriality in the new sense made a more fixed relationship with China necessary. Unable to unite and maintain an independent basis of power, the Mongols became suzerains of the Manchu emperors. Similar arrangements could be found all along the Chinese

[5] Owen Lattimore, *The Mongols of Manchuria* (New York: John Day, 1934).

[6] For a further discussion of Lamaism and its impact on Mongol affairs, see Lattimore (fn. 4), 86-97. For an account of the wars among the northern and western Mongols, see Gavin Hambly, ed., *Central Asia* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1969), chaps. 7, 9, 11, and esp. 17.

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frontier; only the clash with Russia necessitated a more precise definition of the relationship between the suzerains and Russia. Territoriality again altered its meaning as the boundary mediated a different type of exchange.

The treaty of Peking (1860) between Russia and Imperial China was an important step in this direction. It fixed the boundary as "following the mountains, great rivers and the present lines of Chinese permanent pickets." This delimitation still left a substantial part of the Sinkiang region on the Chinese side, but the Imperial government did not decide to include Sinkiang formally in the Chinese Empire until 1884.[7] Even after that date, it was still treated as an "outer region" inhabited by "barbarians" over which largely indirect control was exercised. According to Wheeler, Sinkiang remained substantially independent of governmental control by Peking until the 1940s.[8] The governors appear to have determined all pertinent internal and external policies. Thus, although the Western state system imposed a particular mode of territorial rule upon China's relationships with its clients and the rest of the world, the old social formation of China prevented the new international boundary from serving its function. Local leaders and Russian and Chinese clients made the attribution of the area to either state problematic in spite of its internationally settled boundaries. By the end of World War I, the region was ruled by various warlords who—as the case of Sheng Shih-tsai shows—were more sympathetic to the Soviets than to the National Chinese government under Chiang Kai-shek.[9] The region was firmly in Chinese hands only after the Chinese Revolution. Still, the first treaties signed between the new China and Moscow protected Soviet interests in the area by setting up joint oil- and mineral-exploiting companies in Sinkiang; the Soviets had a majority vote.[10] Stalin had used the same arrangement quite effectively in Eastern Europe in order to cement his political influence over Soviet client states. The arrangement with China continued until 1955.

[7] For a fascinating account of the freewheeling rule of the local warlord Yakub Beg who attempted to fend off Russian, English, and Chinese influence until he was defeated by the Chinese general Tso Tsung-tang in 1878, see Jack Chen, *The Sinkiang Story* (New York: Macmillan, 1977), chap. 6.

[8] For a general discussion, see Surya Sharma, *International Boundary Disputes and International Law* (Bombay: Tripathi, 1976), 194 ff, and Geoffrey Wheeler, "Sinkiang and the Soviet Union," *The China Quarterly* (November-December 1963), 57 ff.

[9] See Chen (fn. 7), chaps. 8-10, for an extensive discussion of the fluid and often shifting political situation under the rule of Sheng Shih-tsai who transferred his sympathies from the Nationalist Chinese government to Stalin, but in 1941 began to persecute Communists with Russian leanings (betting on a defeat of Stalin), only to seek a rapprochement in 1944.

[10] See P. P. Karan, "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute," *Journal of Geography*, 63 (1964), 220-42, at 221.

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The case of the Mongols has significant implications for our inquiry. If boundaries are important because of their role in mediating exchanges, a closer look at the *types of relationships* mediated by boundaries will prove instructive. At the most general level, boundaries are points of contact as well as of separation between a social system and an environment. As Luhmann remarks:

> They reduce the points with the environment, thus allowing the internal conditioning of various relations with the environment. Only where boundaries do exist, relations between system and environment can increase their complexity, their differentiation and their controlled mutability. Boundaries are permeable to causality; they only make sure that each causal process involves the entire system.[11]

The natural boundary of a mountain crest or a watershed that separates societies is natural only because such areas are usually sparsely populated and bereft of natural resources. Thus, exchanges between societies or political systems and the environment are minimized, and therefore the potential for conflict is smaller. But even the small number of exchanges with the environment generally depends upon the social formation of the societies involved. Kingdon Ward remarked that

> obviously a pass of 15,000 feet is nothing to a Tibetan who habitually lives at 12,000 feet altitude. The Tibetan is not stopped by physical but climate barriers, and no boundary pillars are needed to make him respect these. His frontier is the verge of the grass land, the fringe of the pine forests, the 50 inch rainfall contour beyond which no salt is (until indeed you come to the sea) or the 75% saturated atmosphere. The barrier may be invisible; but it is a more formidable one to a Tibetan than the Great Himalayan ranges. If he crosses it he must revolutionise his mode of life.[12]

It is thus important to distinguish between two types of exchanges: system-environment, and system-other systems.

> As long as the contacts with the people on the other side were rare, it was possible to manage relations with a relatively low level of understanding. The others were "barbarians," primitive, etc., which could be classified as part of the wild "environment" because not much came of them. . . . Long-range contacts were essentially reserved to higher strata and traders and supplied the system with "strange" objects and were thus only strengthening the awareness of a deep difference between system and environment.[13]

[11] Niklas Luhmann, "Territorial Borders as System Boundaries," in Raimondo Strassoldo and Giovanni delli Zoti, eds., *Cooperation and Conflict in Border Areas* (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1982), 235-45, at 236.

[12] Kingdon Ward, "Explorations on the Burma-Tibet Frontier," *Geographical Journal* 80 (1932), 465-83, as quoted in J.R.V. Prescott, *Boundaries and Frontiers* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 106.

[13] Luhmann (fn. 11), 238.

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When contacts increase and political and economic interdependencies are recognized, a differentiation arises between inter-system and system-environment relations. Exchanges between systems (states) are increasingly regulated by normative structures, even in cases of interstate violence. Thus, a "negative community"—one not united by a common purpose or a vision of the good life, but only by common practices and the mutual recognition of rights—comes into existence.[14] Boundaries become lines (although their exact demarcation must wait until better means of geodesy develop) instead of remaining zonal frontiers. The importance of center-periphery relations becomes visible and the task of boundary maintenance presents itself.

In the European context, we see these patterns in the development of the state system and in the emergence of the classical conception of boundaries that define exclusive zones of jurisdiction. The Treaty of the Pyrenees, which set up a joint commission for deciding where the exact boundary line between Spain and France would be drawn, inaugurated the first official boundary in the modern sense (1659).[15] Although similar attempts to determine boundaries were recorded earlier (e.g., Philip le Bel's attempt in 1312 to determine the boundaries of Flanders),[16] the largely personalistic political organization of the time made such attempts at delineation a different matter. Under feudal rule, loyalty was owed, depending on circumstances, to various overlords simultaneously. Thus, although the limits of the realm were quite well known, there was a tendency to obfuscate the boundaries of the kingdom. Nobles made war on their own and had pretensions on domains in other realms; interventions and counter-interventions were the order of the day, preventing the kingdoms from acting like unitary states.[17]

In the case of the German Empire before the Thirty Years' War, the lack of clear demarcation of a public realm for decision-making purposes was paralleled by the confused status of the imperial powers with respect to "external affairs." According to C. V. Wedgwood, a population of about "twenty-one million depended for its government on more than two thousand separate authorities," and although free tenants and

[14] I use the term "negative community" for denoting a situation in which there is an agreement on common practices and rights, but not on common purpose. For further discussion, see Terry Nardin, *Law, Morality and the Relations of States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

[15] For the argument that the European state system depended upon a variety of conventions and institutional rules, see Maurice Keens-Soper, "The Practice of a State System," in Michael Donelan, ed., *The Reason of States* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 25-45.

[16] Sharma (fn. 8), 14.

[17] For further discussion of this point, see Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), and Joseph Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

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knights might form federations, there were still "over three hundred potentially conflicting authorities in Germany."[18]

Although the Emperor was nominally charged with preserving "peace and justice" in the realm and with defending it against external aggression, neither the preservation of security nor the administration of justice and peace fell clearly within his governmental powers. Nominally, the seven Electors were in control of the Empire, since an emperor could not be chosen nor a Diet convened without their consent. In addition, their decrees had legal force with or without imperial approval. The effectiveness of their edicts was limited, however, not only by the absence of state institutions to enforce them, but also by the innumerable privileges that exempted particular legal persons from various types of duties.[19] Further peculiarities abounded, including immunity from jurisdiction of the imperial court (*Reichskammergericht*) in case of controversies arising out of the execution of laws.[20]

The different meanings of boundaries in such a political system thus become clear. The King of Bohemia, although a legitimate elector, was not entitled to participate in the meetings of the Electors' circle since his kingdom lay outside the confines of the Empire. The Elector of Brandenburg was a member of the Empire as a prince of Brandenburg—but, as ruler of Prussia since 1618, a vassal of the King of Poland. Similarly, the Duke of Lorraine, which was nominally within the Empire, also owed fealty to the King of France. Thus, even though the Hapsburg family had secured the imperial crown for generations through the control of votes within the Electors' circle, the Emperor's power was virtually nonexistent except within his own possessions. The approval of the Electors' circle had to be sought for imperial initiatives such as the convening of the Diet and for any new tax, alliance, or declaration of war. The Emperor was left without any right to independent action even in serious emergencies.

> Fiscal and military organization was as little in imperial control as legislation. For these purposes the Empire had been divided into ten circles, each with its local Diet and elected president. Should a circle be attacked, the president could appeal to the two neighboring circles to assist him, and if the three together were still unable to defend themselves, a further two might be called in. If this did not ease the situation, the five circles might then ask the Elector of Mainz to call the leading members of the Diet to Frankfort, a form of meeting without imperial consent which was called a

[18] C. V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years' War*, paperback ed. (London: Methuen, 1981), 34ff.

[19] The preservation of these freedoms was originally the task of parliaments, which were largely complaint and adjudicative institutions, not bodies for legislation.

[20] On the function of the *Reichskammergericht*, see Rudolf Smend, *Das Reichskammergericht: Geschichte und Verfassung* (Aalen, Germany: Scientia, 1965).

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> *Deputationstag*. If this meeting agreed that the attacked district needed further help, they in turn appealed to the Emperor for a general Diet. By this amazing procedure it was possible for one-half of the Empire to be fully engaged in civil or external war before anyone was bound so much as to inform the Emperor.[21]

Only exclusive sovereignty made defense and internal administration the primary and increasingly exclusive task of the central authorities. This development illustrates the complexity of the concept of sovereignty. It denotes internal hierarchy as well as external equality. The similarities and differences between boundaries in a state system and those developing in the frontier zones of empires are striking; they show the usefulness of separating center-periphery relations from those of inter-system interactions and system-environment exchanges. Although the Great Wall of China and the Roman *limes* appear to be examples of linear boundaries, they are not boundaries in the modern sense. Owen Lattimore points out that

> . . . the concept of a man-made Great Wall . . . was more a product of the kind of state created within China than of the kind of pressure against China from the steppe. Naturally enough, it is the military aspect of the Great Wall that has commanded most attention, and this has distorted its historical significance.[22]

Considering the immense military strength of Ch'in at the end of the period of the warring states, the border changes of the Great Wall were not very extensive when compared to the territories of the former feudal kingdoms that Ch'in had united, nor was there any imminent menace by northern barbarians. Most of the military threats came from the still unconquered south. The destruction of feudalism resulted from Ch'in's deliberate policy of exterminating the nobility and of converting feudal serfs into peasants who owed rent to their overlord and taxes to the state. The nobles could no longer use serfs as soldiers and were only entitled to rent; the peasants could now be approached directly by the state for taxes and conscripted labor without the intercession of the feudal lord. With these changes, the defense of the boundaries became the task of the central authorities. Imperial boundaries did not operate to demarcate areas of exclusive jurisdiction on the basis of shared practices and mutual recognition of rights, but to keep the environment safe through the establishment of clients and the control of trade.

Similarly, the Roman Empire conceived the *limes* not as a boundary, but as a temporary stopping place where the potentially unlimited expan-

[21] Wedgwood (fn. 18), 36.
[22] Lattimore (fn. 4), 434.

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sion of the *Pax Romana* had come to a halt.[23] The political and administrative domain often extended beyond the wall[24] or stayed inside it at a considerable distance. Boundaries—i.e., legally relevant distinctions—existed only in private legal relations, where they governed property rights. The *ager publicus*, or public domain, had no boundaries; it ended somewhere, but this end was not specifiable by means of a legally relevant line. (The expression used was *fines esse*.) The boundary was therefore essentially a floating zone within which tributary tribes as well as Roman legions with local barbarian recruits were used to keep the peace.[25] Other barbarian tribes were to be slowly acculturated and integrated, or subjugated and suppressed. Caesar's political plan, expressed in his *Commentaries*[26] as well as in Plutarch,[27] not only represents his personal political thinking but the policy consensus in Rome—at least until Commodus: to conquer the world up to the "earth-surrounding ocean." After Commodus, these plans came to naught and Rome developed client relationships with the northern Germanic tribes until internal decay and the crushing defense burdens brought the imperial organization to its knees.

A closer investigation of such client relationships as well as the similarities and differences in managing intersocietal affairs in the state system is now appropriate.

III. Boundaries and the Management of the International System

The distinction between frontiers and boundaries, as well as the examination of how boundaries function under conditions of various social formations, is particularly helpful for understanding some issues of conflict management in international relations. Basically, two classes of techniques were available: management of the *types* of exchanges mediated by boundaries, and manipulation of the *location* of the boundaries. The latter was characteristic of the European balance-of-power system that attempted to "preserve the equilibrium in Europe"[28] through territorial

[23] This thesis has been put forward most eloquently by Paul de Lapradelle, *La Frontière* (Paris: Les Editions Internationales, 1928). For some important modifications of Lapradelle's thesis, see *Studien zu den Militärgrenzen Roms*, Vorträge des 6. Internationalen Limes Kongresses in Süddeutschland (Cologne-Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 1967).

[24] See, e.g., the extensive discussion of Roman boundary arrangements in Franz Altheim, *Niedergang der Alten Welt*, 2 vols. (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klosterman, no date), II, chaps. 2 and 3.

[25] *Ibid.*, chap. 4.

[26] Julius Caesar, *De bello gallico* (*Commentaries*), trans. by John Warrington (New York: Dutton, 1953).

[27] Plutarch, *Vitae Caesarum* (New York: Heritage Press, 1941), chap. 58, sec. 6.

[28] This was the formula in the preamble to the Treaty of Utrecht, which ended the War of Spanish Succession (1713).

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gains and divisions such as the division of Poland and the territorial adjustments at the Congress of Vienna.[29] The former was employed most consistently around the edges of the various European empires that subjugated the colonial world. Institutions such as buffers, protectorates, spheres of interest (or influence), suzerainties, and neutral zones were commonly used to impose European rule on more or less recalcitrant "locals" and to manage potential conflicts with other expanding European powers;[30] as in Europe, the institutions of servitude and imposed neutralization (rather than division of territory) also played a role.

With the abolition of the colonial frontiers, many of the lines formerly marking off spheres of interest became permanent boundaries of successor states; some of the present boundary disputes result from such spheric agreements. The dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the Indian-Chinese boundary problem concerning the meaning and understandings underlying the McMahon line in Tibet (dividing Tibet into two spheres but acknowledging the "suzerainty" of China), are cases in point.[31] Nevertheless, some parallels or spheric boundaries, such as the 49th parallel in North America, are still in existence and serve as functioning boundaries at present.

Why have some meridians, designed primarily as markers indicating agreements in principle for uncharted territory, become boundaries without engendering conflict, and why have others not? One or more of the following conditions seem to have helped in mitigating potential disputes. First, most of the spheric boundaries still in existence are in deserts or polar regions. The maintenance of such lines can be explained in terms of the costs of demarcation in an uncharted and hostile environment. Second, straight lines persisted when a colonial power gained possession of adjacent territory that was once marked off as lying in some other power's sphere of influence. Former spheric demarcations therefore became internal administrative boundaries and only later, through state succession, international boundaries. The Egypt-Sudan, Tanganyika-Kenya, and Botswana-South West Africa borders are cases in point. The acceptance of the 49th parallel as the boundary between Canada and the United States has a different explanation. Jefferson advocated this line in 1818 on the basis of a putative agreement between the Hudson's Bay Company and French Canada. This proposal was acceptable to England precisely

[29] See, e.g., the various compensation schemes of the Congress of Vienna, in Edward Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: Norton, 1967), chap. 9.

[30] For further discussion, see H. Duncan Hall, *Mandates, Dependencies, and Trusteeships* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1948), chap. 1, "The International Frontier."

[31] See J.R.V. Prescott, H. J. Collier and D. F. Prescott, *Frontiers of Asia and Southeast Asia* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1977), chap. 18.

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because the British had wanted that boundary since 1697, but it had never won the acceptance of the French.

Most of the time, however, former demarcation lines marking off the spheres of European power rivalry have been the cause of complicated arrangements. For instance, the treaty that established the Anglo-German sphere of influence in Africa in 1890 specifically provided for future adjustments in accordance with local requirements.[32] Consequently, the boundaries that emerged between Malawi and Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda, and Kenya and Tanzania show alterations (or are still in dispute).

The other method—the imposition of a special regime on a zone on the frontier—has given rise to patterns of interaction that are quite different from those between the sovereign territorial regimes of Europe. For example, in the 19th century the Balkans represented a "frontier zone" in which Austrian, Russian, and British influence met, and which could not be effectively dealt with by the nominal power, the Ottoman Empire. At that time, Turkey was not considered a European state; it only came to be regarded as a "civilized" nation, accepting the common practices and mutually recognized rights of the European state system, after the Crimean War. The Treaty of Adrianople (1829) gave the Tsar, as protector of the Christians, a right of intervention in certain Ottoman possessions, a circumstance that led to the Crimean War. Later on, the Bosnian crisis of 1908 was the result of the incorporation of the nominally Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Austrian Empire, although Austria had "administered" these provinces since 1878.

On the lowest level of formalization is the "sphere of interest," which is either backed by formal or informal agreements among competitor states alone (when "the locals do not matter"), or by additional arrangements with the local authorities. As to a sphere of influence, according to Lord Curzon, "no exterior power but one may reassert itself in the territory so described."[33] Spheres of influence have therefore also been called "semi-suzerainties." Other arrangements, such as the institution of a protectorate, or (full) suzerainty, or condominia, were also developed. The tripartite condominium between Germany, Britain, and the United States over Samoa, and the Anglo-French arrangements in Sudan and the New Hebrides, are examples of such joint administrations. The term

[32] Art. IV, as quoted in K. C. McEwen, *International Boundaries of East Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 178 ff. An example is the shift of the boundary from the shore to the middle of Lake Jipe on the recommendation of a boundary commission working in 1904-1906, which modified the original agreement between Germany and Britain (1893); this line has become the modern Kenya-Tanzania boundary.

[33] Lord Curzon, *Frontiers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 42.

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"sphere of influence" appears to have entered the vocabulary of European diplomacy only in the late 19th century. It is somewhat ironic that this term originally was used by Russia to declare its *disinterest* in controlling Afghanistan. Count Gorchakov is reported to have assured Lord Clarendon in 1869 that "Afghanistan lay completely outside the sphere within which Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence."[34]

The application of this device to Africa during the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 resulted in a relatively uncomplicated division of Africa among the colonial powers; they thus acquired vast territories without having to perfect their title through effective occupation and administration of the vast hinterlands to their colonial enclaves.[35] Since these areas were technically *terra nullius* (i.e., they belonged to nobody), considerable conflict could have developed from the inchoate titles in the absence of a multilateral agreement.[36]

A slightly different problem arose when the European powers faced a local state that, on one hand, could not effectively resist foreign penetration but, on the other, could not be wholly absorbed within one exclusive sphere of influence. For such purposes, "spheres of preponderance" were designed; they nominally preserved the integrity of the country, but allocated influence on an exclusive basis for certain areas or zones. An example of such an arrangement is the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 concerning Persia. Originally this idea had been floated by Salisbury precisely in order to preserve the integrity of Persia; the practical implication, however, was the division of a nominally independent state into exclusive spheres of influence. Keal describes Persian affairs after the 1907 convention:

> Although both signatories had affirmed their intention to maintain the independence and integrity of Persia and to allow equal facilities for trade to all nations, that was not what happened in practice. The two powers sent a joint note to the Persian government, declaring that they would refuse to sanction loans from other powers if these loans involved granting concessions to any other power or their subjects contrary to Russian or British po-

[34] *Ibid.*; see also G. N. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question* (London: Frank Cass, 1967), 326 ff.

[35] Although the principle of contiguity was virtually discounted in establishing a valid title in the *Island of Palmas* decision, Lauterpacht has shown that there is a sound core to this doctrine. For the Palmas decision, see Louis Henkin and others, eds., *International Law, Cases and Materials* (Minneapolis: West, 1980), 256-62. On contiguity, see Hersh Lauterpacht, "Sovereignty over Submarine Areas," *British Yearbook of International Law* 27 (1950), 376-433.

[36] This was the reason for the Latin American doctrine of *uti possidetis*, which foreclosed attempts of other countries to establish title to sparsely administered or even unknown parts of their respective territories. For further discussion, see Friedrich Kratochwil, Paul Rohrlich, and Harpreet Mahajan, *Peace and Disputed Sovereignty* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), case studies on the Beagle Channel and Peru-Ecuador.

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litical and strategic interest. Persia protested, both about this and the Anglo-Russian Agreement, whereupon Petrograd and London reacted by warning other powers against taking up Persia's cause.[37]

Surveying the range of various frontier arrangements in 1945, Duncan Hall found the following rather surprising (but not exhaustive) set of mandates, international regimes, trusteeships, and so forth:

> reading from south to north, . . . : the mandates (now trusteeships) of Ruanda Burundi and Tanganyika; the Uganda Protectorate; rivalries and spheres of influence over Abyssinia; Eritrea, in turn Turkish, Egyptian, Italian, and now a projected international trusteeship; rivalries of Britain and France over Egypt and the valley of the Nile culminating in the Fashoda incident; the condominium of the Sudan; the former condominiums and protectorate over Egypt; the neutralized and demilitarized Suez Canal, with its international regime; the mandates over Transjordan, Palestine, and Syria; the projected international trusteeship regime for Jerusalem; the checkered history of Alexandretta, in turn Turkish territory, League mandate, international regime, and again Turkish territory. As we shall see, the line of phenomena of the international frontier continues historically through Anatolia, along the Straits, through the Balkans, and thence on to the Baltic and even to the Arctic.[38]

Finally, there were neutral zones and buffer states, which allowed the local inhabitants considerable autonomy. Neutral zones stopped functioning when local refugees or even brigands used the lack of a strong internal or external authority for their own purposes. The neutral zone between the British and German territories of the Gold Coast and Togo had to be abolished in 1899 for that reason. All such areas without political authority were set aside in modern times when the exclusivity of territorial rule became more and more important. Thus, the neutral zone between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was divided up equally between these states in 1965.[39]

A good example of a buffer state is Afghanistan, which was created to separate British and Russian influence more effectively. Having failed in 1879 to impose a protectorate upon the resisting tribes, the British, with Russian consent, persuaded the Emir of Afghanistan to accept sovereignty over Vakhan, thereby creating the curious extension of Afghan territory toward China. To a large extent, the treaty of 1907 ended the rivalries of these European powers in that area. In a similar vein, Siam was successful in defending its autonomy against direct interventions by becoming a "neutral" in the British-French contest over Indochina.

[37] Paul Keal, *Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance* (London: Macmillan, 1984), 31.
[38] Hall (fn. 30), 44.
[39] See S. H. Amin, *International and Legal Problems in the Gulf* (London: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1981), 124.

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As in Europe, neutralization was contingent upon the agreement of the Great Powers as well as upon the difficulty or costliness of extending the imperial boundaries.[40] This was the case when the territory in question was effectively administered by some sort of government that could prevent easy penetration. Otherwise, various client arrangements had to be developed in order to prevent the excluded states from invading, or—in cases where the border people were poorly organized—to prevent internal pressure from colonists, traders, military careerists, and others from involving the imperial state in further expansion at great cost. The social formation of the imperial state is therefore as important as that of the outer "barbarians" or tribes. We find historical examples for such imperial expansion due to the activities of traders and entrepreneurs in the machinations of Rhodes and Luederitz, who extended British and German influence in Africa by forcing their governments to protect their private acquisitions. The debate concerning the causes of imperialism and the arguments that "empire does not pay" are familiar. The acquisition of Texas in the American frontier setting also shows the extension of influence originally brought about by private initiative.

The dynamics created by this clash of internal and external factors can be seen in Britain's policy in India. In the case of the British Northwest Frontier, London vacillated between a "closed-border" policy and a "forward" policy. The closed-border policy involved strict patrols of the border by the British, negotiations limited to representatives of transborder societies, and British insistence on the right of supervising and controlling transborder affairs. This policy was usually accompanied by an otherwise noninterventionist stance toward tribal affairs, and punctuated by occasional punitive expeditions when the security of British India was threatened. The forward policy, on the other hand, as exemplified by the Sandeman system of consultation and more active intervention in tribal affairs, offered arbitration and subsidies in order to keep the peace while not discouraging contacts between the subjects and the outsiders.[41]

IV. Unspoken Rules, Networks, and Regimes

After a survey of a variety of forms by which states have tried to modify the exclusionary nature of territorial sovereignty and thereby to manage their relations, the present world system appears to be considerably

[40] For a discussion of the problems involved, see Cyril E. Black and others, *Neutralization and World Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

[41] For a discussion of British policy, see I. Coatman, "The Northwest Frontier Province and Trans-Border Country under the New Constitution," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 18 (July 1931), 335-48, and C. E. Bruce, "The Sandeman Policy as Applied to the Tribal Problems of Today," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 19 (January 1932), 45-67.

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simpler. The emancipation of the colonial world not only abolished most of these arrangements—except when former spheres evolved into actual boundaries—but sovereign equality and the assertion of absolute territorial rights gained new salience. Especially in the third world, sovereignty has been invoked in order to modify domestic legal arrangements and international obligations resulting from state succession. Thus, the affirmation of "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,"[42] which justifies nationalization without the conventional compensation,[43] is another way of reasserting *independence*; this often means that the domestic economy has to be isolated from foreign penetration through emphasis on "borders of separation." Attempts to establish codes of conduct, for multinational corporations for instance, must thus be understood as a means to master the problem of loss of control that is concomitant to increasing *interdependence*. As Krasner has pointed out, the New International Economic Order is less a distributive bargaining for larger shares of wealth than a struggle for control.[44] This struggle is primarily, or at least ostensibly, designed to ensure the sovereign independence of the developing countries within their own territorial confines; at the same time, it is an effort to control influences that originate beyond territorial borders and that have an impact on national life.

Nevertheless, a variety of contradictory tendencies can be found in present international life. The *first* is the universal recognition of territorial sovereignty as the differentiating principle in the international arena. But there is also a *second*, conflicting trend: the erosion of boundaries through the increasing interdependencies of modern economic life. Thus, while political systems are boundary-maintaining systems, markets—although dependent for their creation upon political power and economic networks—are not.[45] It is precisely this difference that led to Wallerstein's argument concerning the success of European capitalism: the penetration of the entire world became possible only after the European powers had given up on the creation of a world empire and contented themselves with economic networks.[46]

[42] See, e.g., United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), 1962, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963).

[43] On this point, see Eduardo Jimenez de Aréchaga, "State Responsibility for the Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 11 (Fall 1978), 179-95; reprinted in Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Saul Mendlovitz, eds., *International Law: A Contemporary Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985).

[44] Stephen Krasner, "The United Nations and Political Conflict between North and South," in Toby Trister Gati, ed., *The U.S., the U.N., and the Management of Global Change* (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 210-26, at 211-14.

[45] This point is made by Raimondo Strassoldo, "Boundaries in Sociological Theory: A Reassessment," in Strassoldo and Delli Zotti (fn. 11).

[46] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the 16th Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1976).

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This expansion, however, did not eliminate differentiation of center and periphery, which sometimes made it necessary to extend direct political control into the penetrated areas. The establishment of colonial rule became necessary when the original informal agreements between the local rulers and their European counterparts broke down.[47] Thus, far from proving the automatic and unproblematic nature of economic expansion, the history of European imperialism, especially in its rush into Africa, proves the importance of political underpinnings for the functioning of unbounded economic exchanges.

A *third* identifiable trait is the result of the power differentials among nations and the tensions between bounded political systems and unbounded exchanges such as economic, ideological, or informational transactions. The issues of dependency, propaganda, and transborder data flows come to mind. Thus, problems necessitating careful conflict management have not disappeared while many of the old techniques of modifying the functions of boundaries for such purposes are no longer available. In short, although the system is based on sovereign territoriality, new conceptions modifying this exclusive regime have evolved that make the management of the international system possible without violating authoritative prescriptions.

Three types of new management devices have evolved: they are usually subsumed under the term "rules of the game."[48] These devices are: *spheres of responsibility, spheres of abstention*, and *functional regimes*. Of these, only functional regimes are clearly legal in character in that they usually rely, among other things, on treaties (bilateral or multilateral) and thereby create explicit rights and obligations. Spheres of responsibility mix legal rights with the unilateral arrogation of competence—which, if respected at all, gives rise only to a norm with the character of an "unspoken rule." Spheres of abstention are the least formal arrangements. They are susceptible to breakdowns as demonstrated by the short-lived détente between the United States and the Soviet Union in the seventies.

SPHERES OF RESPONSIBILITY

Spheres of responsibility may be defined either functionally or territorially. The functional definition shaped the role of the Great Powers (a

[47] This is the argument in John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review*, 2d series, 6 (1953), 1-15.

[48] For a more extensive discussion of the "rules of the game" in the postwar era, see Friedrich Kratochwil, *International Order and Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978). See also Richard A. Falk, "The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of the International Legal Order," in Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds., *The Future of the International Legal Order*, I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), chap. 2. Falk is one of the few "process-oriented" international lawyers who would be inclined to grant some quasi-authoritative status to "rules of the game."

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role that came into existence after the Congress of Vienna). It designated powers with system-wide interests—those that were to have a say in matters pertaining to the management of the system.

In the classic conception of politics, management questions primarily involved the issue of balances of power. But Metternich's attempts to stretch the meaning of security to include the internal constitution of the states (Congress of Verona), and England's reluctance to accede to such an understanding of the Concert,[49] showed that the purely functional system-wide specification of the responsibilities of a Great Power were problematic for two reasons: (1) varying conceptions of legitimate sovereignty existed among the conservative and liberal participants, and (2) the respective interests of various Great Powers showed significant geographic discontinuities.

Gradually, spheres of interest reemerged as the predominant concept, most clearly in the Balkans. As the clashes between Russia and Austria in this region demonstrated, conflict increasingly involved "internal" political groups (Pan-Slavism) or territorial division and incorporation (the Bosnian crisis of 1908). Incorporation became increasingly difficult as the system's flexibility decreased because of nationalism and a new understanding of politics as the "survival of the fittest." A rational balancing in terms of territorial adjustments thus created scores that had to be settled. Territorial adjustments no longer could fulfill the task of restoring an acceptable status quo for all.[50]

The notion of a special sphere of responsibility surfaced at the end of World War II, when the Allies discussed the structure of the postwar international order. In this connection, it is worth mentioning Roosevelt's idea of the "four policemen" charged by the general international community with "enforcing the peace" in their respective areas, and Churchill's idea of a world organization as a framework for *regional arrangements*.[51] The inability of the great powers to come to substantive understandings concerning either their collective responsibilities or their mutually accepted preponderance in certain regions demonstrates not only that these notions were imprecise, but also that they contained conflicting elements.

The Western conceptions of the future international order never resolved the tension between the principles of universalism and the region-

[49] See Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (New York: Gosset & Dunlap, 1964), chap. 15.

[50] On this point, see Friedrich Kratochwil, "On the Notion of Interest in International Relations," *International Organization* 36 (Winter 1981-82), 1-30.

[51] For a discussion of Roosevelt's plan for a world organization after the war, see Willard Range, *Franklin Delano Roosevelt's World Order* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1959). For the various incompatible conceptions emerging from the interactions before and during the San Francisco Conference, see Thomas Campbell, *Masquerade Peace* (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1973).

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alist bias exhibited by Churchill and even sometimes by Roosevelt. The U.N. was based, from the beginning, on an uneasy compromise between the claim of universal competence to deal with all matters of peace and security (even with respect to non-members)—as the Security Council was entrusted with the enforcement of peace—and the claim to collective self-defense that spawned regional alliances.[52] In addition, the two main antagonists, the Soviet Union and the United States, did not have a common understanding of the legitimacy and limits of Great-Power influence in their respective spheres. For this reason, informal agreements—such as Churchill's proposal on apportioning influence in the Balkans on the basis of either exclusive or shared zones of preponderance—were doomed to fail.[53] The U.S. refused to recognize such deals, but even if they had been accepted, the Soviet conception of interest was so extensive that it came to mean the virtual exclusion of all foreign influence, or even constitutional limitations. Instead of exerting power through alliances and informal means, Stalin's mistrust of his client governments—especially when they showed interest in Western economic recovery plans—led to an absolute *Gleichschaltung* of the Soviet satellites.[54]

In this way, we can establish the similarities and differences between the management devices of the 19th century and of modern times. First, there appears to be a similarity in the change from the more universal conception of a functionally defined general responsibility for peace and security to a more solidly defined territorial sphere of influence. What is surprising is the rapidity with which this change occurred in the postwar era. Various forms of the European Concert had functioned (admittedly with different degrees of success) for several generations,[55] but the drastic shift in the postwar era took only a few years. This remarkably quick change, which was accompanied not by mutual accommodation but instead led to the exacerbation of cold-war tensions, was caused by the lack of commonly accepted practices that could guide and set limits to the exertion of influence.[56]

A second comparison between the developments in the 19th century and those of the 20th shows an inverse historical sequence. Metternich's extensive interpretation of Austria's security interest failed to win accept-

[52] This point is further elaborated in Thomas Franck, "Who Killed Article 2.4?" *American Journal of International Law* 71 (April 1977), 224-47.

[53] For an extensive treatment of Churchill's proposal, see Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 447-51.

[54] For a discussion of Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

[55] For a discussion of the European Concert, see Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963).

[56] For a further development of this theme, see Kratochwil (fn. 48), throughout.

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ance and then quickly led to a more moderate interpretation of domestic challenges to the international order; Soviet insistence on an implausibly extensive security interest initially led to hostility and the breakdown of interactions, but ultimately to a *de facto* accommodation. A measure of ideological preponderance was added to the classical notion of a sphere of influence: regimes based on ideologies that do not agree with that of the regional great power can be changed or suppressed. The similarities between the U.S. assertion of primacy in the Western hemisphere (including American interference with nonconformist regimes) and Soviet behavior in the Eastern bloc have been noted. Moreover, both powers have developed extensive rationales or doctrines for their purposes, as Franck and Weisband have pointed out.[57]

Differences also exist. The accommodation that occurred in the late sixties and early seventies was not backed by explicit agreements, and the rules of the game that have emerged in regard to spheres of influence resemble "unspoken" rules. This last point constitutes a significant dissimilarity between the European state system and the modern international system.

In the old conception, a sphere of influence or interest was usually the result of bilateral, explicit agreements. This had two consequences: (1) the agreements created enforceable rights among the contracting parties; and (2) they imposed a regime upon the local inhabitants. Because agreements in international law cannot bind nonparticipating third parties (*pacta tertiis nec prosunt nec nocent*), the nonrecognition of the local powers as full subjects of international law was formerly a precondition for such legal arrangements. With the acceptance of territorial sovereignty as the universal organizing principle in present international relations, the legal expression of such agreements is not possible. Consequently, such understandings can have only the status of tacit or *unspoken* rules, as Keal has called them.[58]

Such rules generally emerge through unilateral calculations (which take verbal as well as nonverbal cues into account); their root lies in the coincidence of the perception of a common interest. Unilateral calculation occurs on the basis of expectations about the other's reaction to the self's action:

> *A*'s expectation of *B* will include an estimation of *B*'s expectations of *A*. This process of replication, it must be noted, is not an interaction between two states, but rather a process in which decision-makers in one state work out

[57] Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband, *Word Politics: Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).

[58] Keal (fn. 37), part I.

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> the consequences of their beliefs about the world; a world they believe to include decision-makers in other states, also working out the consequences of their beliefs. The expectations which are so formed are the expectations of one state, but they refer to other states.[59]

Although expectations that prove correct in a number of instances attain a certain stability and provide some guidance for future decision making in similar situations, compliance with these unspoken rules will be unproblematic *only* when the perception of a common interest is sufficiently strong. Obviously, this will be the case in instances in which the situation resembles a game of coordination—i.e., when the interests of the interacting parties are neither opposed nor mixed.[60] To that extent, Hume's example of two men coming to a "tacit" agreement about how to row a boat is instructive, as a common interest can be assumed.[61] If states perceive the situation as resembling a Prisoners' Dilemma, however—i.e., when mixed motives are given and the incentives to defect are larger than those to cooperate—rules and norms that attempt to shore up the cooperative solution will be endangered. This problem is further aggravated by the imprecision of the tacit rule. Since it is not based on explicit verbal agreements and thus secured by the meanings of ordinary language,[62] but only on unilateral imputations of motives for actions and other nonverbal acts, its institutionalization is weak; no explicit discourse about the tacit rule is possible, and therefore neither scope nor applicability to certain contexts can be discussed.

SPHERES OF ABSTENTION

In the foregoing considerations I referred to spheres of abstention, which were either tacitly agreed upon by the superpowers or created by the United Nations through "preventive diplomacy."[63] Such arrangements broke down in the Congo when the interjection of U.N. troops was identified with the policy goals of a particular faction that possessed outside sympathies. As soon as the question arose for what purposes the U.N. troops were being used—aside from reestablishing minimal control of

[59] *Ibid.*, 50.

[60] These thoughts are more fully developed in Friedrich Kratochwil, "Rules, Norms, Values and the Limits of Rationality," *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie* (forthcoming).

[61] David Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature, Book III, Of Morals*, in *Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy*, ed. Henry Aiken (Darien, CT: Hafner, 1970), 59 ff.

[62] In this context, see Article 31 of the Vienna Convention which establishes that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." See also Jimenez de Aréchaga, "International Law in the Past Third of a Century," 159 *Recueil des Cours* (1978), 42-48.

[63] For a good discussion of this technique, see Inis Claude, *Swords into Ploughshares*, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1984), chap. 14.

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the situation—the idea of preventive diplomacy failed. The opposition of the Soviet Union and its refusal (together with France) to pay for the operation led to a financial crisis of the world organization which clearly and narrowly circumscribed future activities of this kind.

The tacit understanding among the superpowers to leave most of the developing world to its own devices came to naught during the Ford administration and contributed significantly to the demise of détente. The arrangement was susceptible to subversion because of the perception of relatively large gains for limited involvements, particularly in the weak states of Africa. In addition, intervention by proxy (Cuba) appeared to enable the intervening party to disclaim responsibility.

Finally, détente itself was problematic. It was based on the recognition of the Soviet Union as an equal world power, but the United States increasingly tried to de-link the Soviet-American understandings concerning nuclear parity and arms control from the substantive consensus concerning certain regions. For example, attempts by the Soviet Union to propose a joint undertaking in the Middle East and thereby to transform détente into an entente were rebuffed by the United States through the drastic measure of a nuclear alert.[64] "Linkage" was advocated by the U.S. and opposed by the U.S.S.R. in certain areas (détente and economic help), but it was invoked by the Kremlin and negated by the White House in others (condominia).

Negative understandings are weak—aside from the extreme case of mutual assured destruction or, as Hobbes would have called it, the "fear of violent death." They are subject to defeating considerations precisely because an agreement of abstention is often too ambiguous about the limits of allowable influence. Furthermore, the perception of *mutual interest* is not shored up by "rights" that demonstrate to the participants the tangible *quid pro quo* in cases of conflict and insulate an issue from the overall patterns of social interaction.[65] A "right" implies that one is no longer dependent upon the opponent's approval and goodwill in all circumstances.

FUNCTIONAL REGIMES

The third important device for managing international relations in the modern state system is that of functional regimes. Basically, functional regimes "unbundle" the package of rights inherent in territorial sovereignty. Functionalism has therefore sometimes been advocated as an al-

[64] For an extensive discussion of détente and the reasons for its failure, see Coral Bell, *The Diplomacy of Detente: The Kissinger Era* (London: Martin Robertson, 1977).

[65] Luhmann makes the point that rights are means by which conflicts can be limited and resolved without endangering the overall relationship. See Niklas Luhmann, *Soziologie der Aufklärung*, 2d ed. (Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975) II, 29-33.

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ternative organizational principle for international life. Functional regimes, it was hoped, would not only downgrade the importance of national boundaries, but could, through the expansion of transboundary cooperative networks, lead to "peace in parts."[66] In addition, some recent developments seem to indicate that the traditional package of territorial rights is being modified. Several new arrangements have emerged from the Law of the Sea draft treaty (UNCLOS III) by which competing resource uses can be accommodated without the all-or-nothing regulation of territoriality. Only in this fashion could the competing interests in security, resource management, access (navigational rights), pollution abatement, and freedom of research of the new "whole" called "oceans"[67] be guaranteed. The creation of an Exclusive Economic Zone, the new definition of the continental shelf, of international straits, of archipelagic regimes, and of provisos for resource recovery from the deep sea through the International Seabed Authority all show such features.[68] Similarly, a variety of specific resource regimes within the framework created by the Antarctic Treaty has carefully avoided the territorial issues between those countries claiming certain sectors and those not claiming any territory, and between states whose claims overlap (e.g., Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom).[69] One of the most remarkable successes of the Antarctic regime is its demilitarization and denuclearization backed by a unique inspection system.

Whether resource regimes will be similarly successful in holding territorial claims at bay is questionable. Since the Antarctic Treaty is valid only until 1991, it may merely have delayed future conflicts. Even were the present treaty members to prefer the continuation of the present regime, they might be forced to stake out territorial claims because nonmembers might not recognize the present regime *ad infinitum*. The attempts of the third world to declare Antarctica a "Common Heritage of Mankind" may produce the same situation as that of the present Law of the Sea draft treaty in relation to the original concept of a common heritage: that idea was relegated to minor importance, and UNCLOS III resulted in one of the greatest enclosure movements in history by strengthening rather than reducing the expansion of territorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, in view of the second thoughts of many industrial states

[66] See Joseph Nye, *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

[67] A discussion of the emergence of new "wholes" on the basis of new knowledge is in Ernst Haas, "Is there a Hole in the Whole?" *International Organization* 29 (Summer 1975), 327-77.

[68] For a text of the UNCLOS III Draft Convention, see *International Legal Materials*, XXI (November 1982), 1261-1354.

[69] An extensive discussion of the Antarctic regime can be found in F. M. Auburn, *Antarctic Law and Politics* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1982).

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about the redistributive aspirations of the third world, the nonratification of the latter treaty by some important industrial states is bound to create difficulties for a comprehensive regulation of ocean use.[70]

The lessons of these short considerations are not difficult to draw, but they are somewhat disheartening. Since functional logic depends on the willingness of all participants to keep the issue area depoliticized, it can come under pressure when the framing conditions change. The success of the Antarctic regime, for example, appears to have resulted largely from the satisfaction of the superpowers with the treaty, from the marginal strategic importance of the area, from an uneasy truce between claimant and nonclaimant states (papered over by ambiguous treaty language), and from the acquiescence of the world to the privileged status of the treaty's consultative members.[71] Even if we assume that the strategic consensus of both superpowers remains unchanged, their ability to continue along the same lines may depend upon their authority to exclude others from decision making. One way of doing this is to make territorial claims and bury the common heritage idea once and for all.

Functional regimes also need continuous updating and upgrading, depending upon the emergence of new issue areas and the realization of interaction effects of various regimes. The discovery of mineral resources in Antarctica, for example, made negotiations for such a regime a matter of urgency. Furthermore, the effect that mining will have on the other regimes (particularly the living resources and the Antarctica fauna and flora regimes) will make stringent environmental regulation necessary. Such a proliferation of regulations not only necessitates continuous negotiations and cooperation, but also the institutionalization of procedures to settle disputes in order to manage the inevitable conflicts. The advantage of the all-or-nothing principle of territorial sovereignty in this respect is not merely its simplicity, but the implicit presumption that, in the face of newly emerging problems, the territorial unit—and only the territorial unit—has the right to regulate matters. Thus, although clear boundaries create problems by excluding others, they also simplify international life. In the political arena, they appear at present to be the precondition for the existence of national independence, constitutional rule, and responsible government by creating and reinforcing significant breaks within the stream of transactions of world society.

[70] For an assessment of UNCLOS III in terms of the common heritage principle, see Falk and others (fn. 43), chap. 9.

[71] Consultative members are those entitled to make rules (on the basis of unanimity) for the Antarctic. They are the original parties to the Antarctica Treaty, plus those admitted later on the basis of significant research in the area. For a further discussion, see Kratochwil and others (fn. 36), case study on the Arctic and Antarctica, 101-14.

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V. Conclusion

I have addressed the problem of the function of boundaries in territorial and nonterritorial social orders for historical as well as for theoretical reasons. The historical interest is rooted in the need for a better understanding of those changes that led to the emergence of the European state system in the 17th century, after the demise of the medieval empire. The theoretical interest concerns the appraisal of the present world system. This system is characterized by conflicting trends in the universal recognition of territoriality as the organizing principle in international politics and by the observable countertrend of increasing interdependencies that undermine territorial exclusivity.

In the present approach, I investigated three types of exchanges that determine the function of boundaries. By systematically examining the exchanges that take place between a unit and its environment, the exchanges among units, and the exchanges between a unit's center and its periphery—as well as their various interaction effects—I developed a parsimonious explanation of systems characteristics in a wide variety of territorial and nonterritorial social systems. The heuristic power of this approach was further evidenced by its ability to relate the characteristics of systems to modes of conflict management by means of boundaries. Two techniques were discussed: the movement of the location of a boundary, and the changing function of boundaries brought about by allowing or excluding certain types of exchanges. The first strategy was characteristic of the European balance of power and its territorial adjustments. The second was used predominantly in the colonial world, where spheres of influence or preponderance, as well as buffer states, became the standard devices for managing conflict with other European powers.

Beyond these historical examples, I discussed modern attempts of creating functional regimes and formulating tacit rules in order to manage conflicting uses of resources and political interests. I also examined the robustness, or rather the reasons for the limitations and the lack of effectiveness, of these techniques.

Some difficulty is created by attempts to place this approach in the wider context of theoretical efforts in international relations. However, it is apparent that this inquiry is more indebted to a system-of-action perspective[72] than to structural theories of international relations[73] that emphasize the unintended consequences of the actors' choices. Although

[72] Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (New York: Free Press, 1968); see also Niklas Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984).

[73] See, e.g., Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

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structural theories explain an important aspect of interactions in an anarchical environment, they fail to suggest further avenues for research beyond the original market analogy and utility-maximizing actions under constraints. It is here that the advantages of a more historically oriented approach become apparent. By focusing on the changing function of boundaries rather than on the configuration and number of actors or the "rationality" of their actions, the present approach provides for a richer and more detailed treatment of the historical material while preserving parsimony and explanatory power.

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THE STATE AND STRATEGIES OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT

By G. JOHN IKENBERRY*

Introduction

In negotiations leading to the establishment of the European Community, the French government maneuvered to have its agricultural sector subsidized and protected by the regional organization. Thus, a domestic political problem—an inefficient but politically vocal agricultural sector—found a solution in an international agreement. When raw-material-exporting countries in the third world seek to construct commodity agreements to stabilize prices, the international arena is, again, the site for attempts at agreements to solve domestic economic problems. In cases such as these, international politics appears to be an extension of the domestic political economy. Conversely, the Japanese government responded to the declining competitive position of its petrochemical industry by consolidating and phasing out productive capacity. In this case, the solution to an international problem was found through domestic measures. Likewise, when the U.S. government seeks to strengthen the global competitive position of its high-technology industries through funding of research and development, the domestic arena is the site for addressing international problems. In these cases, domestic politics appears to be an extension of the international political economy.

As these examples suggest, national and international political economy impinge on each other, and the lines of causation move in both directions. Few observers would wish to dispute this fact, but it has yet to be incorporated into systematic theoretical conceptions of international and comparative political economy. In this essay, I shall proceed from the premise that international regimes (or agreements) and domestic industrial and trade strategies are part of a larger whole.

The paper is based on two analytic assumptions and one central question. According to the first analytic assumption, the problem of adjust-

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ment is a fundamental dynamic that bears on domestic and international political economy. All states are continuously in the process of adjusting to changes in international and domestic systems. The problems inherent in a country's political and economic position within the larger international system are a basic source of national behavior and international conflict. According to the second analytic assumption, the state—or the state elite—is the crucial actor within the adjustment process. The state may therefore be conceived of as a strategist in the context of domestic and international structures and constraints. Finally, the central question: Why do states seek to solve adjustment problems by moving into the international system or, alternatively, seek domestic solutions to these problems? When national and international systems are considered to be alternative arenas for problem solving, we can begin to ask about the character of adjustment strategies and their structural sources.

In presenting a model of adjustment politics, I suggest that four generic adjustment strategies are potentially available, and then focus on the interests that states have in adjustment politics. By relating these interests to the adjustment strategies, I am able to propose an adjustment preference function for states and to suggest that the domestic and international structural circumstances of states determine the strategy actually chosen. Several research methods are posed as possible techniques to reveal the structural sources of adjustment strategy. Finally, I present the adjustment model in several empirical cases.

The State and Adjustment

States participate in both domestic and international political economic systems. Constituted of different organizational capacities and styles of maneuver, states occupy a unique position to mediate internal and external change. Nettl's "gatekeeper" is an apt image.[1]

As administrative and coercive organizations, states are embedded in complex political and economic environments and have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.[2] Although they vary considerably, they have several elements in common. All states make exclusive claims to the coercive and juridical control of particular territories, and they also make special claims to the definition and representation of broad national interests.

States are also organizations that are staffed by officials whose posi-

[1] J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20 (July 1968), 559-92.
[2] Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 56.

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tions are ultimately insecure.[3] The claim of these officials to office and legitimacy is fundamentally tied up with the state's *sui generis* position in the international system: it acts to protect security interests and property rights.[4] But the legitimacy of the state is always conditional; incumbents are merely stewards of the national economy. Performance and success, however they are measured, are always problematic. All states exist within these enduring national and international contexts.

Finally, states are organizations that, given the alternatives, would like to survive. Consequently, they must change and adapt. They must also bargain with societal and economic actors. This notion—of the state separate from but in a constant bargaining relationship with society—is captured most effectively in historical analyses of states at their moments of birth. In a recent essay, Charles Tilly has sketched a series of relationships between warmaking, capital accumulation, extraction, and European statemaking. Tilly notes that leaders of nascent states, engaged in war with adjacent powerholders, needed to extract resources from local producers and traders. "The quest inevitably involved them in establishing regular access to capitalists who could supply and arrange credit, and to imposing one form of regular taxation or another on the people and activities within their sphere of control."[5] But capitalists were capable of movement (they had what Hirschman calls "movable wealth"),[6] and therefore it was important for state officials to form alliances with various social classes and to foster capital accumulation. At the earliest moment of European state building, state leaders were confronted with a double-edged imperative: to harness domestic wealth so as to strengthen the state's foreign position, and to do so in a way that would not scare off capitalists or diminish economic growth.[7]

[3] The use of the terms "state organization" and "state elite" to define the logical properties of the state is not an inconsistency: the latter term is used metonymically to refer to the former. Beyond that, it is useful to talk about an elite when exploring propositions about the state empirically. Also, because this essay concerns state strategy—or the self-conscious choice of policy by the state—the analyst must ultimately confront the fact that decisions are made by individuals. Nonetheless, those choices flow from the organizational position of the state within larger national and international structures.

[4] That is what Otto Hintze had in mind in his argument that state elites gain their institutional position and legitimacy from the permanent insecurity of sovereign nations in an international system. See Hintze, "The State in Historical Perspective," in Reinhard Bendix, ed., *State and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

[5] Tilly, "Warmaking and Statemaking as Organized Crime," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-91, at 172.

[6] Albert Hirschman, "Exit, Voice, and the State," *World Politics* 31 (October 1978), 90-107.

[7] Douglass C. North has spelled out this fundamental double-edged relationship between state and capital, presenting a more elaborate utility-maximizing model. See North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: Norton, 1981). See also Margaret Levi, "The Predatory Theory of Rule," *Politics and Society* 10 (No. 4, 1981), and John A. C. Conybeare,

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Even when mobility of productive resources is low, state intervention can stifle economic growth and diminish state revenue. International competition, and the resulting need of the state to extract societal resources, may constrain states even in relatively closed national economies. Indeed, the logic of a state's bargaining with society extends beyond considerations of economic growth. Tilly notes that

> the process of bargaining with ordinary people for their acquiescence and their surrender of resources—money, goods, labor power—engaged the civilian managers of the state in establishing limits to state control, perimeters to state violence, and mechanisms for eliciting the consent of the subject population.[8]

This underlying dilemma and the continuing structural necessity for the state to bargain with its own society—so pressing for early modern state builders—is no less relevant for an analysis of the contemporary state.

Of the many international and domestic forces that set states in motion, none is more important than the constant pressure for national adjustment to international change produced by constant differential change between national and international systems. Gilpin notes:

> In every international system there are continual occurrences of political, economic, and technological changes that promise gains and losses for one or another actor . . . In every system, therefore, a process of disequilibrium and adjustment is constantly taking place.[9]

This differential change may involve system-wide economic upheavals such as the Depression of the 1930s or the oil price revolution of the 1970s. It may be more gradual—as in the changing competitive position of particular industrial sectors in advanced industrial countries. It will either generate new opportunities for aggressive domestic response to international change, or it will generate pressure for defensive action to preserve existing domestic arrangements.[10]

"The Rent-Seeking State and Revenue Diversification," *World Politics* 35 (October 1982), 25-42. The state exchanges the provision of particular services (e.g., the maintenance of property rights) for privately generated revenue. It attempts to structure these services so as to maximize revenue. The state is constrained, however, since there is always the possibility that rivals can provide the same services. North argues,

> Where there are no close substitutes, the existing ruler characteristically is a despot, a dictator, or an absolute monarch. The closer the substitutes, the fewer degrees of freedom the ruler possesses, and the greater the percentage of incremental income that will be retained by the constituents. (North, 27).

This proposition opens up the need for complex analysis of the relative mobility of productive resources and other factors that condition the possibilities for "exit."

[8] Charles Tilly, *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1985).

[9] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13.

[10] *Ibid.*; see also R. J. Barry Jones, ed., *Change and the Study of International Relations: The*

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Adjustment processes can and do take place in the absence of (or in spite of) state policy and strategy. International financial markets, for example, responded to the petrodollar recycling process much more effectively than had been anticipated by Western officials. (Also, a portion of the oil price increases of the 1970s was absorbed in the inflation of American dollars.) International market processes such as these can autonomously provide the forces that reequilibrate or adjust national economies to prevailing international conditions. Even if a state's adjustment policy were directed primarily at the margin of larger international processes, it would be a mistake to diminish its significance. The stability and security of nations may hinge on actions taken within that margin. What may appear to be of marginal importance in the long term may be of powerful significance for political and economic actors in the short term. And marginal actions stretched over extended periods can result in profound political and economic change.[11]

The maneuvering of states within national and international arenas can be conceived of as controlled by strategies that states develop to cope with adjustment problems.[12] Adjustment strategy may be directed outward at international regimes, or inward at transforming domestic structures, or somewhere in between in order to maintain existing relationships. Which strategy is chosen will depend in large part on the gross structural circumstances within which the state finds itself—defined in terms of state-society relations on the one hand, and position within the international system on the other. In this paper, I seek to explore the bases on which these choices are made, and to specify the interconnections between domestic and international political economy.

Adjustment Strategies

The logical possibilities for solving adjustment problems fall along two dimensions—the location of adjustment (international or domestic) and the objective of the adjustment initiative. The latter either consists of ac-

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Evaded Dimensions (London: Frances Pinter, 1981); Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980); John A. Vasquez and Richard W. Mansbach, "The Issue Cycle: Conceptualizing Long-Term Global Political Change," *International Organization*, 37 (Spring 1983), 257-79.

[11] For a rather abstract discussion of system change and differential response, see Herbert Simon, "The Architecture of Complexity," in Simon, *The Sciences of the Artificial*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), 193-229. The issue has also been discussed in terms of international equilibrium and disequilibrium. See Richard Rosecrance, *International Relations: Peace or War?* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 113-14.

[12] A similar conception has been used by, for example, Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, in *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 31.

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	International	Domestic
Offensive	Create new international regime	Change domestic structure
Defensive	Maintain or protect regime	Protect domestic structure

FIGURE 1
ADJUSTMENT STRATEGIES

tions seeking to transform the (national or international) system or of actions seeking to preserve existing arrangements. This two-dimensional typology, as summarized in Figure 1, indicates the four possibilities that exist for states seeking to address adjustment problems.

One dimension is adjustment conducted within international arenas. The strategy behind the use of international regime agreements is to avoid difficult domestic adjustments, either by creating new international regimes (offensive international adjustment) or by using international regimes or more temporary agreements to protect existing arrangements (defensive international adjustment). Adjustment within national borders—adapting to new international realities—either changes domestic economic and social structures (offensive domestic adjustment) or it protects those structures by means such as subsidies or tariffs (defensive domestic adjustment).

Offensive international adjustment is the more ambitious type of response. The strategy involves the creation of new "rules of the game" for international interactions, and the number of states necessary to create an international regime and the level of adherence to rules and procedures is considerably greater than in the other strategies. The GATT trade regime, the Bretton Woods monetary system, and the proposed rules embodied in the New International Economic Order are the most ambitious and far-reaching examples of this type of international system of rules and obligations.[13]

For defensive international adjustment, the international arrangements are more limited. Rather than creating new international rules and

[13] See Stephen Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

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procedures, the strategy here involves drawing on international agreements to protect existing domestic industries and institutions. In this response, a number of countries cooperate to protect domestic institutions within the prevailing international rules by such means as negotiated trade quotas and orderly marketing agreements. While international offensive adjustment seeks agreements to rewrite the rules of the game, international defensive adjustment seeks agreement on more narrow steps in order to mitigate the effects of adverse international economic change.[14]

Domestic offensive and domestic defensive strategies mirror this distinction. In domestic offensive strategy, the structure of national industries and institutions is changed in an effort to cope with new international realities. This may involve phasing out or encouraging the growth of particular industries, or creating new institutions and arrangements that facilitate domestic economic adjustment. Efforts are focused inward at adapting institutions and redeploying domestic resources. One form of this strategy may involve vigorous and anticipatory government action to gain an edge over competitors. Investment in research and development, rationalization of corporate investment decision making, and other government devices may be used to encourage or coerce private firms to alter their behavior. Alternatively, the government may simply stand aside and let market forces do the work. Here the state acts by abstaining from intervention; put differently, the state acting as "gatekeeper," keeping the gate open.[15]

Domestic defensive adjustment is protective and seeks to avoid change altogether. A strategy of this sort typically culminates in the erection of barriers to new international economic competition or to other forms of change. The tariff is the most obvious example; less obvious state actions, such as subsidies and other non-tariff barriers, have increasingly emerged in contemporary trade relations.

[14] In some respects, the difference between international offensive and defensive strategies is captured in Keohane's distinction between "control-oriented" regimes and "insurance" regimes. Control-oriented regimes seek to prescribe and regularize behavior among participants within the regime, by which members gain a high measure of control over the behavior of the other actors. Insurance regimes are less ambitious and seek to pool risks of specific international economic change among regime participants. While control-oriented regimes attempt to go to the source of deleterious international change, insurance arrangements aim to soften the impact of that change. See Robert O. Keohane, "Demand for International Regimes," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), 325-55.

[15] See the discussion of Japanese "anticipatory adjustment policy" in Michele Schmiegelow, "Cutting Across Doctrines: Positive Adjustment in Japan," *International Organization* 39 (Spring 1985), 261-96. A variety of categories of adjustment have been developed by the O.E.C.D. to characterize national patterns in the 1970s and beyond. See O.E.C.D., *Positive Adjustment Policy—Managing Structural Change* (Paris: O.E.C.D., 1983).

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Explaining State Preferences

How does one explain in which cases these various adjustment strategies will be pursued by states? An explanation of states' preferences must be a layered exercise. At one level, we must investigate what states would like if multiple possibilities for action existed. That is essentially an exercise in specifying states' interests. At a second level, we must explore the constraints that delimit how those interests may be realized—in other words, the structural bases of states' actions.

In a useful analysis of these two types of explanation, Steven Lukes makes a distinction between "rational" and "structural" constraints.[16] The term "rational constraints" refers to the array of economic costs that attach to particular policy options; decisions are based on a rational calculation of the differential costs and advantages of each choice. Rational constraints are not concerned with the availability of opportunities for action, but with their expense. The term "structural constraints" refers to the institutional obstacles to action. Even if he is willing to pay the costs, the actor may either not be able to pursue an option, or structural obstacles may limit his knowledge of it.

In exploring rational constraints on state action, I will develop a model of adjustment politics. To start with, there are several assumptions about the interests of states that must be related to the strategies sketched above.

Assumption 1: *States seek to minimize the costs of governance and to maximize national competitiveness; when there are conflicts, they will prefer the former over the latter.*

In this model, states have only two interests. *The first is to minimize the domestic political costs of changes*. Because they are fundamentally political organizations, even autonomous and powerful states are enmeshed in a complex political and economic environment—an environment that rewards and punishes state action. In the present analysis, I shall assume that state action which seeks to change the behavior of specific societal groups is costly; how costly it is, and whether the state is willing to bear that cost, must be weighed against the availability of alternative options and the gains to be found in meeting adjustment goals themselves.

The state's second interest, that of *maximizing national competitiveness*, is essentially an efficiency value which is important because it reflects the competitiveness and productivity of the national economy. Where competitiveness is maximized, the national economy is based on a sound and

[16] Lukes, "Power and Structure," in Lukes, *Essays in Social Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 12-13.

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efficient footing. In making the adjustment, it may be necessary to discourage uncompetitive industry and to encourage promising industry; or societal behavior that bears on national economic performance may have to be influenced.

The two state interests may conflict with each other when added measures of efficiency cannot be gained without incurring additional political costs. Ultimately, however, they may complement each other: because full competitiveness is a measure of economic health, the state should reap the political rewards.

The two interests may diverge temporally, however. The long-term value of competitiveness or efficiency may require state action that is quite costly in the short term. Consequently, the model assumes that, when serious conflict does emerge, the state will choose to forgo long-term adjustment gains in order to conserve short-term political costs. Implicit in this assumption is that the state is a political organization which seeks to protect itself *qua* organization. Its officials hold positions that are ultimately insecure. Because of its uniquely constituted position at the intersection of domestic and international systems, the state is a steward of both the national economy and society; but when push comes to shove, it will choose organizational over national goals.

Assumption 2: *International policies have lower costs of governance than domestic policies.*

As noted above, adjustment can be achieved by making either domestic or international changes. By this second assumption, the state will bear fewer political costs if the changes come at the international rather than the domestic level. If the relevant international regime is arranged to accommodate domestic patterns of societal behavior or industrial performance, the internal costs of change will be negligible. Therefore, wherever possible, states will seek international solutions to problems of adjustment.[17]

When adjustment takes place in the international system, the costs are shared among a number of countries. International solutions are likely to take the form of regimes—rules and procedures of a general sort that can be used to solve individual problems of adjustment. The motivation or demand for regimes in this context is captured by Keohane in his discussion of risk and uncertainty.[18] States are most likely to seek international

[17] An alternative (but not antithetical) argument not developed here is that some problems lend themselves to international solution more than others. For present purposes, I assume that there are important reasons to attempt international cooperative solutions regardless of their substantive nature.

[18] Keohane (fn. 14).

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regime arrangements when they cannot control their environments effectively. Successful regimes will emerge where a number of states share similar risks, but where events do not impinge uniformly on all the states at the same moment.

For example, a state with a national steel industry facing a major international competitive challenge and diminished markets would rather set up international agreements limiting surplus capacity than engage in wholesale industrial restructuring. The international agreement limits the pressure on the domestic industry; the cost of surplus capacity and competitive threat is shouldered by a number of producing countries rather than the single national industry. Thus, the state conserves the governance costs of the political pressure generated by displaced workers and the turmoil surrounding the insecurity of other domestic constituencies that would suffer from temporary or long-term unemployment or industrial disruption.

Another example would be countries with national economies that are highly dependent on the export of a unique or limited set of commodities. Here the adjustment problem often centers on fluctuating demand and prices in international markets. Adjustment could be achieved by the frequent though painful expansion and contraction of the national economy; domestically, offensive adjustment would entail restructuring and diversifying export goods, while defensive measures at the national level might involve steps to cushion labor and capital from international fluctuations. International arrangements to stabilize those external markets would thus be preferable. Efforts to achieve these sorts of international solutions can be found in proposals tendered by third-world, commodity-exporting nations in UNCTAD and in regional groupings such as the Lomé Convention.[19] From the perspective of the state, the international redress of adjustment dilemmas is more attractive because the costs are shouldered by an enlarged set of actors.

The state experiences governance costs because internal change can jeopardize state coherence and control. International redress of adjustment problems shifts the burden of change or at least distributes it more broadly. In other words, international solutions to adjustment problems tend to preserve the stability of domestic political institutions—a stability that is valued by the state. As one analyst notes:

> The state's personnel ordinarily have a strong interest in maintaining the stability of institutions which stand between the society and the collapse into civil war; the ease of their own jobs, the prestige of the institutions

[19] Isebill V. Gruhn, "The Lomé Convention: Inching toward Interdependence," *International Organization* 30 (Spring 1976), 242-62.

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with which they are identified, ultimately perhaps their physical safety and (in the case of elected politicians and those about them) their survival in office, all depend on continuing social stability. It is that pursuit of stability which provides the clues to the ultimate motivation of state action.[20]

Assumption 3: *Offensive policies have higher competitive gains than defensive policies.*

This assumption addresses the maximization of competitiveness. Offensive policies, either domestic or international, further adjustment processes more completely than defensive policies. While defensive policies seek to preserve the old order in some fashion, offensive policies seek to create new conditions that establish efficient or competitive relationships between domestic and international systems. Thus, offensive policies either create new regimes or new and favorable competitive positions within old regimes; defensive policies create protective blocks within old regimes or within underlying competitive positions. For this reason, I argue that offensive policies do more to promote further adjustment than defensive policies.

In effect, offensive policies are more efficient because they reestablish an international equilibrium. (I am here accepting the neoclassical assumptions concerning the efficiency and productivity of self-sustaining economic relations.) But the perspective is decidedly state-centered. The argument is that the state benefits from, and therefore comes to have an interest in, more rather than less economic efficiency. In other words, if the political costs are equal among available options, the state will support the option that furthers national economic efficiency and competitiveness.[21]

From the foregoing assumptions, we can spell out the relevant state preference function:

$$\text{Governance } (G)_{\text{Low}}/\text{Competition } (C)_{\text{High}} > G_L/C_L > G_H/C_H > G_H/C_L$$

These preferences could be expanded upon, but it is more useful to recast the preference ranking in terms of the four strategies specified above. In accordance with our assumptions, the strategies may be ranked as follows:

1. Offensive international strategy.

[20] Colin Crouch, "The State, Capital and Liberal Democracy," in Crouch, ed., *State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1979), 40.

[21] Not all offensive international strategies seek to place national economics in a more *efficient* relationship with the international system. The New International Economic Order (N.I.E.O.), for example, seeks to place developing nations in a more stable and *competitive* relationship with the international system. In general, however, the programmatic ideas of the N.I.E.O. are antithetical to market and efficiency measures of that relationship.

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2. Defensive international strategy.
3. Offensive domestic strategy.
4. Defensive domestic strategy.

If a state can change the international regime to facilitate adjustment, that will be the preferred strategy because it maximizes competitiveness (more than the defensive international strategy) and it has lower governance costs than the domestic alternatives. If that strategy is not possible, the next likely one is defensive international adjustment. It does not achieve more adjustment than the domestic offensive strategy, but it has fewer governance costs. By the first assumption of the model, the state will exchange adjustment gains for fewer governance costs when it has to make the choice. Where competitive gains from domestic offensive adjustment are exceptional and governance costs minimal, the ordering of the middle two strategies may be reversed. For present purposes, the model leaves this possible indeterminacy to empirical applications. Thus, domestic offensive strategy ranks third because it allows more adjustment than the international defensive alternative; it will be chosen if the costs of governance remain equal between them.[22] The lowest-ranking strategy is defensive domestic adjustment, which does not have the adjustment-maximizing possibilities of either international strategies or the domestic offensive strategy.[23]

[22] The political costs of domestic defensive and offensive policies are not equal, of course. A defensive strategy is likely to have fewer immediate governance costs than an offensive one. But similar domestic offensive initiatives will have different costs in different countries. Because of national differences in the organization of industrial production and the political institutions that surround the state and the economy, domestic restructuring can proceed more smoothly and with less resistance in some countries than in others. These factors themselves have been explained in terms of long-term historic differences in the necessity of domestic change. See Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985). These variations in the flexibility and adaptability of domestic institutions do not allow for a strict specification of strategic preferences. A state with little domestic adaptability may seek an international adjustment strategy with more persistence and vigor, or it may move more quickly to accept a domestic defensive response. At this point the model reaches its heuristic limits, and a more historical case-by-case analysis becomes appropriate.

[23] The notion that there is a "national preference frontier" for adjustment outcomes is less controversial than the attendant argument that the four strategies are fixed in relation to each other on that frontier, and that all states share that fixed preference function. In an alternative argument, the point would be that the four strategies may not embody uniform and fixed summations of efficiency and governance costs. Although the optimal strategy may still be offensive international adjustment, the other three strategies may vary in their relationships to each other along an indifference curve. Thus, even if structural constraints allowed the state to pursue any one of the remaining three strategies, it might not necessarily seek a defensive international strategy over the other two, or it might favor the offensive domestic strategy over the defensive domestic strategy. More contingent relations between the three strategies would make the model more complex by raising the *differential costs* of the various options to greater importance. Structure remains important at a more basic level. In this refined model, there may be no *a priori* way of ascertaining which of the three strategies would be preferred over the others without knowing more precisely the costs of governance that are unique to

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Structural Constraints on Strategies

The above rankings predict the strategy that a state will adopt where choices are available. But the larger argument is that these choices are made in the context of domestic and international structural constraints, which radically delimit their range. The preference function predicts what states will seek to achieve; structural constraints will determine what is possible.

At this point, the specification of structural constraints remains crude. The term is used to refer to both domestic and international institutional conditions that remain relatively stable over time and constrain policy choice. Structure is defined from the perspective of the actor itself: domestic structure determines the ability of the state to alter the behavior of domestic actors, and international structure defines the access of the state to international rules and norms. Structure may be different for different states: a small state with few resources will find structures at the international level more inflexible than a larger state with resources capable of changing international regimes and arrangements.

Domestic structures also differ. Some states will find their domestic institutions and groups less tractable than others. Structural properties attached to these differences in the configuration of their domestic economic and political institutions—which are often summarized in terms of state and society relationships—provide powerful constraints on the exercise of state action. A recent study of crossnational differences in industrial adjustment capacity points precisely to those gross configurations of domestic organizational structures that are summarized in terms of "industry-institutional" relationships.[24]

States differ in their capacity to reach out into international structures and influence rules and regimes to mediate adjustment. Only certain states, perhaps only a single hegemonic actor, can create a new regime for the purpose of its adjustment. Other international strategies, however, exist without regime-creating power. These strategies are more unilateral; in a sense, they externalize domestic problems.[25] In each case, however, structure ultimately limits adjustment strategy.

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each country. The variables that move one strategy or another off the indifference curve are proximate national circumstances, such as the stability of governing coalitions, the strength of the bureaucracy, and so forth. In a sense, this alternative puts more refined and contingent variables into the rational constraints on states; my more simple model moves those variables to the level of structural constraints.

[24] Geoffrey Shepherd, François Duchene and Christopher Saunders, eds., *Europe's Industries: Public and Private Strategies for Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 4.

[25] The use of the term international *structure*, rather than international *system*, is meant to convey a stronger sense of the unplanned and unchanging nature of international political and

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The analysis comes to a juncture at this point. One method of discussing the structural determinants of adjustment is to work inductively from the strategies to the structure without directly specifying structural conditions. Rather, one would look at the strategies themselves and assume that they *reveal* the structures. This approach would not provide a test of the model. In effect, the strategies, assuming the veracity of the preference ranking, are a window into the structural world. In this approach, the strength of the model lies in accepting the robustness of the assumptions and using them heuristically to uncover the international and domestic structural constraints on state adjustment.[26]

In an alternative approach, the structures themselves would be specified more precisely, thus setting up deductive propositions about the likely adoption of an adjustment strategy. With a stronger *a priori* identification of relevant structural variables, this approach would predict outcomes based on the presence or absence of those variables.

Although these are valid alternative methods of elaborating the adjustment model, a clear-cut choice would not be constructive at the present stage of research. The problem with adopting the first method is that it does not provide a basis for predicting (and therefore falsifying) the propositions. The problem with the second method is that at this stage it is difficult to specify structure, whether domestic or international, in completely formal terms. Furthermore, structure is not, strictly speaking, a source of *causation*. The structures provide *limits on and possibilities for* state action; the state's interests themselves are not determined by structure. They emerge through the interplay of a state elite that is adapting and strategizing in the context of those structures. More precisely, the *formal* interests of states stem from the obdurate organizational predicament of the state's geopolitical and spatial position. The *substantive* interests—in this case, the type of adjustment strategy—emerge in the struggle to find ways for the state to assert itself in the adjustment process.

Two alternative research procedures combine deductive and inductive methods. In the first, one would look for patterns of structural influence. If the same country adopted the same adjustment strategy over a long

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economic realms. This point, and the variety of international structures, is discussed by Susan Strange, "Structures, Values, and Risk in the Study of the International Political Economy," in R. J. Barry Jones, ed., *Perspectives on Political Economy* (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), 213-19.

[26] Without a prior and independent specification of structures, the framework remains a model and not a theory. This type of heuristic model can effectively guide empirical investigation and generate substantial hypotheses. This is the approach used by North (fn. 7), chap. 3. The model cannot directly predict outcomes, however, and consequently falls short of a theory. On models and theories, see Duncan Snidal, "The Game *Theory* of International Politics," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985), 25-57.

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stretch of time and in a variety of policy areas, the structural argument would be supported. Whether domestic or international, structure by definition is a set of variables that changes very slowly. One would therefore want to find consistency in state policy over time and space.

A second research procedure focuses more directly on the strategizing behavior of states. If the assumptions and preference functions are accurate, states should be attempting to pursue the most desired strategy—offensive international adjustment. If the structural argument is correct, states should be adapting their preferred strategy to the constraints imposed by domestic and international structures. Thus, one should be able to observe states adjusting their adjustment strategy.

In the following brief case studies, I will explore the model through both these second-best research methods in search of patterns in country cases across time and space, and of adaptive state behavior.

Empirical Exploration of the Model

The notion of adjustment is at the center of this analysis. As a category of state behavior, this notion has an interesting history. Although international adjustment is as old as the system of states, the use of the term is actually of rather recent vintage.[27] In the late 1970s, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) generated a series of documents that placed adjustment issues at the heart of relations among the advanced industrial countries.[28]

Noting an "increased need for adjustment," the O.E.C.D.'s analysis sought to provide an intellectual rationale for positive adjustment strategies, international and domestic alike. The increased importance of adjustment comes from an evolution away from the postwar system of expanding markets, in which governmental action was oriented primarily at growth policies, and the strengthening of key sectors. In making its case, the O.E.C.D. distinguished between defensive policies that aim at preserving the status quo, and offensive policies that move national economies to new levels of competitive efficiency.[29]

Adjustment, whether defensive or offensive, is a broader category of behavior than that with which we are concerned. We are not interested in all political outcomes at the national level that influence adjustment prospects; the focus here is on *state* strategy, on the preferences of state

[27] See Linda Hesselman, "Trends in European Industrial Intervention," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 7 (1983), 197-208.
[28] O.E.C.D., *The Case for Positive Adjustment Policies* (Paris: O.E.C.D., 1979).
[29] *Ibid.*, 3-8, 71.

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elites. Clearly, the strategic preferences of state actors do not exhaust the outcomes of adjustment policy.

State adjustment strategy can be identified by three characteristics. First, the state's preferences must be consistently embraced by the elite over an extended period of time, even spanning several administrations. This does not mean that strategy cannot change. Indeed, I argue that strategy can be adaptive, changing in accordance with palpable domestic and international constraints. Second, these preferences will not consistently cause material advantage to accrue to one particular societal group. In other words, the policy preferences reflect a *set* of national adjustment goals. Third, the adjustment strategy will in some way define the boundaries of politics within the country. This condition, qualitative though it be, is inserted to ensure that the strategy is truly important and has implications for the conduct of interest-group and class politics.

The foregoing analysis points to new ways of comparing the adjustment strategies of states. Historical cases for all four adjustment strategies can be found; they are summarized in Figure 2.

One of the most important and widely encountered cases of adjustment was that of energy in the 1970s. In the energy case summarized below, the United States eventually adopted an offensive domestic response. In the past, the U.S. has exhibited a pattern of domestic defensive response in the trade area through the use of the tariff. In recent years, however, it has more frequently sought international defensive protection through voluntary export agreements. The offensive adjustment policy of Japan and other industrialized importing countries resulted in efforts to reorient domestic industry to compete more effectively in international markets.[30] While the United States attempted to defend its domestic economic position through international cooperation among consuming countries (defensive international strategy), limitations in state capacity at both the international and domestic levels forced a redirection of strategy into minimalist market reform.

Examples of offensive international strategy—involving the creation of new international regimes that facilitate domestic adjustment—are less numerous. The Nixon shocks of 1971 could be included here. Although the style of the initiative appears defensive, the unilateral American moves in the international monetary regime did serve to create a new, if ill-defined, regime.

At a different level of initiative, the efforts by developing countries to create a New International Economic Order can be understood as an

[30] Schmiegelow (fn. 15).

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	International	Domestic
Offensive	Create new international regime *Bretton Woods* *GATT* *N.I.E.O.*	Change domestic structure *Export offensive* *Industrial restructuring*
Defensive	Maintain or protect regime *Orderly marketing agreements* *I.E.A.*	Protect domestic structure *Tariffs* *Subsidies*

FIGURE 2
ADJUSTMENT CASES

attempt to solve internal adjustment problems by restructuring international economic rules. Krasner develops a variant of this thesis. Third-world countries, he argues, are "exposed to vacillations of an international system from which they cannot extricate themselves but over which they have limited control." Because of equally obdurate internal weaknesses, developing countries have consistently sought to create international regimes that will mitigate this structural vulnerability.[31]

Defensive international strategy is the most difficult to specify empirically. It is international in that it involves cooperative behavior between states, and it is defensive in that it seeks to preserve existing arrangements. Washington's efforts to organize a response to the oil shocks by oil-consuming countries is an ill-fated example of such a strategy. Other illustrations are negotiated production-sharing arrangements found in such areas as textiles and steel. Let us take a closer look at the case of American energy adjustment.

[31] Krasner (fn. 13).

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The Limits of U.S. International Energy Strategy

The United States responded to the initial oil shocks by launching an international offensive strategy that attempted to salvage the old petroleum order. Because of limitations on U.S. international and domestic capacity, this strategy was grudgingly abandoned in favor of more modest domestic measures.

Interest in an international solution to energy shortages surfaced before the October 1973 crisis. Urging a united front against OPEC, one State Department official had written in early 1973 that the Western importing nations should create an "international authority" that would avoid cut-throat competition for available energy. He argued that "such competition could drive prices far higher than we can presently imagine."[32]

American policy evolved through several stages. During the 1973-1974 oil-price shock, Secretary of State Kissinger led the U.S. interest in confronting OPEC directly in an attempt to roll back prices. Unable to achieve any results through ministerial contacts with selected OPEC countries, American officials encouraged the organization of Western importing countries to confront OPEC on a unified basis. Kissinger wanted to coordinate the energy policies of the advanced industrial countries and to unite the consuming nations in jointly reducing oil consumption and thus providing the conditions for OPEC price moderation. Although other Western countries were skeptical of this American initiative, a conference was held in Washington in February 1974. Agreement was reached by November among 17 advanced consuming countries (with France abstaining) on the creation of the International Energy Agency (I.E.A.). Despite Kissinger's more ambitious plans for the use of the new international organization,[33] the I.E.A. remained a modest mechanism for contingency oil-sharing arrangements. It became a focal point for a variety of defensive international schemes that were proposed, in the wake of the first oil shocks, to mitigate the financial and oil-import vulnerabilities of the Western consuming countries.[34] But as a mechanism to recapture the erstwhile petroleum order, the I.E.A. fell short of American hopes. As if to reject the plausibility of the confrontational American position formally, the OPEC Economic Commission announced a further four-percent price rise, to take effect on January 1, 1975.

[32] James E. Akins, "The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here," *Foreign Affairs* 51 (No. 3, 1973), 487.

[33] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, address by Henry Kissinger, November 14, 1974.

[34] Nazli Choucri, *International Politics of Energy Interdependence: The Case of Petroleum* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1976), 61-75.

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In the meantime, U.S. strategy shifted again. Rather than confront OPEC in an effort to reestablish the old petroleum regime, Washington—still seeking an international adjustment solution—moved to a more defensive posture. The idea now was for the United States to facilitate a dialogue between consuming and producing nations in order to establish stable international oil prices. In order to protect massive Western investments in energy development, Kissinger proposed a "common price floor" for oil. "Paradoxically," Kissinger argued, "in order to protect the major investments in the industrialized countries that are needed to bring the international oil price down, we must ensure that the price for oil on the domestic market does not fall below a certain price." He also proposed an international consortium to pool capital for energy investment as well as to conduct joint research and development. By establishing these agreements among the consuming nations, Kissinger envisaged more constructive negotiations with OPEC on prices, stable markets, and petrodollar recycling. The bargain Kissinger sought to strike with OPEC turned on the logic that OPEC should "accept a significant price reduction now in return for stability over a longer period, or they can run the risk of a dramatic break in prices when the program of alternative energy sources begins to pay off."[35]

In this way, Kissinger's offensive international strategy moved toward a more defensive position while still attempting to structure an international price-floor agreement to stabilize the regime. This also failed. Aside from the I.E.A., the consuming countries were not able to develop an effective international strategy for containing or stabilizing the petroleum regime. By September 1974, at a joint meeting of the I.M.F. and the World Bank, financial officials from 124 nations were talking about how to live with dramatically high oil prices. For those countries without the ability to contain the oil shocks internationally, adjustment was already moving to the national level.

The price-floor proposal met with protracted debate within the I.E.A. The European Common Market countered with a more elaborate multitiered price plan. Individual countries tendered reservations to the various price-floor proposals. Great Britain was concerned with the fate of its coal industry; West Germany wanted further study; Japan did not want to confront OPEC, and its foreign minister protested that the price plan was "beyond the bounds of reason."[36] In the end, neither the I.E.A. nor the E.E.C. endorsed the proposal.

[35] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, address by Henry Kissinger, February 3, 1975.

[36] Arabinda Ghosh, *OPEC, the Petroleum Industry, and United States Energy Policy* (London: Quorum Books, 1983), 155.

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Kissinger followed the logic of the price-floor idea to an extreme. The proposal had given legitimacy to the demands of other commodity producers for cartel agreements on prices. By May 1975, Kissinger acknowledged that international agreements covering other raw materials would be considered on a "case-by-case basis." Later that year, he proposed specific international commissions to explore and negotiate commodity agreements. These efforts to stabilize international resource and commodity markets did not provide any headway on the ultimate American goal—namely, to induce OPEC to moderate or reduce oil prices. The demise of the U.S. international adjustment strategy came in late 1976. On the eve of the seven-nation Conference on International Economic Cooperation (C.I.E.C.), Kissinger sent word to the other industrialized countries conceding that "there is no negotiable package which the industrialized countries could accept and which would also present sufficient inducement to OPEC to refrain from a substantial oil price increase over several years, given the lack of leverage by consumers over oil prices."[37]

When it became clear that international initiatives which might have moderated or even rolled back OPEC price increases had not succeeded, U.S. policy was left with domestic measures. Initially Washington sought to reshape domestic supply and demand in order to draw down oil import levels. The most ambitious efforts of the late Ford and early Carter administrations included proposals for massive government financing of domestic alternative energy resources and elaborate taxing and spending programs to promote various energy production and conservation goals. The purpose of the proposals was to bring the government into the energy sector in new and more extensive ways in order to reshape and enlarge the domestic industry. In effect, the United States was moving toward an offensive domestic strategy.

This strategy ran up against structural constraints—in this case domestic incapacities of the U.S. government to bring programmatic planning and control into the sector. Although a patchwork of fiscally based programs did emerge, the final chapter of American adjustment strategy was being written. Beginning in January 1975 with the Ford administration's commitment to decontrol oil prices, U.S. adjustment policy came to emphasize a market strategy. Although the government had few tools and institutional links with the energy sector with which to pursue a more interventionist strategy, it did have the ability to tinker with the market. In the face of new levels of dependence on imports and another oil price upheaval in 1979, decontrol became increasingly attractive. In

[37] *New York Times*, December 14, 1976.

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April 1979, the Carter administration decided to begin a phased-in program of oil decontrol.

Within six years—between 1973 and 1979—American adjustment policy had traversed three of the four adjustment strategies. After its initial ambitious international designs to reshape and defend the old petroleum order by seeking to restructure the international regime to meet the exigencies of national adjustment, the United States grudgingly had to recast and scale down its policy objectives. By the end of the period, U.S. policy remained at the mercy of the oil-price revolution and the new regime it had ushered in.

The early confrontational American position had been premised on the ability of the U.S. to reduce its oil imports and to increase domestic production. Indeed, at a secret session of a September 1974 Washington Conference, Kissinger had attempted to persuade the foreign and finance ministers of France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and Italy to cooperate in decreasing their oil consumption by 15 percent.[38] In its own disappointing efforts to move toward greater energy self-sufficiency, the administration found that, even if energy supply and demand were not entirely price inelastic, U.S. political institutions were utterly unresponsive. International offensive strategy needs to be undergirded by sufficient and relevant domestic resources and capacities. In this case, the capacity to reduce oil imports—and thus to take the upward pressure off international prices—was missing.[39]

The American case supports the central propositions of the adjustment model. This is true both for the intentional aspects of the model, where there is a ranking in preferences, and for the structural aspects, in which states are expected to shift to the level where possibilities for action exist. The sequence of strategies adopted by state officials, which moved from offensive international action to domestic offensive action, is explained by the intervening role of both domestic and international structures.

German and Japanese Energy Adjustment

The West German and Japanese experiences with energy adjustment do not provide as full an illustration of the model as that of the United States. Still, these cases are examples of state strategies that move between

[38] Ghosh (fn. 36), 151.

[39] The importance of domestic capacity to the hegemonic behavior of a dominant international power has been noted by others. See Arthur A. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order," *International Organization* 38 (Spring 1984); and Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977," in Holsti, Siverson, and George (fn. 10).

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international defensive and domestic offensive positions; the importance of structure is also reaffirmed.

Lacking the claims to international hegemonic leadership that guided the initial American designs for adjustment, the Germans and Japanese moved more quickly toward a domestic offensive strategy. Energy adjustment took the form of industrial and trade policy, with the state encouraging industrial competitiveness and efficiency across all sectors. Japan—and, to a lesser extent, West Germany—responded to the shocks by launching a commercial offensive, attempting to make up for balance-of-payments problems by selling more exports—particularly to the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East. Both states also engaged in some industrial restructuring. Japan scaled down or phased out parts of some energy-intensive industries such as aluminum and petrochemicals.[40]

West Germany's competitive adjustment was reflected in its support for the programmatic doctrine of positive adjustment that emerged in the late 1970s within the O.E.C.D. This doctrine advocated market adjustments and positive government action to support the transition out of declining industries. Governments and businesses were exhorted to transfer resources into more competitive sectors rather than to erect protectionist barriers and subsidies.[41] The United States embraced this position in principle, but was less willing than Germany to pursue its policy consequences.[42]

West Germany's domestic offensive strategy went beyond measures to confront the oil shocks directly. It became part of a larger long-term effort to keep the national economy in a favorable competitive position. Leading state and Social Democratic Party experts began to articulate this position in the early 1970s as one that would put the state at the center of "goal-oriented" and forward-looking plans for industrial change. The policy included support for advanced technology industries and for social policy that anticipated labor-force requirements; it strengthened corporatist institutions that would bind together labor and management.[43]

Actual political practice diverged from this articulated state goal even though the offensive strategy did have support. The strategy—known as "Modell Deutschland"—did form the basis for the Social Democratic

[40] Raymond Vernon, *Two Hungry Giants: The United States and Japan in the Quest for Oil and Ores* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 105-6; Edward Boyer, "How Japan Manages Declining Industries," *Fortune*, January 10, 1983.

[41] O.E.C.D. (fn. 28).

[42] Stephen Wilks and Kenneth Dyson, "The Character and Economic Context of Industrial Crises," in Dyson and Wilks, eds., *Industrial Crisis: A Comparative Study of the State and Industry* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

[43] Josef Esser and Wolfgang Fach with Kenneth Dyson, " 'Social market' and Modernization Policy: West Germany," in Dyson and Wilks, *ibid.*

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Party's election campaign in 1976.[44] The outcome was to be economic vitality and international competitiveness, implemented through a systematic policy of structural modernization of the economy. Institutionally, the policy resulted in the establishment of the Ministry of Research and Technology in the early 1970s and in the liberal funding of this and other agencies supporting export-oriented industrial change.[45]

Japan's offensive domestic strategy was more elegantly formulated and more coherently implemented than that of West Germany. It consisted of a sequence of specific steps that were carried out after 1973 to tackle problems of inflation, balance-of-payments deficits, growth, and unemployment. In the first phase (1973-1975), Japan pursued a tight monetary policy to address inflationary pressures. In the second phase (1975-1977), exports began to restore equilibrium in trade payments—helped by a depreciated currency and overall growth in world markets. Finally, in the third phase (1977-1979), growth was restored to previous levels.[46]

Within this macroeconomic context, the Japanese state initiated specific programs to encourage efficient use of industrial energy and competitive export trade positions. One Japanese specialist notes:

> Since 1973, Japan's industrial structure has changed in three main directions. First, the share of manufacturing industries in total production and employment decreased, while that of the tertiary industries increased significantly. Second, raw and intermediate materials industries, such as steel and aluminum, decreased in importance, and processing industries, such as machinery and pharmaceuticals, became relatively larger. Third, structurally depressed industries emerged, in need of adjustment and restructuring. This whole process can be seen as movement from a high energy-consuming economy toward a more energy-conserving and more energy-efficient system. . . .[47]

Undergirding this willingness to pursue an offensive strategy were institutions and policy instruments well suited to competitive adjustment. In Japan, the "guidance" mechanisms and financial institutions of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry allowed the government actively to encourage adaptation. In the Federal Republic, the government's role was more limited; semi-public institutions linking commercial banks with industrial groups played a central role in industrial adjustment. The domestic offensive strategy of Germany and Japan was

[44] Andres Markovits, ed., *The Political Economy of West Germany: Modell Deutschland* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

[45] Esser and others (fn. 43).

[46] Teruyasu Murakami, "The Remarkable Adaption of Japan's Economy," in Daniel Yergin and Martin Hillenbrand, eds., *Global Insecurity: A Strategy for Energy & Economic Renewal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

[47] *Ibid.*, 143.

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distinctive in that it was a multisector adjustment that involved the state in a wide range of negotiations and compromises with affected industries in order to promote competitive commercial change.

These cases do not show the shifting of adjustment strategy—found in the American case—that helped to reveal the ranking of state preferences. Nonetheless, the Japanese and German experiences with energy adjustment point to the willingness of states to promote competitive adjustment where domestic structural circumstances permit. German and Japanese state officials might have preferred an international regime agreement to moderate OPEC prices, but they were not in a position to craft such an ambitious scheme. Also, with more flexible domestic institutions, domestic offensive policy was less costly than it was for the United States. Indeed, even if state officials in the U.S. had wished to bear heavy political (or governance) costs for offensive change, domestic structures precluded its implementation. It remains a speculative point whether these differences may have influenced the willingness of Germany and Japan to concede oil price rises to OPEC while the United States remained tenacious in its efforts well into 1975. States with less adaptability in domestic institutions, but with at least a glimmer of international influence, are more likely to persist in trying to find international solutions to adjustment problems.

Conclusion

The conception of the state as a strategic actor goes back at least as far as Machiavelli. Indeed, it is at the heart of the Realist vision of international relations. Yet the Realist tradition has been concerned primarily with the state's external struggle for power and wealth. The idea of an autonomous and purposive state, lodged between national and international systems, raises issues of the alternative political domains in which state goals are pursued, and of the trade-offs between them. The present analysis has sought to explore the logic of the Janus-faced state in the context of national adjustment to international economic change.

The notion that there are alternative "external" and "internal" arenas for state activity has been suggested by others. In his discussion of the balancing of geopolitical power in a bipolar world, for example, Kenneth Waltz argues that the superpowers tend to resort to internal rather than external strategies—"relying on their own capabilities rather than on the capabilities of allies." Because of superior reliability and precision, mobilization of domestic resources becomes a more attractive option than re-

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liance on the resources of allies.[48] Waltz's insight is suggestive of the present argument. A state can pursue goals—be they geopolitical balance or economic adjustment—by moving either nationally or internationally; the actual strategies chosen will hinge on broad structural characteristics that frame its environment.

The cases of adjustment discussed here do not suggest clear-cut commitments to a single policy. States that are faced with serious international challenges will engage in all sorts of efforts in all types of venues to address such problems. But the emphasis on strategy—which attempts to strip away the "noise" and to focus on the fundamental decisions—does provide a bit more clarity.[49] This analysis suggests a need to broaden our perspective. A state that seemingly engages in tedious domestic politics may actually be solving the same sort of problem as another state that engages in international politics. By focusing on the motivations and limits on state adjustment strategy, new insights can be found concerning the methodology of state action, located as it is at the intersection of domestic and international political economy.

[48] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1979), 168.

[49] The variety of state initiatives suggests a further possibility. Because I have invoked a conception of the state as an actor making choices that maximize particular economic values and minimize political costs, it is possible to argue that states will pursue more than one strategy, embracing each in turn until the marginal costs of the policy equals the marginal returns. Thus, states will attempt to change domestic and international structures until the costs equal the benefits. They will also attempt to hold on to existing domestic and international structures until the costs equal the benefits.

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CULTURE AND DECISION MAKING IN CHINA, JAPAN, RUSSIA, AND THE UNITED STATES

By FRITZ GAENSLEN*

HUMAN beings are suspended in webs of significance they themselves have spun.[1] To add specificity to the metaphor, we can think of the filaments of these webs as assumptions—assumptions about such things as human nature; causality; the possible, the desirable, and the appropriate; the nature of the physical environment; and the relationship of human beings to their fellows. Where these assumptions are shared, where they define a "life-world" for a collectivity of people, they constitute what is commonly referred to as a culture. In this study, I shall focus on shared assumptions about the relationship of human beings to their fellows. More specifically, I shall present evidence that suggests (1) that Chinese, Japanese, and Russians tend to have somewhat different conceptions of "self" and "others" than do Americans, and that the former tend to be more collectivist than the latter; and (2) that these different conceptions have implications for collective decision making under conditions of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. Observing differences in the processes by which persons in a disagreement try to influence one another, I offer a particular sort of explanation for these differences—a cultural explanation.

Cultural Explanations and Political Science

Cultural explanations are not currently a prominent feature of mainstream political science research. In fact, although the concept of "culture" enjoyed a certain popularity in the 1960s and early 1970s,[2] and although one occasionally receives an indication of isolated pockets of

* I would like to thank John P. Burke, John Creighton Campbell, Michel Oksenberg, Robert D. Putnam, Ronald Rapoport, Martin K. Whyte, and William Zimmerman for their comments and suggestions.

[1] The metaphor is borrowed from Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5.

[2] See, for example, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

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continuing interest,[3] cultural explanations have largely fallen into disfavor in recent years. They continue to appear in the literature, but as straw men—as explanations to be demolished in order to build "better" ones. These latter explanations generally conceive of man as universal *homo economicus* and focus on the material incentives associated with various alternative behaviors. Such universalist, materialist accounts of human action are often powerfully compelling; at the same time, they are not usually as damaging to cultural accounts as their authors might have us believe.

Consider the following examples. DiFranceisco and Gitelman have observed that most people in the Soviet Union apparently do not think they can make, or even influence, government policy; indeed, they are not even interested in doing so.[4] Should we come to the "cultural" conclusion, then, that most Soviet citizens are passive, deferential, and conformist in their orientation toward governmental authority? No, say DiFranceisco and Gitelman, for the seeming passivity of Soviet citizens in the face of government policy makers disappears when these same citizens confront those who *implement* policy. Working the "output side" of the Soviet system, people pursue their interests with an imagination, cunning, and zeal that would make a businessman blush. In the Soviet Union, to influence policy making is difficult; to influence policy implementation is both necessary and possible.

Susan Shirk sets up a similar argument and analysis in her study of the political behavior of urban Chinese high school students.[5] By Shirk's account, the behavior of Chinese students in ordinary public schools in the early 1960s was characterized by acrimonious political competition, the avoidance of political activists, and a retreat into the private world of friends and family. Should this behavior be interpreted as reflecting the persistence of traditional cultural orientations in the face of the regime's efforts to create a "new socialist man"? No, says Shirk, for students in specialized technical schools and in private, "people-run" schools behaved differently: the former could meet regime demands for political activism secure in the knowledge that such activism would harm neither their friendships nor their careers; they were virtually guaranteed good

[3] See especially David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" *Comparative Politics* 11 (January 1979), 127-45; also Lowell Dittmer, "Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," *World Politics* 29 (July 1977), 552-83.

[4] Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture and 'Covert Participation' in Policy Implementation," *American Political Science Review* 78 (September 1984), 603-21.

[5] Shirk, *Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 4-7, 56-62.

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city jobs after graduation. The latter could ignore political demands altogether; no matter how they behaved, they had virtually no chance of being admitted to a university or being assigned to a good city job. The ordinary high school students behaved the way they did, then, not because they were "feudal remnants," but because they were subject to a set of a regime-designed opportunity structures and incentives that were different from those in technical and private schools. Opportunities for advancement were present for ordinary high school students, but the demand far exceeded the supply.

Finally, Robert Marshall, looking at collective decision making in rural hamlets in Japan, offers a similar analysis.[6] While he was doing his field work, Marshall found a strong tendency toward unanimity in decision making in the hamlets. Is this tendency to be seen as reflecting a national inclination toward harmony, consensus, conformity, solidarity, and tradition? No, says Marshall. Where community action involves committing resources that are already corporate property, and where implementation is possible without the active support of each member, no member will find it worthwhile to voice opposition; thus, where a majority agrees, unanimity results. But where community action depends on individuals committing privately held resources, the structure of incentives is different, and in these cases open division often occurs.

For our purposes, each of these studies makes a valuable, if familiar, point: a focus on national culture is likely to obscure one's vision of the variety of behavior that can occur *within* societies. Moreover, reference to national culture cannot satisfactorily account for such variation. Indeed, the authors of these studies convince us that most people (Americans included) are likely to respond to the variety of situations described in much the manner as the Chinese, Japanese, and Russians. That is to say that these studies, insofar as they are about culture at all, are about similarities among societies. Cultural explanations, however, are not about similarities; they cannot be if the explanations are to be compelling. Cultural explanations are essentially explanations of *differences*; if a study is to say anything about such differences, it must be—as the above studies are not—comparative between societies.

Although comparison is a necessary condition for a compelling cultural explanation, it is not a sufficient one. The following example concerns how citizens make up their minds how to vote: Do they give the greatest weight to their party identification, their evaluation of the candidates, or their evaluation of the issues? Evidence suggests that Japanese

[6] Marshall, *Collective Decision Making in Rural Japan*, Michigan Papers in Japanese Studies (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, 1984), 145-55.

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voters give greater weight to the candidate component than do Americans or West Europeans; many analysts have interpreted this difference as reflecting the greater "personalism" of the Japanese. More convincing, however, is Thomas Rochon's explanation that the difference lies in Japan's unusual electoral system. Because Japan employs multimember, single-vote districts, with the seats going to the top finishers in the district, the larger Japanese political parties often nominate more than one candidate per district. As a result, a candidate's party label cannot by itself determine a voter's choice; voters must eventually consider the individual candidates.[7]

Another example concerns a difference in industrial practice between the Soviet Union and China in the 1950s. In the view of a number of writers, Chinese leaders abandoned the piece-rate incentive system employed in Soviet industry because they regarded it as too individualistic and contrary to traditional Chinese orientations whereby people are to be motivated through their attachment to a group. Andrew Walder argues, however, that China simply did not have the trained personnel necessary to administer such a system properly, that supply shortages and administrative confusion in the wake of Liberation undermined the successful operation of this system, and that the piece-rate system impeded the efforts of the party to establish control over industrial managers.[8]

In both of these comparative examples, a cultural explanation of differences is pitted against a structural explanation—and found wanting. Why do the structural explanations seem more persuasive? It is not because structural explanations are necessarily correct or because cultural explanations are necessarily wrongheaded. The problem is of the chicken-and-egg variety: people hold beliefs, attitudes, and values that lead them to create particular institutions (for example, electoral systems); institutions lead people to hold particular beliefs, attitudes, and values; and so on. Implicit in each explanation is an understanding of human motives and behavior which, by itself, is inadequate to the complexity of real life.

Cultural explanations—those that account for differences in human behavior by reference to differences in the enduring, internal dispositions of individuals—understate the extent to which individuals can be made to behave contrary to their dispositions as well as the extent to which the dispositions themselves can be changed. In other words, purely cultural

[7] Rochon, "Electoral Systems and the Basis of the Vote: The Case of Japan," in John C. Campbell, ed., *Parties, Candidates, and Voters in Japan: Six Quantitative Studies*, Michigan Papers in Japanese Studies (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, 1981).

[8] Walder, "Work and Authority in Chinese Industry: State Socialism and the Institutional Culture of Dependency," Ph.D. diss. (University of Michigan, 1981), 157.

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accounts of human behavior portray man as *less* malleable than we suspect he really is.

Structural explanations fall victim to the opposite error. Structural explanations—those that account for differences in human behavior by reference to differences in the structure of rewards and punishments associated with various social arrangements—assume that a shift in the structure of rewards and punishments will automatically produce a shift in what individuals think and do. Such explanations overstate the extent to which people are able to discern the structure of rewards and punishments inherent in any situation, and understate the extent to which people find meaning and satisfaction in adhering to their beliefs, attitudes, and values. A purely structural understanding of human motives and behavior cannot, for example, satisfactorily account for the persistence of certain attitudes about the role of government among Soviet emigrés to Israel[9] or among Chinese emigrés to Hong Kong[10] despite a marked change in the structure of incentives these emigrés face. In other words, purely structural accounts of human behavior portray man as *more* malleable than we suspect he really is.

The question then is, under what circumstances is a cultural explanation likely to seem most persuasive? The above discussion suggests two rules. First, the smaller the conceptual distance between cultural variables and what one wishes to explain by them, the more compelling a cultural explanation is likely to be. The direct connection between "culture" and a dependent variable like "level of economic development"[11] or "degree of democratic stability"[12] will always seem tenuous. Second, cultural explanations are likely to seem most persuasive when the individuals whose behavior is to be explained are unclear about the structure of rewards and punishments they face—when their situation is characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity.

Interpersonal Relations and Decision Making

Do assumptions about the relationship of individuals to their fellows affect the collective decision processes of political elites? This question is part of a larger one: Are there grounds for believing that interpersonal

[9] See Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture: Insights from Jewish Emigrés," *Soviet Studies* 29 (October 1977), 543-64.

[10] See Martin K. Whyte and William L. Parish, *Urban Life in Contemporary China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 337; Jay Mathews and Linda Mathews, *One Billion: A China Chronicle* (New York: Random House, 1983), 161.

[11] David McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (New York: Free Press, 1961).

[12] Almond and Verba (fn. 2).

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relations affect the decision processes of political elites? Do concerns about such things as friendship, status, and loyalty have an impact on how political leaders conduct themselves with one another in the context of small-group decision making? A voluminous laboratory literature suggests that such concerns do indeed affect the behavior of decision makers.[13] How might the skeptic respond to this literature? Beyond questioning the face validity of most bargaining games,[14] and beyond noting that laboratory participants are not usually political elites, a skeptic might argue that laboratory studies are able to show the effects they do precisely because the "noise" of the real world has been eliminated, and that aspects of interpersonal relations affect group decision processes in the laboratory because there the tasks that confront decision makers are not particularly compelling. Real-world decision makers may agree with this assessment. High public officials and managers in large organizations commonly understand their own behavior—and certainly represent that behavior to outsiders—largely in terms of objectives external to the decision-making group. "Important events have important causes," we are told, and interpersonal concerns take a backseat to "getting the job done."[15]

The skeptic, however, overestimates the extent to which "getting the job done" is a straightforward source of motivation for political leaders. As Alexander George and others have observed, the issues confronting top decision makers are often characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity.[16] Leaders may find it difficult to devise a single yardstick capable of reconciling the multiple and competing values and interests embedded in a particular issue; they frequently lack the information needed to assess the outcomes associated with various alternatives; and they may even find it difficult to determine their preferences in a given situation in the first place.

In these circumstances, interpersonal concerns are likely to intrude on decision making for two reasons. First, insofar as complexity, uncer-

[13] See, for example, Alvin Zander, "The Psychology of Group Processes," *Annual Review of Psychology* 30 (1979), 417-51; Joseph E. McGrath, *Groups: Interaction and Performance* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984).

[14] See Charlan Nemeth, "A Critical Analysis of Research Utilizing the Prisoner's Dilemma Paradigm for the Study of Bargaining," in Leonard Berkowitz, ed., *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, VI (New York: Academic Press, 1972), 203-34; Barry R. Schlenker and Thomas V. Bonoma, "Fun and Games: The Validity of Games for the Study of Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22 (March 1978), 7-38.

[15] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 4; Chris Argyris, "Some Unintended Consequences of Rigorous Research," *Psychological Bulletin* 70 (November 1968), 190.

[16] George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 26-28.

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tainty, and ambiguity induce psychological stress in decision makers, a focus on interpersonal concerns can help to relieve this stress. In one version of this process, participants test their beliefs not against external reality but against the beliefs of their fellow decision makers, seeking certainty in the converging opinions of other people.[17] In another version, participants import into the decision-making arena such private concerns as their self-esteem, their career prospects, their bureaucratic resources, and the approval or disapproval of others because they find it easier to act with confidence on the basis of these concerns than on the basis of the public issue with all its murkiness.[18]

Second, to the extent that decision-making situations are characterized by complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity, those who evaluate the performance of decision makers will have little choice but to base their judgment, in substantial measure, on the quality of an individual's relations with his colleagues. As studies of corporations show, the higher one climbs in an organization, the more vague the evaluative criteria are likely to become, and the more one is likely to be evaluated on the basis of such things as trustworthiness, loyalty, and being "a good team player."[19] This conclusion is also supported by evidence which shows that, generally speaking, the higher the rung of both the political ladder and the corporate ladder, the more socially homogeneous the occupants.[20] In other words, the greater the complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity associated with an organizational level, the greater the likelihood that elites will select recruits in their own image. Decision makers who realize the importance of interpersonal relations for their careers, then, can be expected to view decision-making situations as opportunities to demonstrate the proper behavior toward their colleagues—perhaps to the neglect of the decision problem itself.

To these theoretical reasons for the impact of interpersonal relations on elite decision making we can add the testimony of elite decision makers themselves. Affection, esprit de corps, respect, the desire for the regard of one's colleagues, the desire to be part of the group, the perception of status differences, the formality or informality of meetings, and loyalty—all appear in the reminiscences of former government decision makers as having an impact on group decision processes and as affecting the definition

[17] John D. Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 121-22.

[18] See George (fn. 16), 26-27; Steinbruner (fn. 17), 145.

[19] Rosabeth Moss Kanter, *Men and Women of the Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 47-68.

[20] See Robert D. Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 33-36, 108-109; Kanter (fn. 19), 47-68.

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of decision problems, the quality of information brought to bear on these problems, the number of alternatives considered, and the scrutiny to which these alternatives are subjected.[21]

In sum, grounds exist for believing that interpersonal relations often affect the decision processes of political elites. The impact of cultural assumptions about the meaning of "self" and "others" can be thought of as a subset of these concerns. Because decision makers carry around with them conceptions of what *particular* people (their fellow decision makers) are like, we may reasonably suppose that they also carry around with them conceptions of what *people in general* (including their fellow decision makers) are like; these conceptions may vary from one society to another.

Data and Methods

Although the data are unusual enough to merit detailed discussion, limitations of space require that I restrict myself to the essentials.[22]

The complete data consist of one thousand interpersonal disagreements drawn from contemporary Chinese, Japanese, Soviet Russian, and American fiction. An interpersonal disagreement was said to exist whenever at least two characters verbally expressed to one another that they had opposing interests or contradictory evaluations of some state of affairs. Examples of disagreements include a student arguing with a professor over a course grade, a rickshaw puller and his customer haggling over the fare, two peasants arguing about which is the best spot in the market for selling their cooperative's vegetables, a party organizer in a publishing house and the head of the secretarial pool arguing over who should be in charge in the absence of the latter, a geisha and her patron arguing about the nature of their relationship, and a mine chief and a district engineer arguing about whether to emphasize innovation or the fulfilling of production quotas.

I construe such disagreements to be an opportunity for these persons to attempt to influence each other, and the resolution of the disagreement, whatever form it takes (including nonresolution), to be the decision. That

[21] See Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decision and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); Larry Berman, *Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam* (New York: Norton, 1982); George (fn. 16). We should not dismiss the possibility, however, that the reminiscences of political elites are distorted by memory and by the desire to impose meaning on the past.

[22] For greater detail, see Fritz Gaenslen, "Fiction and Reality: A Case Study," *Sociological Methods and Research* 10 (May 1982), 379-420; Fritz Gaenslen, "Culture and Decision Making: Social Influence in China, Japan, Soviet Russia, and the United States," Ph.D. diss. (University of Michigan, 1984).

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is not as much an oversimplification of decision-making reality as might at first appear. Although analysts of decision processes commonly distinguish between the stages of search, evaluation, and choice, evidence suggests that these stages are seldom distinct in practice, and that the process of choice tends to structure or bias the activities of search and evaluation.[23] In focusing on interpersonal disagreements, and on who says what to whom with what effect, I focus on the deliberations associated with choice.

Disagreements were drawn, in order of their appearance, from short stories and novels selected at random from six different lists: (1) government-controlled Chinese fiction published between 1951 and 1976 in Beijing; (2) Chinese fiction not subject to government control published in China between 1918 and 1949; (3) Soviet Russian fiction, government-controlled and published in Moscow between 1946 and 1970; (4) *samizdat* fiction, written in the Soviet Union but smuggled to the West without undergoing Soviet censorship; (5) Japanese fiction published between 1900 and 1970; and (6) American fiction published between 1900 and 1970. Although these lists do not define the universe of published fiction for each society, they are adequate for present purposes: we require (1) a sufficient number of disagreements and sufficient dispersion of these disagreements on the variables thought necessary to describe them and (2) a sufficient number of authors so as not to be overly dependent on the particular worldviews of particular authors. Of the 514 works by 272 different authors that were read, 337 contained disagreements; 1000 of these disagreements were examined.[24]

[23] See Alexander George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review* 66 (September 1972), 751-85; K. R. MacCrimmon and R. N. Taylor, "Decision-making and Problem-solving," in Marvin Dunnette, ed., *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976), 1397-1453.

[24] The government-controlled Chinese list consisted of all fiction appearing in the monthly journal *Chinese Literature* (Peking: Foreign Language Press), and also listed in Meishi Tsai's *Contemporary Chinese Novels and Short Stories 1949-1974: An Annotated Bibliography* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979) as having been available to mainland Chinese readers. The uncensored Chinese list consisted of all fiction mentioned in Donald A. Gibbs and Yun-chen Li, *A Bibliography of Studies and Translations of Modern Chinese Literature 1918-1942* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). The government-controlled Soviet list consisted of all fiction appearing in the monthly journal *Soviet Literature* (Moscow: Writers Union of the U.S.S.R.) and set in the R.S.F.S.R. The Soviet *samizdat* list consisted of all appropriate fiction mentioned in Max Hayward, "Literature in the Soviet Period 1917-1975," in Robert Auty and Dimitri Obolensky, eds., *Companion to Russian Studies 2: An Introduction to Russian Language and Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 185-230, or in Deming Brown, *Soviet Russian Literature Since Stalin* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). The Japanese list consisted of all fiction mentioned in Yukio Fujino, *Modern Japanese Literature in Western Translations: A Bibliography, 1868 to the Present* (Tokyo: International House of Japan Library, 1972), or appearing in *Japan Quarterly* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbum) between 1972 and 1977. The American list consisted of all fiction appearing in the annual anthology, *Best American Short Stories*, between 1915 and 1970 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin).

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Can fiction be read reliably? Each disagreement was identified and coded by two persons working independently of each other. Coders were college seniors or graduate students with backgrounds in literature. An example of a codebook entry is:

> An "expert argument" consists of one disputant explaining to the other, "Do it this way and the environment will cause such-and-such a consequence," or "Do it this way because it will work best." How prominent in the attempt to resolve this dispute is expert argument?
>
> 1. Prominent.
> 2. Present.
> 3. Absent.

For some thirty variables, the range of intercoder agreement extended from a high of 99.9 percent to a low of 82.4 percent. What was found in the fiction, then, is not the result of idiosyncratic reading; it is really there, or more accurately, intersubjectively "there" to be found.

What about validity? Or, put another way, what is the relationship between fictional descriptions of disagreements and real disagreements? Our hypothesis proposes that, although authors of fiction choose their outcomes, they tend to be constrained by reality in depicting the processes that produce these outcomes. Thus, frequency distributions on single variables may *not* reflect reality, but relationships between variables *should*. This hypothesis was put to a test in which 36 findings were culled from the social psychology literature on conflict resolution and from the anthropological literature on dispute settlement. Two examples of such findings are that:

A. The more equal the disputants in status, the more likely a contested good will be divided according to the principle of equality rather than equity.
B. Arbitrated disagreements are more likely than mediated disagreements to result in outcomes in which one disputant dominates.

The 36 social science findings were compared with each set of fictional findings. Three results merit our attention. First, the correlations in the fiction subject to government censorship (Chinese and Soviet) were generally lower than the correlations in the corresponding uncensored fiction (pre-1949 Chinese and *samizdat*). Second, where there was a substantial difference between a pre-1949 Chinese correlation and a post-1949 correlation, there also tended to be a substantial difference between the two Soviet correlations. Together, these findings suggest that government control in *both* China and the Soviet Union has worked to reduce somewhat the mimetic power of Chinese and Soviet fiction. The most important result, however, is that 87 percent of the social science findings, on the average, were supported in each of the four sets of uncensored fiction.

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Moreover, the supported findings overwhelmingly tended to be the same ones in each set. In short, the data suggest that authors do, indeed, tend to describe human action in realistically probable terms, and that fiction can be a valid source for the exploration of regularities in human social behavior.

Lest the reader remain doubtful as to the potential value of fiction, let us adduce some of the advantages that fiction has over conventional ways of studying decision making. First, it eliminates the problem of "social desirability" that we may encounter when we ask people how they make decisions. Whatever the extent of a reader's involvement in fiction, the behavior of the characters remains undisturbed. Second, the problem of "observer contamination" in connection with decision processes that are observed directly is also eliminated, for the same reason. Third, the problem of limited access often experienced in field research is no longer so overwhelming. We need not draw inferences based on a meager number of cases; fiction permits us to make a large number of observations not only in the United States, but also, as in the present study, in China, Japan, and Soviet Russia. Finally, the problem of verisimilitude often associated with laboratory studies is also resolved. Fiction tends to have natural settings: characters have "real" relationships with one another, and the issues they confront have "real" meaning.[25]

Individualism and Collectivism

No universally agreed-upon dimensions exist for describing the different ways people might conceive of self, others, or an individual's relation to his fellows. However, the individualist-collectivist dimension, while no doubt oversimplifying a complex and variegated reality, remains useful. Not only do the concepts of individualism and collectivism enjoy wide currency in political and social thought; they are also part of the everyday language of peripatetic journalists and scholars—including those travel-

[25] It is appropriate here to say something about the use of fiction in English translation. In a study concerned with the impact of interpersonal relations on how people behave in disagreements, the use of translations is less than ideal because speech often contains subtle clues as to the nature of the relationship between speaker and listener. The reader who relies on translations, then, may be left with fewer clues with which to work. In the present case, however, the available clues were sufficient; if they had not been, we should have found much less agreement between the readers in their coding of the variables and much less correspondence between fiction and reality. Although elements of tone, idiom, and characterization may be lost in the move from one language to another, this is less likely to be the case with plot, with the who-says-what-to-whom-with-what-effect that is the stuff of disagreements. For present purposes, it is irrelevant to what extent the translated fiction is representative of fiction that has not been translated. The proper question is whether there is some basis for supposing that in *this* fiction relationships between variables will mirror those found in life. For the uncensored fiction, I have reported such a basis.

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ing back and forth between China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. In ideal-typical terms, individualists conceive of people as if they were unconnected atoms, whereas collectivists conceive of people as if they were interdependent parts of a larger organic whole. In the former conception, individuals are "pictured abstractly as given," autonomous from society, "with given interests, wants, purposes [and] needs."[26] In the latter conception, man does not constitute society, but society constitutes man. Community is "an integral part of the human psyche, united in consciousness with individuality, so that sociality and individuality ... are not antagonistic but mutually supportive."[27] These ideal-type conceptions may be thought of as defining the end points of a *continuum* along which, in principle, the real conceptions of real people can be located. In this view, real people embody tensions within themselves

> between desire or interests on one hand and duty or obligation on the other; between belief in equality and the demand for differential reward, status, and prestige; between the liking for privacy and the enjoyment of collective activity; ... and between selfishness and altruism.[28]

In other words, I do not conceive of Americans as individualists and of Chinese, Japanese, and Russians as collectivists, nor of Chinese, Japanese, and Russians as sharing an identical understanding of self and other persons. I argue only that Chinese, Japanese, and Russians tend to be closer than Americans to the collectivist end of the individualist-collectivist spectrum. If this understanding is correct, then we should expect the processes of social influence of Americans to differ from those of Chinese, Japanese, and Russians in predictable ways, at least under conditions of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity.

HYPOTHESIS 1: THE POWER OF NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS

Individualists value autonomy, the sense that their thought and actions are not determined by agencies or by causes outside of their control. Collectivists, on the other hand, find satisfaction in being part of some larger social entity and in submitting their will to the needs and goals of the group. The individualist, then, is a stronger supporter of liberty, while the collectivist is a stronger supporter of hierarchy and authority. The individualist finds the idea of rights congenial, but is troubled by the notion of duties and obligations; for the collectivist, it is the reverse. In addition, the individualist believes that each individual knows his own interests

[26] Steven Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), 73.
[27] Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Mind and Politics: An Approach to the Meaning of Liberal and Socialist Individualism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 14.
[28] J. Roland Pennock, *Democratic Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 59.

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best; the collectivist, by contrast, finds it conceivable that others know better.[29]

It follows that, in disagreements between superiors and subordinates, collectivist superiors will enjoy an advantage over their subordinates that their individualist counterparts do not possess in the same degree: collectivist subordinates, more than individualist ones, are likely to find the normative arguments of their superiors compelling. First, collectivists will be more likely to share the values of their superiors, to be members of the same moral universe. Second, even in those instances where they do not share the values of their superiors, collectivists will be more inclined to fulfill the duties and obligations of their subordinate status. Conceiving of themselves and others as parts of a larger organic whole, collectivists will more readily submit to their superiors because this is the subordinate's role. "Role" should be a better predictor of collectivist behavior than of individualist behavior.

A normative argument consists of saying or implying, "Do it this way because it is right," or "Do it this way because it is proper." It is an appeal to morality, ethics, ideology, or legitimacy. Table 1 shows the association between the prominence of normative arguments (prominent, present, absent) in each disagreement and the likelihood of different disagreement outcomes. The more prominent the use of a normative argument, the more frequently the superior wins in the Chinese, Japanese, and Russian disagreements, but not in American ones.[30] How should we interpret the

[29] I conceive of the pure collectivist as a good deal less egalitarian than some readers might deem appropriate; however, I am concerned with man as I think we have known him historically and not as we, or Marx, or Rousseau, might like him to be.

[30] The statistical associations reported throughout this study are small, and they sometimes do not meet standard levels of formal significance. Are the results likely to be an artifact of chance? Since all of the nine comparisons made in this study (three hypotheses by three countries) are in the expected direction, an argument can be made against such a conclusion. Nevertheless, are the results of sufficient magnitude to warrant our attention? In answering this question, readers should consider the following: First, the data probably understate the differences in cultural assumptions about the meaning of "self" and "others." This is so because these assumptions are not measured directly, but inferred from associations between attitudes and behavior. Research shows that the magnitude of such associations is likely to be modest even under the best of circumstances. (See Howard Schuman and Michael P. Johnson, "Attitudes and Behavior," *Annual Review of Sociology* 2 [1976], 161-207.) Second, the data can also be seen as understating the differential impact of cultural assumptions on small-group decision making among political elites. This is so because we expect this impact to be most noteworthy under conditions of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. In fiction, decision makers often face complexity, but the competing values and interests to be reconciled are rarely those of more than two people. The fictional decision makers also commonly face uncertainty about the relation of means to ends, but rarely do they face complexity at the same time. Finally, in no case do fictional decision makers face ambiguity. Disputants are always able to envision the outcomes they prefer. In short, the situations described in the fiction are simpler than those commonly said to confront political elites. Finally, collective decision processes are likely to be relatively indeterminate in character; in view of such indeterminacy, even modest levels of "explained variance" may be the best we can hope for.

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TABLE 1
ASSOCIATION (GAMMA) BETWEEN THE PROMINENCE OF NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS AND LIKELIHOOD OF DIFFERENT DISAGREEMENT OUTCOMES

	Superior Wins	*Subordinate Wins*	*Other Outcomes*[b]	*n*
China	.15	−.27	.06	63
Japan	.36	−.13	−.28	105
Soviet Union	.16	−.43[a]	.45	37
United States	.08	.05	−.07	92
Censored China	.20	−.37[a]	.11	126
Censored Soviet	.12	−.16	.01	114

[a] Significant at .05 level.
[b] Compromise, Integrative Solution, Avoidance, Failure to Resolve.

absence of this tendency in the American case? Two explanations seem plausible. First, normative arguments may not be especially likely to produce victories for American superiors because they do not produce victories in general. If a normative argument is to convince, disputants must share the same values. Where this circumstance does not exist, we would expect a disagreement that is framed ultimately in terms of normative arguments either to remain unresolved or to end in a compromise, in an integrative (or log-rolling) solution, or in avoidance. Thus, one explanation for the lack of association between normative argument and victory by the superior in the American disagreements may be a relative lack of value consensus in American society. If this explanation were correct, however, we would expect to find a positive association in Table 1 between the prominence of normative arguments and the likelihood of "other outcomes"—but we do not. A second explanation, then, holds that there is sufficient value consensus in American society, but that this consensus favors subordinates and superiors equally. In this view, little positive association exists between normative argument and the success of superiors because subordinates have at their disposal norms, rules, and rights that have grown out of that American tradition which invests sanctity in the individual and which seeks to protect the individual against unwarranted claims from the more powerful. The data are consistent with this interpretation. Table 1 shows that the more prominent the use of normative arguments, the less frequently the subordinate wins in Chinese, Japanese, and Russian disagreements, but not in American disagreements. In China, Japan, and Soviet Russia, superiors thus appear to have an advantage over their subordinates not possessed to the same degree by their American counterparts.

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HYPOTHESIS II: THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SETTINGS

Because individualists want to pursue their own good in their own way, they require a sphere of thought and action free from public interference. Individualists value privacy; for them, the private world takes precedence over the public world. For collectivists, on the other hand, a life restricted to the private world is a life without meaning, for meaning derives from one's place in the collective. The greater importance of the public realm for collectivists is likely to reinforce the advantage of collectivist superiors over their subordinates. In public, collectivist subordinates will be reluctant to challenge superiors, and superiors will be reluctant to permit such challenges, because they risk the collapse of a social order valued by superiors and subordinates alike. For individualists, by contrast, such confrontations do not chance the destruction of an entire community, but only the embarrassment of a few "unconnected atoms." Collectivist superiors, then, will command two advantages not shared to the same degree by their individualist counterparts. First, by keeping decision making in the public realm, collectivists will be more able to promote their own autonomy. Second, by forcing subordinates to seek influence in private, they will be better able to control them through restricting their communication with each other and through divide-and-rule strategies.

Table 2 presents a measure of the extent to which, in the uncensored fiction, subordinates are at a disadvantage in arguing with their superiors in public. The measure was obtained by subtracting the likelihood of a subordinate's victory in a public setting from the likelihood of a subordinate's victory in a private one (eliminating all cases involving the intervention of intermediaries or allies). The table shows, for example, that whereas Japanese subordinates are 14.1 percent worse off in public than in private, American subordinates are only 6.2 percent worse off. More generally, the setting of the disagreement makes less of a difference to American subordinates in their chances for victory than to Chinese, Jap-

TABLE 2
EXTENT TO WHICH SUBORDINATES IN A DISAGREEMENT WITH SUPERIORS ARE DISADVANTAGED BY PUBLIC SETTINGS
(Likelihood of a Subordinate's Victory in Public Subtracted from the Likelihood of a Subordinate's Victory in Private)

	%	*n*
China	10.8	32
Japan	14.1	74
Soviet Union	12.3	23
United States	6.2	63

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anese, and Russian subordinates. In other words, the presence of an audience appears to disadvantage Chinese, Japanese, and Russian subordinates more than American ones. Observers who have attended meetings in China, Japan, and the Soviet Union ostensibly devoted to decision making have frequently noted their quality of orchestrated ritual.[31] The present findings help to make sense of this ritual. Once again, Chinese, Japanese, and Russians appear to have a more collectivistic understanding of self and others than Americans do.

HYPOTHESIS III: INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AND BEHAVIOR

Individualists adhere to the principle of the supreme and intrinsic value of the individual human being. Collectivists, in contrast, believe that the collectivity is valuable in a way that cannot be reduced to the benefits, advantages, and enjoyments accruing to particular individuals. The individualist, then, is a stronger supporter of equality, for a belief in inherent human dignity implies that respect is equally due to all persons simply by virtue of their being persons. The hypothesis that follows is that the behavior of participants in a disagreement between individualists will be less contingent upon their relationship to one another than the behavior of participants in a disagreement between collectivists. Individualists are more likely to treat different people the same than collectivists are.

In order to assess the social relationship between participants in decision making, we need to know what categories people use to define the nature of their bonds with one another. Here I have relied on the work of Myron Wish and his associates.[32] These authors presented a long list of interpersonal relationships (between close friends, between business partners, between political opponents, between parent and teenager, and so forth) to American subjects, asking them to rate these relationships on 25 bipolar scales (relaxed-tense, fair-unfair, interesting-dull, etc.). Using a multidimensional scaling technique, the authors then identified several dimensions necessary and sufficient to describe how their subjects perceived these relationships. The relationships were perceived as varying in the extent to which they were equal or unequal, friendly or hostile, intense or superficial, and socioemotional or task-oriented. Although comparable Chinese, Japanese, and Russian subjects might construe social relationships along somewhat different dimensions, I have used the

[31] See, for example, Gail E. Henderson and Myron S. Cohen, *The Chinese Hospital: A Socialist Work Unit* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 140-46; Hiram James McLendon, "*Sogo Shosha*: Social Structure and Sociocultural Process and Change in a Japanese General Trading Company," Ph.D. diss. (Harvard University, 1979), 215-18; Theodore Shabad, "Tedious Meetings Are Siberian's Target," *New York Times*, August 14, 1983, p. 4.

[32] Myron Wish, Morton Deutsch, and Susan J. Kaplan, "Perceived Dimensions of Interpersonal Relations," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 33 (April 1976), 409-20.

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categories identified here as a guide. (See Appendix.) Five questions were asked about each pair of disputants in the fiction; the answers were taken as defining the nature of the social relationship between disputants.

For a measure of behavior, I focus on the various sorts of arguments disputants use as they attempt to influence one another. Not only do I distinguish between the normative arguments and expert arguments described above, but also between coercive and referent arguments. A coercive argument essentially consists of saying or implying, "See it my way and I will reward you," or "See it my way or I will punish you." A referent argument takes the form of "See it my way because *I* ask you to." One person asks another to identify with him, to take him as a referent, or to do him a personal favor.

What is the impact of the social relationship between disputants on their behavior toward one another in a disagreement? One way to answer this question is to assess the combined effects (R^2) of the various dimensions of the disputant relationship on the prominence of each type of argument, and average the results. The findings are presented in Table 3. The social relationship among Chinese, Japanese, and Russians appears to have a greater impact on the way they argue with one another than it does among Americans. Americans, more than Chinese, Japanese, and Russians, appear to treat *different* people the same.

CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

Do the findings presented above persist over time? Unfortunately, the data do not permit a complete answer. Sufficient disagreements are available, however, in Japanese and American fiction; they are distributed over a wide enough expanse of years to permit a tentative conclusion about two of the findings. The picture is clearly one of continuity rather than change. The association between the prominence of normative argument and the frequency of victory by the superior in prewar Japanese fiction (.37) is only slightly greater than the association between these var-

TABLE 3
IMPACT OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISPUTANTS ON THE PROMINENCE OF COERCIVE, NORMATIVE, EXPERT, AND REFERENT ARGUMENTS (Mean R^2)

	R^2	n
China	.18	100
Japan	.15	200
Soviet Union	.14	100
United States	.10	200

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iables in postwar Japanese fiction (.34). In the American case, comparison of prewar fiction (.05) with postwar fiction (.09) reveals a similar continuity. When we consider the impact of the social relationship between disputants on the way they argue with one another (R^2), we find the same pattern. The impact varies only slightly in Japanese fiction (.15 prewar, .17 postwar) and not at all in American fiction (.10). Although these results hardly add up to a firm position on the nature of cultural stability and change, they do suggest that we should beware of too easily equating an individualist conception with modernity and a collectivist conception with tradition. Urbanization, industrialization, and widespread literacy appear to be congruent with a wide variety of understandings about the relationship of human beings to their fellows.

Implications for Decision Making

The first two findings of this study suggest that, other things being equal, the advantage of superiors over subordinates is likely to be greater for Chinese, Japanese, and Russians than for Americans; because of different cultural assumptions, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian superiors are likely to have at their disposal a resource not possessed to the same degree by their American counterparts. What are the implications of this difference between superiors and subordinates for decision making? Laboratory studies provide useful insights for two reasons. First, they allow the investigator to vary the amount of resources available to either a superior or a subordinate while holding the behavior of the other constant. Second, laboratory conditions permit the investigator to attribute the behavior of either a superior or a subordinate directly to these resources rather than to, say, a sense of efficacy acquired over a long period of success or failure, praise or condemnation.

Let us consider first the behavior of superiors. Different laboratory studies have varied the expertise,[33] the formal authority,[34] and the capability to reward and punish[35] available to superiors, while holding the behavior of subordinates constant. These studies found that the greater the disparity in resources between superiors and subordinates, the more superiors developed a heightened sense of their own worth and devalued the worth of those below them. The findings imply the following sources

[33] Allan W. Lerner, *The Politics of Decision-Making: Strategy, Cooperation, and Conflict* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1976), 38-81.

[34] Samuel C. Shiflett and Stanley M. Nealey, "The Effects of Changing Leader Power: A Test of 'Situational Engineering'," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance* 17 (December 1972), 371-82.

[35] David Kipnis, "Does Power Corrupt?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 24 (October 1972), 33-41.

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of superior behavior. When a subordinate complies with the wishes of a superior, the superior will attribute the cause of the subordinate's compliance to some combination of his own advantage over the subordinate and the latter's desire to perform well. The greater the advantage the superior has over the subordinate, the more he will attribute the subordinate's compliance to this advantage rather than to the private motivation of the subordinate. Thus, the greater this advantage, the more the superior will feel that if he did not have this advantage, the subordinate would not comply; therefore, the more he will strive to maintain or increase this advantage, and the more closely he will monitor his subordinate's behavior.

Several propositions follow concerning the behavior of Chinese, Japanese, and Russian superiors as compared to American ones. First, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian superiors may be expected, more than American ones, to prefer that true decision making not take place between superiors and subordinates at all, but rather that it take place among peers. Second, they may be expected, more than American superiors, to desire that occasions of ostensible decision making which involve superiors and subordinates in fact serve the functions of socializing subordinates and enhancing the legitimacy of superiors. Third, they may be expected, more than American superiors, to prefer secrecy in decision making; secrecy aids a superior in maintaining psychological distance from his subordinates and in helping to maintain his public persona while actually getting some work done. Fourth, they may be expected, more than American superiors, to wish to cloak their goals for subordinates in myth, ritual, and ideology. Finally, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian superiors, more than American ones, may be expected to desire to monitor and control their subordinates closely.

Now let us consider the behavior of subordinates. Laboratory studies generally support a conclusion that complements the findings noted above. The studies concerned with subordinate behavior imply that the greater the advantage of a superior over a subordinate, the weaker will be the striving of the subordinate to reduce this advantage.[36] In order to obtain a clearer picture of this dynamic, however, we need to look elsewhere.[37] A finding of long standing in organizational research is that there is often a discrepancy between the influence subordinates believe

[36] See Mauk Mulder, "Power Equalization Through Participation?" *Administrative Science Quarterly* 16 (March 1971), 31-39; Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 93; Murray Webster and James E. Driskell, "Status Generalization: A Review and Some New Data," *American Sociological Review* 43 (April 1978), 220-36.

[37] In the following discussion, I am indebted to Laurence B. Mohr, "Authority and Democracy in Organizations," *Human Relations* 30 (October 1977), 919-47.

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they have and the influence they are judged to have by an outside (presumably more objective) observer: some subordinates believe they have less influence than they actually have, and some believe they have more. In both cases, we may conjecture that the evaluations depend upon how much influence subordinates believe they *should* have. A subordinate who believes that there are only a few matters over which he should have some say will be inclined to exaggerate his actual influence. A subordinate who believes that there are many matters over which he should have some say will be inclined to underestimate his actual influence. Who are the likely exaggerators and who are the likely underestimators? Evidence suggests that the exaggerators will tend to be found at a *lower level in the social hierarchy* than the underestimators.[38] These results are consistent with survey findings which show that lower-status adult Americans are *less* likely than upper-status adult Americans to believe that people like them do not possess enough political power.[39] Thus, the above implication proves to be correct: the greater the advantage of a superior over a subordinate, the weaker will be the striving of the subordinate to reduce this advantage.

Once more, several propositions follow. First, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian subordinates, more than American ones, may be expected to desire to push responsibility onto those above them. Second, they may be expected, more than their American counterparts, to desire to present superiors with unanimous recommendations rather than confronting them directly as individuals. Finally, they may be more reluctant than American subordinates to participate in decision making in the first place.

The third finding of this study suggests that, other things being equal, the behavior of Chinese, Japanese, and Russian decision participants will be more contingent on their relationship to one another than that of Americans. What implications follow from this difference? Research by Jeffrey Rubin and his colleagues is suggestive. In the mid-1970s, Rubin and Brown, reviewing laboratory studies of bargaining behavior, encountered a large number of contradictory and apparently irreconcilable findings. In Prisoners' Dilemma-type games in particular, they found a pattern of relationships between gender and bargaining. In some studies, males were more cooperative than females, while in other studies males were more competitive. Closer examination revealed that the studies were not strictly comparable. In some studies subjects played against a

[38] Mauk Mulder, "Reduction of Power Differences in Practice," in Geert Hofstede and M. Sami Kassem, eds., *European Contributions to Organization Theory* (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1976), 79-94; Mohr (fn. 37).

[39] Joel D. Aberbach, "Power Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 71 (December 1977), 1553.

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fixed strategy that gave the greatest reward to consistently competitive behavior, while in other studies subjects played against an adversary whose behavior was contingent on the subject's own—games that gave the greatest reward to consistently cooperative behavior. This distinction helped to make sense of the disparate findings about gender and bargaining. In the games that rewarded consistent cooperation, males tended to be more cooperative than females. In the games that rewarded consistent competition, males tended to be more competitive than females. Males, then, appeared to be more oriented toward the impersonal task of maximizing their own earnings. Females, in contrast, seemed more sensitive and reactive to the interpersonal aspects of their relationship. Males and females do not differ in their propensity to bargain cooperatively, Rubin and Brown concluded; they tend to differ in *interpersonal orientation*.[40] The confidence of these authors in this conclusion was bolstered by two other findings. First, the bargaining-game literature showed that females were more likely than males to be influenced by (1) the gender of their bargaining partner, (2) the gender of the experimenter, (3) the attractiveness of their bargaining partner, (4) equity considerations, and (5) the opportunity for communication.[41] Second, Swap and Rubin found that when they measured "interpersonal orientation" directly among a sample of American undergraduates, females scored higher than males. Females were more likely to agree with such statements as (1) I am interested in knowing what makes people tick; (2) I am greatly influenced by the moods of the people I am with; (3) it's important for me to work with people with whom I get along, even if that means I get less done; and (4) I am very sensitive to criticism. Males, on the other hand, were more likely to agree with such statements as (1) I would rather think about a personal problem by myself than discuss it with others; (2) what others think about my actions is of little consequence to me; (3) one good turn does not necessarily deserve another; and (4) I generally view myself as a person who is not terribly interested in what other people are like.[42]

For our purposes, what is striking about this discussion is the considerable overlap between the "interpersonal orientation" construct and the "individual-collectivist" construct. Individualists are low in interpersonal orientation, while collectivists are high in interpersonal orientation.

[40] Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Bert R. Brown, *The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation* (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 172-75.

[41] *Ibid.*, 172-73.

[42] Walter C. Swap and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "Measurement of Interpersonal Orientation," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 44 (January 1983), 211. None of the differences found in the fiction is an artifact of different proportions of female disputants in the different sets of fiction.

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Thus, the behaviors that distinguish these two groups may also be expected to distinguish Americans from Chinese, Japanese, and Russians. The research of Rubin and his colleagues suggests two propositions. First, Americans are likely to be less reactive to each other's bargaining behavior than Chinese, Japanese, or Russians. That is to say, given the slightest hint of intransigence or exploitation on the part of a fellow countryman, Chinese, Japanese, and Russians will be more likely than Americans to overreact with vengeance; and, given the slightest hint of goodwill, Chinese, Japanese, and Russians will be more likely to overreact with cooperation.

Rubin and his colleagues also report a second finding. Subjects high in interpersonal orientation were more likely than subjects low in interpersonal orientation to attribute the success of another person to internal, personal factors (ability and effort) rather than to situational factors (luck and task difficulty).[43] This finding raises the possibility that Chinese, Japanese, and Russians will be more likely than Americans to assign personal credit or fault in evaluating decisions.

There are two additional propositions. First, to the extent that Chinese, Japanese, and Russians are more sensitive than Americans to interpersonal relations, they are more likely to give attention to the design of decision-making procedures, to the composition of decision-making groups, and to the particular forums in which decision making takes place. Various structural arrangements can contribute either to the effectiveness of decision making or to the power concerns of particular individuals; but in China, Japan, and the Soviet Union, more than in the United States, we should expect such arrangements to be less a matter of chance than of conscious intent.[44] Those decision makers who are more aware that interpersonal relations can affect decision processes should want to devote more time to shaping these processes.

Finally, to the extent that interpersonal relations are important in decision making, the study of decision making is difficult. The study of Chinese, Japanese, and Russian decision making, then, is likely to be more complicated than the study of American decision making. This proposition, and the others discussed above, are summarized in ideal-typical terms in Table 4.

[43] *Ibid.*, 218.

[44] In this regard, see Ellen Jones, "Committee Decision Making in the Soviet Union," *World Politics* 36 (January 1984), 165-88; Michel Oksenberg, "Methods of Communication within the Chinese Bureaucracy," *The China Quarterly* (No. 57, 1974), 1-39; Kenneth Lieberthal, *Central Documents and Politburo Politics in China*, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, 1978); Ezra F. Vogel, ed., *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision Making* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

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TABLE 4
IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISION MAKING:
COLLECTIVISTS AND INDIVIDUALISTS COMPARED

Collectivist Decision Makers	*Individualist Decision Makers*
1. Interpersonal relations have much impact on decision making.	1. Interpersonal relations have little impact on decision making.
2. Much attention is given to design procedures, composition of decision making group, and forum of decision making.	2. Decision procedures, group composition, and forum of decision making are often left to chance.
3. Decision makers are overly reactive to behavior of fellow participants.	3. Decision makers are primarily concerned with task environment.
4. Evaluation of decision is likely to involve assignment of personal credit or fault.	4. Evaluation of decision is likely to take external circumstances into account.
5. Decision participants are particularly attentive to superiors.	5. Decision participants are not overly concerned with superiors.
6. Decision making among equals is preferred.	6. Decision makers are not overly concerned about status differences among them.
7. Superiors believe that meetings involving unequals should serve socialization functions.	7. Meetings involving unequals are seen as useful for decision making.
8. Secrecy is preferred in decision making.	8. Public decision making is often acceptable.
9. Superiors desire to control subordinates.	9. Superiors are willing to grant some autonomy to subordinates.
10. Subordinates desire to avoid responsibility.	10. Subordinates are willing to accept responsibility.
11. Subordinates often use delegates in communicating with superiors.	11. Subordinates are willing to act as individuals in communicating with superiors.
12. Subordinates are reluctant to participate in decision making.	12. Subordinates are willing to participate in decision making.
13. Study of decision making is difficult.	13. Study of decision making is not difficult.

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Culture Revisited

A recent review asserts that political science has abandoned "the Parsonian view of man as essentially . . . nonrational, governed by enculturated norms and values," and has accepted instead "*homo economicus*, man as the rational maximizer of his own advantage."[45] My quarrel with a conception of man as *homo economicus* is not that it fails to give a powerful account of a great deal of human behavior, but that it gives an inadequate account of the nature and variety of human values. I agree that, in seeking to understand human behavior, we do best to assume that people are rational pursuers of their own self-interest. I object, however, to the notion that the meaning of "self-interest" is the same everywhere. If the meaning of "self" can vary, then so can the meaning of "self-interest."

There are two reasons for paying attention to even small cultural differences. First, they can matter a great deal in group decision making. Perhaps this would not be so if human information-processing were relatively error-free and if decision making always proceeded along the rational route so often prescribed for it. Not only is human social judgment beset by a number of shortcomings and biases, however,[46] but real decision-making processes are often extremely fluid, *ad hoc*, and even chaotic; the definition of the situation frequently only emerges as participants think up and make known their objections to an initial suggested course of action.[47] In a process so fluid and ill-defined, cultural conceptions about the individual's relation to his fellows can easily leave their mark.

As an illustration, consider Robert Axelrod's finding when he coded participants' causal assertions (expert arguments) as these appeared in transcripts of foreign policy meetings in three different settings: the British Eastern Committee in 1918, the meeting between Hitler and Chamberlain in Munich in 1938, and the Japanese Council on National Security in 1970. Axelrod found that Japanese participants were more than twice as likely to disagree with something they themselves had said than participants in the other two settings.[48] In Japan more than in the West, I suggest, expert arguments can have at least two meanings. First, they can be assertions about the real world in which speakers have confidence. Sec-

[45] Ronald Rogowski, "Rationalist Theories of Politics: A Midterm Report," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978), 296-323, at 297.

[46] See Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "The Psychology of Preferences," *Scientific American* 246 (January 1982).

[47] See, for example, Paul A. Anderson, "Decision Making by Objection and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 28 (June 1983), 383-403.

[48] Robert Axelrod, "Argumentation in Foreign Policy Settings: Britain in 1918, Munich in 1938, and Japan in 1970," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21 (December 1977), 727-55.

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ond, as particularly inoffensive arguments, they can be expressions of group solidarity, concern, and respect. This conclusion is supported by evidence from Japanese fiction showing expert argument to be positively associated with compromises, logrolling solutions, and avoiding the issue altogether.[49] The interesting question is how Japanese participants in decision making distinguish one sort of expert argument from the other.

If cultural conceptions about man's relation to his fellows can affect group decision making, there are several implications for further research. First, much basic work needs to be done on how these conceptions can vary and on the conditions that elicit them. In lumping Chinese, Japanese, and Russians in a single category, I most certainly do an injustice to differences among them. Second, analysts should pay closer attention to particular relationships among particular decision makers; in other words, gossip about people in high places may turn out to be data. Third, analysts should devote more effort to identifying the mechanisms by which personal connections are formed in different societies, and the precise nature of the bonds that characterize phenomena (said to be especially significant in China, Japan, and the Soviet Union) such as factions and patron-client networks. Finally, analysts should consider a wider range of interpretations in assessing the meaning of particular decisions.

The second reason for paying attention to even small cultural differences is more humanistic: if such differences exist, we should try to document them. If we fail to do so because no agreed-upon method for identifying cultural attributes exists, or because it is difficult to make cultural explanations convincing, we yield to mere convenience. Such convenience comes at the cost of adopting a theoretical position in which one assumes (1) that societies do not have a cultural aspect, or (2) that culture has *no* consequence for behavioral variables, or (3) that different cultures have the *same* consequences for these variables.[50] Western social scientists who specialize in Chinese, Japanese, and Soviet affairs do not generally hold these assumptions; it is only the demands of formal scholarship that often make it appear so. In informal conversation, reference to culture as an explanatory factor is not uncommon. In cold print, however, the Chinese, Japanese, and Russians are usually portrayed as desiring—like the rest of us—money, status, and power, never mind a few peculiar ideas. A model of mankind that ignores these ideas is incomplete.

[49] Gaenslen (fn. 22, 1984), 201.

[50] This point is made by John Child, "Culture, Contingency, and Capitalism in the Cross-National Study of Organizations," in L. L. Cummings and Barry N. Staw, eds., *Research in Organizational Behavior*, III (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1981), 307.

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Appendix
Dimensions of the Relationship between Disputants

1. Would you say that the disputing characters generally consider each other to be peers (status equals), or do they perceive each other as unequal in status?
   1. They are peers.
   2. One is of slightly higher status than the other.
   3. One is of much higher status than the other.
2. Which of the following do you think best describes the affective bond between the disputing characters just prior to the dispute?
   1. Very warm; they were friends.
   2. Slightly warm; they were acquaintances.
   3. Neutral; they were strangers.
   4. Cold; they were enemies.
3. Given the context of the story, how often would you say the disputing characters came into contact with each other prior to their disagreement?
   1. Often; enough to have some familiarity with each others' general values, beliefs, and customary behavior.
   2. Occasionally; enough to have formed definite but very generalized impressions of each other (e.g., whether X is a "nice person" or not, "serious," "sense of humor," etc.).
   3. Seldom; the two have met before, but they really know little about each other.
   4. Never.
4. Given the context of the story, how often do you think the disputing characters expect to have dealings or contact with one another following their disagreement? (N.B.: This includes involuntary contact.)
   1. Very often; every day without fail.
   2. Often; more than once a week to possibly every day.
   3. Occasionally; at least twice a month.
   4. Seldom.
   5. Never.
   6. Unclear.
5. In your judgment, is the basic interpersonal relationship between the two disputing characters just prior to the dispute primarily a task-oriented one or primarily a socioemotional one?
   1. Task-oriented.
   2. Mixed.
   3. Socioemotional.

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Review Articles

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: Toward a New Theory of Institutions

By ORAN R. YOUNG

Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 290 pp.
Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, 372 pp.
John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *The Antinomies of Interdependence*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, 506 pp.

CURRENT events play a determinative role in setting research agendas in the field of international relations. During the height of the cold war in the 1950s and 1960s, scholars rushed to improve our understanding of strategic interaction and conflict. After the demise of détente, the souring of Soviet-American relations during the 1980s provided a new stimulus for studies of international conflict. Postwar crises—especially anxiety-producing ones like the Berlin confrontation of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962—triggered a burst of academic interest in the generic phenomenon of crisis. The emergence of the European Economic Community during the 1960s prompted many scholars to analyze functional integration and to construct neofunctional theories of economic and political integration. Increasing prominence of multinational corporations during the 1970s spurred students of international relations to break away from state-centered perspectives and to investigate the nature of transnational relations. There is nothing unusual about such a relationship between current events and research programs; it occurs in many fields to one degree or another. In the field of international relations, however, the result has been a succession of transient fads. As Susan Strange puts it (in Krasner, 337), the outcome all too often is "one of those shifts of fashion not too difficult to explain as a temporary reaction to events in the real world but in itself making little in the way of a long-term contribution to knowledge."

Today, we are witnessing an extraordinary blossoming of academic interest in international regimes. Without doubt, this burst of work on regimes or, more broadly, on international institutions reflects an emerging sense, especially among Americans, that the international order en-

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gineered by the United States and its allies in the aftermath of World War II is eroding rapidly and may even be approaching the verge of collapse. The international trade regime seems incapable of stemming a mounting tide of protectionist pressures flowing from many corners of the world, including the United States itself. The monetary regime is staggering under the impact of a series of debt crises and may go under as these crises become increasingly severe over the next few years. Accordingly, the sudden burst of interest in international institutions, a subject that was decidedly out of fashion during the 1970s, is easy enough to explain as a response to current events. But is the resultant surge of scholarly work on international regimes any more likely to yield lasting contributions to knowledge than have other recent fads or fashions in the field of international relations? In this essay, I argue that the jury is still out; it will remain out until we make a sustained effort to evaluate the significance of regimes or institutions more broadly, as determinants of collective behavior at the international level. Yet the literature on regimes has introduced a conception of international institutions that differs markedly from the conception embedded in the orthodox literature on international relations. In my judgment, this conception has already helped to identify constructive opportunities for reintegrating the subfields of international politics, economics, law, and organization.

What Are International Regimes?

The books under consideration all begin with similar definitions of international regimes. In the formulation Krasner provides, regimes are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (p. 2). This apparent definitional consensus is a remarkable achievement in a field of study that is as anarchical as international relations has been over the last generation. But it is not sufficient to suppress insistent criticisms regarding the clarity and, therefore, the utility of the concept of international regimes. Strange, for example, states flatly that the notion of regimes "is yet one more woolly concept that is a fertile source of discussion simply because people mean different things when they use it" (in Krasner, 342-43). Another prominent commentator, speaking for many readers of the regimes literature, has recently characterized the concept of a regime as "vague" and argued that it "cries out for conceptual development."[1] Accordingly, it seems pointless to proceed to a discussion of substantive issues raised by the literature without some

[1] Friedrich Kratochwil, "The Force of Prescriptions," *International Organization* 38 (Autumn 1984), 685.

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consideration of the conceptual problems plaguing the notion of regimes.

Part of the problem with Krasner's definition is that it does not allow us to identify regimes with precision or to separate regimes easily from the rest of international relations. The common definition is really only a list of elements that are hard to differentiate conceptually and that often overlap in real-world situations. In an effort to address this problem, Krasner offers the following elaboration:

> Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice (p. 2).

This means that we must now cope with another set of ambiguous terms in the form of beliefs, standards, prescriptions, and practices—in addition to the original set consisting of principles, norms, rules, and procedures. As Kratochwil and others have demonstrated, there are many ways to explicate concepts like rules, prescriptions, norms, and practices; choices made at this level exert a profound impact on subsequent analyses.[2]

The common definition also exhibits a disconcerting elasticity when applied to the real world of international relations. Strange observes that some writers adopt a narrow view, using the concept of a regime to apply to "internationally agreed arrangements, usually executed with the help of an international organization." Others, she points out, broaden the concept to encompass "almost any fairly stable distribution of power to influence outcomes," thereby blurring the distinction between international regimes and the entire realm of international relations. Under the circumstances, Strange is surely justified in doubting whether there is going to be "much useful or substantial convergence of conclusions about the answers to . . . questions concerning [the] making and unmaking" of international regimes (in Krasner, 343).

More generally, the definition of regimes employed by the books under consideration is conceptually thin. It provides a checklist of elements whose occurrence at the same time and in the same space is sufficient to place any phenomenon in the category labeled "regimes." But it does not tie the concept into any larger system of ideas that would help to solve the definitional ambiguities discussed in the preceding paragraphs, and that would offer guidance in formulating key questions and hypotheses regarding international regimes. Certainly, it is wrong to expect too much of definitions. In efforts to come to grips with intangible phenomena, however, definitions that are not clearly integrated into some larger con-

[2] *Ibid.*, 685-703.

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ceptual system inevitably lead to trouble. Thus, Olson's concept of collective goods, Rawls's concept of justice as fairness, and Raiffa's concept of a zone of agreement would all be virtually useless if they were not embedded in larger systems of ideas that serve to flesh them out and to guide thinking about their use in understanding the world of observable events. More than anything else, it is this problem of conceptual thinness that could relegate studies of international regimes to the status of a passing fashion.

In order to provide a long-term contribution to knowledge, such work should start with the proposition that international regimes are social institutions, and tie the analysis of regimes directly to the study of institutions more generally. Social institutions are recognized practices consisting of easily identifiable roles, coupled with collections of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles. Thus, we are all familiar with the roles of husband and wife in the institution of marriage, buyer and seller in market institutions, owner and non-owner in structures of property rights, and voter and candidate in electoral systems. The rules or conventions that grow up around these roles and that constitute the superstructure of social institutions ordinarily encompass sets of rights or entitlements (for example, the use and disposition rights of property owners) as well as sets of behavioral prescriptions (for example, the rules of trespass in systems of property rights). It is not difficult to apply this conception of social institutions to the particular case of international regimes. In the books under consideration, Keohane, Ruggie, Lipson, Finlayson, Zacher, and Cohen have assembled a rich collection of materials for such an analysis of the postwar international regimes for trade and money.

It is tempting to join writers like Rawls in thinking about social institutions as practices that participants select in a conscious and careful fashion.[3] Some of those who have contributed to the regimes literature (for example, Keohane and Stein) often seem to proceed in this way. But this perspective is misleading at best. As many observers of social institutions have noted, such practices frequently possess a remarkably coercive quality. Actors are expected to perform their roles in social institutions, and the cost to individual actors of opting out of participation in prevailing institutions is likely to be prohibitive. This is undoubtedly a major factor which accounts for the longevity of many social institutions, even those that become severe threats to social welfare. (Consider the case of war as an example at the international level.) Yet it would be wrong to assume

[3] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

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that social institutions are static or unchanging. The political, economic, technological, and moral conditions that are their bases sometimes shift in such a way that the institutions themselves atrophy (for example, colonialism in international society). In other cases, circumstances converge to produce an abrupt upheaval in which many prevailing social institutions are swept aside (such as the *ancien régime* in the French Revolution). None of this, however, provides any basis for optimism for those whose interest in regimes stems from a desire to engage in institutional design or social engineering. The fact that the trade and monetary regimes established in the aftermath of World War II may now be on the verge of collapse offers no assurance that those likely to be affected will be able or even willing to restructure these regimes on a planned basis.

Of equal importance for this examination of the burgeoning literature on international regimes is the distinction between social institutions and organizations. Institutions are practices composed of recognized roles coupled with sets of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles. Organizations are physical entities possessing offices, personnel, equipment, budgets, and so forth. Both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are organizations. The Bretton Woods system, by contrast, is an international institution or regime. A striking feature of the postwar international trade regime is that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) establishes an institutional arrangement requiring little in the way of organization, whereas the rejected International Trade Organization (ITO) would have coupled the trade regime with an explicit organization. Commentators on international relations make a mistake when they say that international society features few effective institutions; what they mean to assert is that it has few effective international organizations. There is no simple relationship between institutions or regimes and organizations. Some social institutions (for example, open-to-entry common property regimes during periods of light usage) operate effectively in the absence of any elaborate organizations. Organizations sometimes come into existence (for example, the United Nations after World War II) in the absence of any well-established counterpart institutions. The relationships that can and do arise between regimes and organizations should therefore constitute a subject of considerable interest to students of international relations.

The Origins of Regimes

To inquire into the origins of regimes is to ask why social institutions arise in the international community and how such institutions actually

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emerge in a setting that is generally regarded as anarchical.[4] Two features of the regimes literature stand out in this context. There is a remarkable amount of agreement concerning the reasons why the actors in the international community allow themselves to be drawn into regimes or social institutions. On the other hand, there is an equal amount of confusion and disagreement about the actual processes through which regimes come into existence.

By now, everyone is aware that rational egoists operating in the absence of effective rules or social conventions often fail to realize feasible joint gains and instead end up with outcomes that are suboptimal (sometimes dramatically suboptimal) for all concerned. Perhaps the classic exemplar of these problems of individual rationality is the Prisoners' Dilemma, a paradigm that many observers have scrutinized closely and applied repeatedly to the world of international relations. But other examples emerge from theoretical studies of collective action problems, common property difficulties, and security dilemmas, as well as from empirical studies of protectionist measures, trade wars, arms races, and so forth. In short, actors frequently experience powerful incentives to accept the behavioral constraints associated with institutional arrangements in order to maximize their own long-term gains, regardless of their attitudes toward the common good. Whether individual actors approach such issues in terms of rule utilitarianism, the development of an ethical system, or some sort of non-utilitarian contractarianism is not crucial at this juncture. The point is that it is easy to comprehend why actors would willingly abandon a truly anarchical social environment for a world featuring recognized social institutions, though this need not imply acceptance of any elaborate organizations (such as, for example, a centralized government).

In the books under consideration, various authors lay out this argument in a clear and convincing manner. Without doubt, Keohane offers the most extensive and, in some ways, the most peculiar treatment of this subject (pp. 49-132). He analyzes regime formation at length in a vocabulary adapted from microeconomics. Thus, the development of regimes constitutes a response to "political market failure" (p. 85) on the part of actors who assess their options in terms of a kind of rule utilitarianism and who employ reasonably low discount rates in computing the present value of future benefits. It is an easy step from this starting point to a consideration of the "demand" for international regimes, as well as to an

[4] For a well-known description of international society in these terms, see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

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analysis in which actors deliberately enter into institutional arrangements through some sort of bargaining process so long as the marginal benefits of doing so outweigh the marginal costs (p. 76). I have no quarrel with Keohane's choice of this vocabulary in his effort to explain why individual actors experience powerful incentives to enter into social institutions that subsequently limit their freedom of action. As I shall demonstrate later, however, the use of this microeconomic vocabulary does introduce profound biases into any consideration of the significance of international regimes.

Confusion abounds when we turn to the actual processes through which institutions emerge. Writers like Stein and Keohane strongly imply that regime formation is a process of bargaining or negotiation in which the members of a group perceive a zone of agreement, or contract zone, and gradually come to terms on a set of mutually satisfactory institutional arrangements. In fact, these writers often suggest that arrangements emerging in any other way do not really qualify as regimes (Keohane, 76). This assertion has the effect of directing the attention of those interested in international regimes almost exclusively toward institutional arrangements that are formalized in contracts or treaties (as, for example, the postwar international trade and monetary regimes). Yet Keohane himself has repeatedly sought to assess the importance of the presence of a hegemonic power in efforts to form regimes (pp. 135-81). This inevitably leads to confusion. Nothing in theories of bargaining or negotiation suggests that, so long as a contract zone or a zone of agreement exists, a dominant party is needed to produce agreement. On the contrary, the usual assumption embedded in such theories is that rational actors will find a way to realize feasible joint gains. The concept of a hegemon, on the other hand, is closely associated with the idea of one actor possessing the effective capacity or power to impose institutional arrangements on the group regardless of the preferences of the other members.[5] These comments suggest the need for a careful consideration of the role of coercion in the formation of imposed regimes in contrast to the role of bargaining in the formation of negotiated regimes. No doubt, many social interactions feature a complex mixture of conventional bargaining and coercion.[6] But they are distinct processes; it does not clarify matters to conflate them in thinking about the origins of international regimes.

[5] In a recent essay, Charles P. Kindleberger states that he prefers "to think of leadership or responsibility" rather than hegemonic power. But concepts like leadership and responsibility surely fail to capture the element of imposition or coercion embedded in many uses of the term "hegemony." See Kindleberger, "International Public Goods without International Government," *American Economic Review* 76 (March 1986), 10.

[6] This fact has given rise to the concept of coercive diplomacy. See Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), and Oran R. Young, *The Pol-*

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Additionally, some of the most interesting recent theoretical work on the emergence of rules or social conventions among rational egoists focuses on spontaneous or, to use Hayek's term, self-generating institutional arrangements arising in the absence of either conventional bargaining or coercive pressure (for example, Lewis's and Hardin's studies on social conventions and Schelling's on the role of "k" groups in solving collective action problems).[7] Even more suggestive is the recent volume by Axelrod (who has a longstanding interest in international relations) on the "evolution of cooperation."[8] This study demonstrates that purely self-interested actors may develop effective rules or social conventions spontaneously so long as they expect to interact with each other repeatedly and use relatively low discount rates in computing the present value of future benefits.[9]

The focus on negotiated institutions in the regimes literature may be a reflection of the liberal biases of the authors. It is only in the context of such a contractarian perspective, after all, that it makes sense to think seriously about the prospects for institutional design regarding international regimes. Nonetheless, it is unfortunate that most of the authors in the books under consideration have chosen to ignore or to minimize the significance of coercive pressures and, especially, spontaneous processes in thinking about the formation of regimes. In so doing, they have inevitably produced one-dimensional accounts of the emergence of institutional arrangements in international society. We should introduce clear analytic distinctions among negotiation, imposition, and spontaneous processes in thinking about the emergence of international regimes or institutional arrangements. We would then be in a position to produce a far richer account of regime formation, appraising systematically the conditions under which one or another of these processes is likely to predominate, as well as the conditions under which two or more of them are likely to occur in a complex mixture.

Stability and Change

It is no exaggeration to say that the search for determinants of stability and change in international institutions constitutes the central feature of

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itics of Force: Bargaining during International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

[7] David K. Lewis, *Convention: A Philosophical Study* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); Russell Hardin, *Collective Action* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), chaps. 10-14; Thomas C. Schelling, *Micromotives and Macrobehavior* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), chap. 7.

[8] Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

[9] For a thoughtful review discussing some of the limits of Axelrod's analysis under real-

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the recent regimes literature (Keohane, 43). That is perhaps understandable in the light of growing concerns about the future of some of the major postwar international institutions, such as the trade and monetary regimes. Nor is there anything peculiar or inappropriate about a pattern in which the attention of scholars follows trends in real-world activities. Despite the efforts that have been devoted to the analysis of stability and change in regimes, however, there is considerable confusion in the literature about this aspect of international regimes.

A debate focusing on the hypothesis of hegemonic stability has dominated the study of this issue for some years. As Keohane (drawing on the essence of Kindleberger's earlier work) explicates it, this hypothesis suggests that the presence of a dominant great power is of great importance (perhaps even necessary) not only to the initial formation of regimes, but also to the maintenance of institutional arrangements over time (p. 31).[10] It is easy enough to see how observers of the U.S. role in the aftermath of World War II might have arrived at a hypothesis along these lines. But the hypothesis does not withstand the test of analytic scrutiny. Its theoretical underpinnings are shaky at best. The presence of a dominant great power may give rise to an Olsonian "privileged group."[11] Also, the exertion of coercive pressure by a single dominant power or an effective ruling coalition will be central to any effort to form imposed regimes or institutional arrangements. There is nothing, however, in the theoretical literature on bargaining to suggest that social contracts will come unglued in the absence of a dominant partner. Spontaneous institutional arrangements often exhibit great continuity, as well as great flexibility, even in large groups of "small" actors. Institutions typically acquire considerable staying power of an inertial nature. The costs to individual actors of ignoring or breaking away from established institutions on a unilateral basis are generally high. Even leading members of groups experience great social pressure to conform, at least in a rough way, to the rules or conventions of social institutions. What is more, the difficulties of putting together a winning coalition in support of some specific alternative to prevailing institutional arrangements are notorious.

Nor do empirical studies of regimes support the hypothesis of hegemonic stability. To be sure, sharp shifts in the distribution of power gen-

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world conditions, see Joanne Gowa, "Anarchy, egoism, and third images: *The Evolution of Cooperation* and international relations," *International Organization*, 40 (Winter 1986), 167-86.

[10] For a recent restatement of Kindleberger's position on this issue, see Kindleberger (fn. 5), 10.

[11] Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), chap. 1.

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erally lead, over time, to adjustments in existing social institutions. But, as Keohane argues, "hegemony and international regimes can both contribute to cooperation" (p. 240). That is, the emergence of effective institutions can become a source of order or stability, quite apart from the actions of a dominant power, or even in the absence of such a power. This means that the hegemonic stability hypothesis is dead. Keohane himself puts it well:

> The dominance of a single great power can contribute to order in world politics, in particular circumstances, but it is not a sufficient condition and there is little reason to believe that it is necessary" (p. 46).

Perhaps older theoreticians, who placed great emphasis on the existence of a balance of power in maintaining institutional arrangements in international society, can be forgiven a sense of *déjà vu* in reading a passage like this.

What are the implications of this conclusion for the study of international regimes? To begin with, much of the recent work on regimes is part of the American study of international relations. The erosion of American dominance has progressed far enough to call into question some of the familiar assumptions underlying U.S. foreign policy. Keohane is quite explicit about this in asking whether and how cooperation among the advanced capitalist countries can persist without the dominance of the United States (pp. 41-43). The same underlying concern surely motivates many of the other contributors to the regimes literature. Yet this concern will undoubtedly seem both self-serving and ironic to many non-American students of international relations. As Strange, among others, argues (in Krasner, 340-41), the United States continues to be an enormously powerful actor in the international system. Further, many non-Americans clearly regard the restoration of Europe and Japan to the status of major powers in the international community as a healthy development rather than as a cause for concern. In the classic formulations (from Hobbes to Rawls), after all, the central issue addressed in efforts to devise workable social contracts or agreements regarding social institutions (though not necessarily organizations) is the search for mutually acceptable constraints on the actions of those who are, in at least some rough sense, equals;[12] it is not the perpetuation or the legitimation of dominance on the part of a hegemonic power.

The concern over the possible threat to international cooperation posed

[12] Hobbes attached particular importance to the rough equality of individuals in the state of nature because he assumed that virtually every individual in such a state would possess the physical ability to kill any other member of the group.

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by the erosion of American hegemony is also ironic in light of the fact that the ideology of capitalism, at least in its American version, extolls the virtues of a world of numerous equals (that is, price-takers in a system of exchange relations) over a world featuring a dominant power (that is, a monopolist or a monopsonist in market terms). Why should this supposition, so widely supported by American observers at the domestic level, be inapplicable at the level of international society? Commentators in other countries may not only regard the concern over regime stability in the absence of American hegemony as a strictly American problem; they may also find it hard to sympathize with the true motivation underlying this concern. To quote Strange again, "to non-American eyes . . . , there is something quite exaggerated in the weeping and wailing and wringing of American hands over the fall of the imperial republic" (in Krasner, 340).

These comments aside, however, it is certainly worthwhile to conduct a more general inquiry into the conditions governing stability and change in international institutions. As a first step, we need to shift from Keohane's emphasis on "*after* hegemony," which directs attention to the problem of maintaining international institutions following the erosion of American dominance, to an emphasis on "*beyond* hegemony," which would encourage a wider examination of the full set of conditions governing the rise and fall of institutional arrangements at the international level. Institutions change in response to a number of political, economic, technological, sociocultural, and even moral developments (see Ruggie, 462-65). Undoubtedly, institutional arrangements do adjust to sharp shifts in the distribution of power in all social systems. But we must also consider the role of changes in prevailing structures of property rights in giving rise to the European-dominated institutions of the international states system during the 16th and 17th centuries.[13] We must further think about the consequences of technological developments, such as the impact of nuclear weapons on war as a social institution, or the impact of high-endurance stern trawlers on open-to-entry common property regimes for marine fisheries.[14] And let us not forget the role of evolving ethical and moral sensibilities in delegitimizing the institution of colonialism during the 20th century.[15]

I would conclude that (1) there are no necessary conditions for change in international regimes, and (2) that any of a variety of factors may be

[13] Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, *The Rise of the Western World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

[14] William W. Warner, *Distant Water: The Fate of the North Atlantic Fishermen* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983).

[15] A. P. Thornton, *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies* (New York: Macmillan, 1959).

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sufficient to precipitate major changes in prevailing social institutions in real-world situations. This variety may seem frustrating to those seeking to construct a parsimonious theory of stability and change in international regimes. For all its shortcomings, the hypothesis of hegemonic stability offered the attractions of a simple theory emphasizing a single master variable. Yet the argument I have sketched here suggests that studies of stability and change can become a rich vein in the literature on international regimes. It also offers some guidelines to those wondering how to approach this subject following the demise of the hegemonic stability hypothesis.

Do Regimes Matter?

One of the more surprising features of the literature on regimes is the relative absence of sustained analyses of the significance of regimes or, more broadly, social institutions as determinants of collective behavior at the international level. To be sure, Krasner presents a brief account of regimes as intervening variables (pp. 5-10). Ruggie and his colleagues make some attempt to explore the place of international institutions in the "matrix of constraints and opportunities" faced by developing countries in efforts to improve their lot (pp. 462-65). Keohane obviously believes institutions can and do have an impact on state behavior (p. 26), but he devotes most of his energy to a consideration of regime formation and change. The result is a partial analytic vacuum. The ultimate justification for devoting substantial time and energy to the study of regimes must be the proposition that we can account for a good deal of the variance in collective behavior at the international level in terms of the impact of institutional arrangements. For the most part, however, this proposition is relegated to the realm of assumptions rather than brought forward as a focus for analytical and empirical investigation.

To make matters worse, the assumptions brought to bear on this subject by different groups of thinkers differ markedly. Political scientists steeped in the power-oriented perspectives of realism or trained in the empirical methodologies of behavioralism tend to dismiss any emphasis on the role of institutions as a vestige of the discredited ideas of the formal, legal, institutional school of thought. Other students of politics, as well as most lawyers (many of whom make a living by devising, interpreting, and refining institutional arrangements), cannot imagine treating institutions as anything but central determinants of collective behavior. Mainstream economists, proud of the formalizations of neoclassical economics that have emerged in the wake of the dismissal of the institu-

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tional economics of Veblen, Commons, and Mitchell, generally ignore institutional issues (via a liberal use of *ceteris paribus* assumptions) or regard them as hopelessly intractable. But the public-choice movement, as exemplified by the works of Arrow, Buchanan, Tullock, and Olson, places great weight on the character of institutional arrangements in explaining collective choices or macrobehavior. For their part, many Marxists also stress the role of institutions (for example, the international division of labor) in analyzing "imperialist" conflicts among capitalist states and the structural bases of dependency constraining third-world countries.

The books under consideration also handle the issue of the significance of institutional arrangements through a liberal use of assumptions. Most of the authors, however, take a moderate stance in which regimes emerge as intervening variables. Keohane exemplifies this point of view in his effort to combine realism, with its emphasis on the determinative role of power, and institutionalism, with its stress on the behavioral significance of social institutions. In essence, he argues (pp. 7-10) that even actors conforming to the behavioral postulates of the realist model may experience powerful incentives to negotiate cooperative institutional arrangements, and that the resulting institutions can, in turn, play a significant role by changing "the calculations of advantage that governments make" (p. 26).

Where do we find the truth regarding the significance of institutions as determinants of collective behavior? Almost everyone believes, in the final analysis, that social institutions are of importance in domestic society. Otherwise, profound questions would be raised about many propositions dealing with the relative merits of alternative electoral procedures, structures of property rights, economic systems, mechanisms for resolving disputes, and so forth. No doubt, it is tempting simply to transfer this conviction from the domestic realm to the international arena. But that will not do: many influential writers maintain that international society differs from domestic society in a number of ways that diminish the significance of institutions at the international level. They would agree with Strange in asserting that it is possible to understand who gets what in international society "by looking not at the regime that emerges on the surface but underneath, at the bargains on which it is based" (in Krasner, 354). Such analysts regard international regimes as epiphenomena whose dictates are apt to be ignored whenever actors find it inconvenient or costly to comply with them, and whose substantive components are readily changeable whenever powerful members of the community find them cumbersome or otherwise outmoded. What is more, they argue that it is perfectly possible to construct satisfactory explanations of collective behavior at the international level in terms of factors that have nothing to

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do with institutions (for example, prevailing configurations of power and interest, or geopolitical considerations). From this perspective, the emphasis on institutions in the literature on regimes not only encourages the articulation of unnecessarily cumbersome explanations, but also diverts attention from the real determinants of collective behavior at the international level.

The foregoing suggests the need for a more sustained effort to evaluate the significance of international regimes. Part of this effort must surely take the form of careful empirical work. Taking a cue from the public-choice movement, students of international regimes might well consider devising a series of controlled experiments to investigate the consequences of alternative institutional arrangements under conditions that simulate those prevailing in international society. There is also room for natural experiments that would compare and contrast real-world regimes both synchronically and diachronically. The trick here is to select cases, at least initially, in such a way that, other than the relevant institutional arrangements themselves, as much as possible remains constant. This procedure would minimize interpretive ambiguity and make it possible to attribute variance in collective behavior to the impact of institutional arrangements with some degree of confidence. The postwar trade and monetary regimes, which constitute the principal focus of the regimes literature, are therefore not good cases for a rigorous, empirical examination of the significance of international regimes. Because they arose in an environment in which many fundamental features of the international system were changing simultaneously, it is nearly impossible to separate the impact of these regimes from the impact of numerous other changes. Those seeking more meaningful cases for use in natural experiments regarding the significance of international regimes should consider synchronic comparisons of the various international commodity regimes that have arisen over the last several decades, or diachronic assessments of the Antarctic regime or the regime for pollution control in the Mediterranean.

Behavioral Models

This discussion also suggests the importance of rethinking and refining the theoretical models on which we rely to comprehend the behavior of the actors in international relations and, especially, the links between the behavior of individual actors and collective behavior. The analysis of international behavior embedded in the regimes literature has struck a remarkably responsive chord among some readers while provoking

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sharply antagonistic reactions among others. Both reactions may stem from linkages between propositions incorporated in the regimes literature and the (often implicit) behavioral models employed by students of international relations. To see the relevance of this observation for any effort to assess the significance of international regimes, consider the following contrasts.

Those who call themselves realists assume that, in the final analysis, the actors in international arenas are status maximizers.[16] Whatever the ultimate source of this behavior, status-maximizing actors evaluate their own performance in relation to the performance of others, striving to attain the highest possible rank in the hierarchy of members of the international community.[17] The currency for the measurement of performance in this setting is power—an arrangement that makes sense since power itself is a relational concept. Any gain in power on the part of one actor signifies a relative loss of power for other members of the community, and vice versa. It is easy to see that a society composed of status maximizers will resemble a Hobbesian state of nature. Because gains for individual actors amount to losses for others, the members of the group will find themselves in more or less pure conflict (game theorists call it "zero-sum" conflict) with each other all the time. They will be preoccupied with enhancing their own status and avoiding the danger of losing ground to other members of the group. In such a world, actors may enter into short-term alliances on an expediential basis; particularly powerful status maximizers may also impose their will regarding institutional arrangements on weaker neighbors. But such actors will not experience incentives to accept social contracts in which all members of the group comply with restrictive behavioral conventions in order to realize joint gains. There simply will not be joint gains for which it is feasible for actors to cooperate. Analysts who think in these terms typically regard the regimes literature as naive and misguided. In fact, they may well treat this literature as dangerous because it diverts attention from the analysis of power relationships that, in their view, should constitute the major concern of students of international relations.

An alternative model proceeds by borrowing the behavioral assumptions of economics and dealing with the actors in international relations as self-interested utility maximizers. This approach, which is often espoused by writers like Keohane, Krasner, and Stein, is sometimes labeled

[16] For a brief but clear account by an economist of status-maximizing behavior, see E. J. Mishan, *What Political Economy Is All About* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), chap. 17.

[17] Although writers like Waltz sometimes suggest that the character of the international system forces individual actors to operate as status maximizers, others attribute such behavior simply to envy or an individual's lust for power.

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(misleadingly, I think) neorealism or structural realism.[18] Self-interested utility maximizers choose continuously among available alternatives in such a way as to maximize their own welfare, without comparing their performance to that of others or even considering the implications their own actions have for others. It is easy enough to see why actors of this type will often accept the constraints associated with regimes or other social institutions on the basis of straightforward calculations of a utilitarian nature: to the extent that they find themselves involved in interdependent decision making (a pervasive condition in the realm of international relations), they are bound to discover that individually rational behavior regularly produces suboptimal (sometimes even disastrous) outcomes, and that they (as well as other members of the group) can benefit by accepting the constraints of institutional arrangements. The significance of institutions in a behavioral environment of this type arises from the facts that individual defectors may find themselves excluded from receiving the benefits of regimes and that defection on the part of individuals may initiate an unraveling of institutional arrangements with a consequent loss of benefits to all members of the group.[19] Self-interested utility maximizers may, however, be perfectly happy with spontaneous institutional arrangements in contrast to negotiated regimes. What is more, they do not comply with the provisions of prevailing institutions out of habit or any sense of obligation or propriety; they participate in regimes strictly as a means of maximizing net benefits for themselves and will feel no compunctions about violating institutional requirements whenever they conclude that it is possible to increase their net benefits by doing so.

A third behavioral model treats the actors in international relations as role players whose actions are heavily constrained by the requirements of the roles they occupy. Though Krasner labels this perspective "Grotian" (pp. 8-10), it is actually easier to comprehend in terms of Rawls's analysis of practices:

> It is the mark of a practice that being taught how to engage in it involves being instructed in the rules that define it, and that appeal is made to those rules to correct the behavior of those engaged in it. Those engaged in a practice recognize the rules as defining it. The rules cannot be taken as simply describing how those engaged in the practice in fact behave; it is not simply that they act as if they were obeying the rules.[20]

[18] Keohane (esp. 110-32) engages in some interesting efforts to vary the behavioral assumptions he employs in thinking about international cooperation. Nonetheless, the theoretical force of the analysis set forth in *After Hegemony* stems directly from behavioral models which assume that individual actors are self-interested utility maximizers.

[19] For some related observations, see Robert O. Keohane, "Reciprocity in international relations," *International Organization* 40 (Winter 1986), 1-27.

[20] John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," *Philosophical Review* 65 (No. 1, 1955), 24.

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Participation in a practice, he goes on to observe, "necessarily involves the abdication of full liberty to act on utilitarian or prudential grounds."[21] Actors may have an opportunity to choose which practices to join; it is possible to opt for football rather than baseball, or for nonalignment rather than alignment at the international level. But they are not at liberty to violate the rules or conventions of a practice once they have become participants in it. It just does not make sense for a chess player to refuse to accept the concept of checkmate, for a speaker of English to assert that it makes no difference whether subjects and predicates agree, or for an actor in the existing international society to disregard the rules regarding the nationality of citizens. In the international community, moreover, actors face a rather limited menu of available practices among which to choose. A "new" state, for example, has little choice but to join the basic institutional arrangements of the states system. As renegade states like the Soviet Union in the 1920s and the People's Republic of China in the 1960s discovered, there really are no other practices available at this level. With respect to more specific regimes, there is sometimes more latitude for choice. But even in those areas, the limitations are severe. What are the options, for example, for a nonsocialist state that dislikes the provisions of the prevailing trade and monetary regimes?

To return to the basic issue, it is apparent that these behavioral models have radically different implications regarding the significance of international regimes. There is little or no room for social institutions (other than purely coercive arrangements) in a world of status maximizers. Although regimes may become important determinants of behavior in a world of self-interested utility maximizers, they can also run down or unravel with remarkable speed in such a behavioral environment. By contrast, practices or institutional arrangements may come to dominate in a world of role players.

It is therefore of great importance to weigh the relative merits of these models in thinking about the future of the research program embedded in the literature on regimes. There is no need to make a definitive choice among these behavioral models. Like competing models in other fields of inquiry (for example, the wave and particle theories of light), each captures important features of reality, but none offers a satisfactory account of the full range of observable phenomena. Even so, many students of international relations, especially those who call themselves realists, will argue that the behavior of international actors is weighted more toward status maximizing than the typical behavior of actors in domestic settings. This proposition is difficult to sustain, partly because status-maximizing

[21] *Ibid.*

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behavior is widespread in domestic settings. There is nothing uncommon in domestic society about individuals motivated by a desire to keep up with the Joneses or, more simply, by envy. Additionally, both utility-maximizing behavior and role-playing behavior are common at the international level. The fact that much of this behavior occurs in connection with social institutions that do not feature highly developed organizations should not be allowed to cloud our vision.[22] In any case, assessments of the significance of institutional arrangements as determinants of collective behavior at the international level will ultimately rest heavily on our judgments regarding the status of these alternative behavioral models. If we want to reach definite conclusions about the persuasiveness of the vision of the world embedded in the literature on regimes, therefore, we must examine our assumptions about the behavior of the actors in international arenas more carefully.

The Promise of Institutionalism

The preceding discussion makes it clear why the jury is still out on whether the recent surge of interest in international regimes represents a development of lasting importance, rather than a mere fad or fashion, in our thinking about international relations. Are social institutions major determinants of collective behavior at the international level, or are we simply exploring the conditions governing stability and change in institutional arrangements? Because the investigation of social institutions as determinants of collective international behavior involves our most basic assumptions about the behavior of actors in international arenas, we will be able to provide a conclusive answer to this question only by rethinking and refining some of the major premises on which the study of international relations rests.

Yet, the literature on international regimes has already played a constructive role in promoting a reintegration of the subfields of international politics, economics, law, and organization. It is no accident that this literature is closely associated with the ideas of those who have become leaders in the movement to revive the study of international political economy. Whether we look at the international trade regime, the international monetary regime, or the international oil regime (Keohane, 135-81), it is apparent that these arrangements involve a complex interaction of politics and economics in which the actions of states and private entities impinge on each other at every turn. Any effort to comprehend the politics or the economics of these regimes in isolation would make little

[22] See also Keohane (fn. 19).

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sense—a fact that makes the choice of a political economy perspective entirely natural.

It would also be difficult to achieve a real grasp of the character of these regimes without thinking systematically about questions of international law and organization. For the most part, the institutional arrangements included in these regimes are embodied in conventions or treaties requiring careful interpretation and adaptation to changing circumstances, just as other legal formulas do. Similarly, relations between the regimes themselves and various explicit organizations are of obvious importance in this field of inquiry. Exactly how critical is the presence of an organization like the International Monetary Fund to the operation of the prevailing international monetary regime? Why do organizations seem to be less important in connection with the international trade regime than in connection with the international monetary regime? Most of those who seek to understand international regimes, therefore, have become students of international relations in the true sense of the term, endeavoring to shed light on the connecting points of international politics, economics, law, and organization. Whatever the ultimate fate of the literature on international regimes, this feature is an extremely valuable one that we should do our best to nurture and retain.

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ELECTIONS AND THE DEMOCRATIC CLASS STRUGGLE

By ROBERT W. JACKMAN*

Walter Korpi, *The Democratic Class Struggle*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983, 277 pp.

Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, 229 pp.

> In democracies the poor have more sovereign power than the men of property; for they are more numerous and the decisions of the majority prevail.
>
> —*Aristotle*[1]

> Universal Suffrage is the equivalent of political power for the working class of England, where the proletariat forms the large majority of the population. ... The carrying of Universal Suffrage in England would, therefore, be a far more socialistic measure than anything which has been honoured with that name in the Continent. Its inevitable result, here, is the *political supremacy of the working class*.
>
> —*Karl Marx*[2]

> Democracy is not the ideally best form of government unless this weak side of it can be strengthened; unless it can be so organised that no class, not even the most numerous, shall be able to reduce all but itself to political insignificance, and direct the course of legislation and administration by its exclusive class interest.
>
> —*John Stuart Mill*[3]

PART of our continuing interest in democratic electoral politics stems from a widespread belief that the process is intrinsically desirable. But many analysts are also interested in the electoral process as a mechanism that produces distinctive policy outcomes. More specifically, this is the procedure through which popular sovereignty is exercised and political inequalities are minimized. It thus provides an institutional vehicle for the resolution of group conflict in which "the people" (or at least a majority of them) cast the decisive votes.

* I would like to thank Kenneth Bollen, Mary Jackman, Joseph Schlesinger, and Brian Silver for their comments and advice.

[1] *The Politics*, Translated by T. A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1962), 237.

[2] "The Chartists," *New York Daily Tribune*, August 25, 1852. Reprinted in T. B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel, eds., *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1963), 204-7; emphasis in original.

[3] *Considerations on Representative Government* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1862), 170.

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Political conflict, in turn, centers on the distribution of material goods, which is typically concentrated in favor of a minority at the expense of the low-income majority. Assuming that voters seek to maximize their material well-being, elections provide the means for the majority to increase their own incomes and to reduce those of the wealthy minority. In other words, by minimizing *political* inequalities, elections also serve to minimize *economic* inequalities, and thus constitute the expression of the democratic class struggle.

The argument is not new. It is implicit in Aristotle's emphasis on the poor constituting the political majority, even though his criteria for citizenship are not modern ones. It is explicit in Marx's optimistic conclusion that universal suffrage would guarantee the political *supremacy* of the working class. And it is equally explicit in Mill's analysis of the effects of the unfettered extension of the suffrage. Indeed, it was expressly to limit the "danger" of "class legislation" that Mill developed his famous proposal to weight votes according to the education of voters. Well over one hundred years later, with universal suffrage the norm in Western democracies, the argument is almost a commonplace. The interpretation of elections offered by Lipset in *Political Man* helped to place the class-struggle thesis in the mainstream of political sociology;[4] as I will show below, the argument has enjoyed a recent resurgence.

The class-struggle interpretation of elections hinges logically on a set of assumptions about the nature of the electoral process in the Western democracies. In general, these assumptions have not been explicitly acknowledged, but that does not detract from their being central to the argument. After a review of contemporary versions of the democratic class-struggle interpretation, of which Walter Korpi's *The Democratic Class Struggle* is the most complete recent treatment, I will evaluate those ideas in light of a broad literature on the nature of democratic political competition, including Arend Lijphart's recent *Democracies*. This evaluation indicates that the assumptions underlying the democratic class-struggle thesis are implausible. As a result, that thesis constitutes a flawed interpretation of the role of elections since the introduction of universal suffrage.

Elections and the Class Struggle

In *Political Man*, Lipset devoted two chapters to "Elections: The Expression of the Democratic Class Struggle." He argued that, within

[4] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Doubleday, 1960).

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capitalist democracies, political parties express conflict between different groups. While playing down appeals to class division, parties do in fact "represent the interests of different classes." Lipset concluded that, despite variations from country to country based on the significance of group memberships other than class (such as those stemming from religion or region),

> the principal generalization which can be made is that parties are primarily based on either the lower classes or the middle and upper classes. This generalization even holds true for the American parties, which have traditionally been considered an exception to the class-cleavage pattern of Europe.[5]

Why do these patterns obtain?

> The simplest explanation for this widespread pattern is simple economic self-interest. The leftist parties represent themselves as instruments of social change in the direction of equality; the lower-income groups support them in order to become economically better off, while the higher-income groups oppose them in order to maintain their economic advantages.[6]

Four years later, Lipset completed the argument in these terms:

> All democratic countries remain stratified societies in which access to education, economic opportunity, culture and consumption goods is highly unequal. . . . However, in all countries, the more deprived strata, in income and status terms, continue to express their resentments against the stratification system or simply their desire to be represented by politicians who will seek to further redistribute the goods of society, by voting for parties which stand for an increase in welfare state measures and for state intervention in the economy to prevent unemployment and increase their income vis-à-vis the more privileged strata.[7]

At about the same time, Lenski developed a "conflict" theory of stratification.[8] His basic observation is that the relation between economic development and inequality appears to be nonlinear, such that inequality in the distribution of material goods has historically increased as societies have moved from horticultural economies to the early stages of industrialization, but has then *de*creased as industrialization has proceeded.[9] In

[5] *Ibid.*, 230. Lipset took the term "democratic class struggle" from the title of the book by Dewey Anderson and Percy Davidson, *Ballots and the Democratic Class Struggle* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1943).

[6] Lipset (fn. 4), 239.

[7] Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," in Stephen R. Graubard, ed., *A New Europe?* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), 337-69, at 345.

[8] Gerhard E. Lenski, *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

[9] This description, of course, is consistent with Kuznets's argument that the development-inequality relation follows an inverted U-shaped curve. See Simon Kuznets, "Economic

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seeking to account for this "reversal," his explanation centers on the rise of the "new democratic ideology":

> Wherever democratic theory has become institutionalized, a dramatic new possibility has arisen: now the many can combine against the few, and even though individually the many are weaker, in concentration they may be as strong or stronger.[10]

According to Lenski, three features of the liberal democracies promote the egalitarian impulse: the first is their emphasis on universal suffrage; the second is their protection of the rights of organized political opposition; and the third is their extension, to disadvantaged groups, of the right to organize and engage in collective action in their own behalf. Lenski concluded that low-income groups have effectively used these rights to promote their economic interests through their support of labor unions and parties of the left, whose programs, in turn, have created societies that are more egalitarian.[11] In this sense, political conflict between economic classes has helped to shape the distribution of material goods within the industrial democracies.

Although they were developed independently of each other, Lipset's and Lenski's arguments are very similar. They are also similar to that of the earlier theorists, although they place more explicit emphasis on *political parties* as the institutions that mobilize, organize, and represent class interests. This emphasis is consistent with Key's suggestion that without interparty competition, politics rapidly becomes issue-less, an outcome that benefits the "haves" at the expense of the "have-nots."[12]

In the last decade, the popularity of the class-struggle interpretation of elections has enjoyed a considerable resurgence under a variety of labels. It is central, for example, to the analyses by Hibbs and Tufte of the macroeconomic policies pursued by different governments in Western Europe since World War II.[13] These studies have found their way into a

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Growth and Income Inequality," *American Economic Review* 45 (March 1955), 1-28; Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, "Political Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income," *American Sociological Review* 50 (August 1985), 438-57.

[10] Lenski (fn. 8), 318.

[11] See, e.g., *ibid.*, 319-24, 378-80.

[12] V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949), 307. Key's discussion provided the framework for much of the analysis of the role of interparty competition in redistributive politics, starting with Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," *Journal of Politics* 25 (May 1963), 265-89.

[13] Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," *American Political Science Review* 71 (December 1977), 1467-87; Edward R. Tufte, *Political Control of the Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), chap. 4. For a survey of these and related studies, see James E. Alt and K. Alec Chrystal, *Political Economics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983).

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wider literature.[14] Indeed, the argument appears to form the cornerstone of the so-called "new political economy" of the advanced capitalist societies.[15] Stephens and Stephens label it the "political class struggle school" of analysis; Shalev refers to it as the "social democratic model"; Weir and Skocpol call it the "working class strength approach"; and Hibbs and Dennis identify a "party cleavage model."[16]

The most complete recent version of the argument is offered by Walter Korpi, in *The Democratic Class Struggle*. This book contains an analysis of voting behavior in Sweden that is supplemented with a more limited series of comparative analyses of working-class mobilization, industrial conflict, and social policies in OECD countries. It is useful to compare Korpi's perspective with the earlier discussions by Lipset, Lenski, and others.

Korpi begins by arguing that the commonly offered explanations of the development of advanced capitalist societies are wanting. The pluralist explanation assumes that all groups command roughly equivalent political resources, so that politics involves competition among equals and there are no major political inequalities. A revisionist explanation associated with neocorporatism asserts instead that politics centers on relations between corporatist organizations, and that political parties are relegated to a secondary role. In contrast, what Korpi labels the Leninist approach concludes that political institutions simply reflect the economic interests of dominant groups. He rejects all three broad explanations in favor of the class-struggle interpretation of elections. Specifically, Korpi argues:

[14] For example, Robert A. Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 174-75; Benjamin I. Page, *Who Gets What from Government* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 144-45.

[15] Roger Hollingsworth and Robert Hanneman, "Working-Class Power and the Political Economy of Western Capitalist Societies," in Richard F. Tomasson, ed., *Comparative Social Research*, V (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1982), 61-80.

[16] Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, "The Labor Movement, Political Power, and Worker's Participation in Western Europe," in Maurice Zeitlin, ed., *Political Power and Social Theory*, III (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1982), 215-49; Michael Shalev, "The Social Democratic Model and Beyond: Two Generations of Comparative Research on the Welfare State," in Richard F. Tomasson, ed., *Comparative Social Research*, VI (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1983), 315-52; Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, "State Structures and the Possibilities for 'Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 107-63; Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. and Christopher Dennis, "Partisan Eras and the Distribution of Net Income," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 1985. Similar views can be found in, for example, Göstä Esping-Andersen, Roger Friedland, and Erik Olin Wright, "Modes of Class Struggle and the Capitalist State," *Kapitalistate* 3 (Summer 1976), 186-219, and Larry J. Griffin, Joel A. Devine, and Michael Wallace, "On the Economic and Political Determinants of Welfare Spending in the Post-World War II Era," *Politics and Society* 12 (No. 3, 1983), 331-72.

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> The distribution of power resources influences the outcomes of the exchange processes and consequently the degree of inequality in society. Stronger groups thus will often get the "lion's share" of what is to be distributed. Power resources, which can be regarded as stocks of values, thus influence the flow of values between individuals and collectivities (p. 18).

Within the capitalist democracies, the critical distinction in the distribution of power resources is that between capital and labor, so that most political conflict takes place, in fact, between capital and labor.

> In the tripartite societal bargaining between the state, labour and capital, the distribution of power resources and the political composition of the government can affect the pattern of coalition formation in this triad and the outcomes of the bargaining. The smaller the disadvantage in power resources of the labour movement and the stronger the left party hold over the government, the more likely are state representatives to side with labour in the tripartite bargaining. Accordingly, the compromises resulting from societal bargaining can be expected to be more to the favour of wage-earners (p. 25).

Korpi summarizes the argument with a chart that shows the distribution of power resources between the main classes shaping the nature of "state interventions"; in turn, these influence the "distributive process." The latter bears directly on inequality in the level of living, which includes income, health, education, and housing (p. 187).

The parallels with the Lipset-Lenski discussions are striking. Indeed, it is instructive to compare Korpi's chart with the arrow diagram provided by Lenski. (Both are displayed in Figure 1.)[17] Although Lenski also incorporated technological and economic forces, "Polity" refers to the distribution of political resources across income groups. One apparent difference from earlier treatments is that Korpi explicitly includes "state interventions" in his model. It is not at all clear, however, from his definition of the "state" what this involves. Consider the following:

> The state can be conceived of as a set of institutional structures which have emerged in the struggles between classes and interest groups in a society. The crucial aspect of this set of institutions is that they determine the ways in which decision-making on behalf of the whole society can legitimately be made and enforced. The state must not, however, be seen as an actor in itself, or as a pure instrument to be used by whichever group that has it under its control. While the institutional structures and the state can be used to affect, e.g., distributive processes in the society, these structures also affect the way in which power resources can be mobilized and are, in turn, affected by the use of power resources (p. 19).

The "set of institutional structures" is not clearly defined. If it is a *set*, why

[17] Lenski (fn. 8), 436.

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FIGURE 1
POLITICS AND THE DISTRIBUTIVE PROCESS
ACCORDING TO LENSKI AND KORPI



Sources: Lenski (fn. 8), 436;
Korpi, p. 187.

are the state and institutional structures treated separately only three sentences later? What *kinds* of institutional arrangements are important, or can a state be *any* configuration of national political institutions? In other words, do crossnational variations in such institutional procedures as electoral systems or degree of centralization imply corresponding variations in degree of "stateness," or does Korpi have other forms of institutional structures in mind? If so, what are they?

Korpi's use of the term is further clouded by his suggestion that the state not be reified—that is, not "seen as an actor in itself, or as a pure instrument." If the state is not an actor, however, it is unclear how it can be engaged in the tripartite bargaining process between "the state, labour, and capital." Finally, although Korpi does appear to imply that the state is more than the incumbent government and its administration, he also suggests that it can be under the "control" of one group (class?) or another. If that is the case, the distinction between the state and the government becomes difficult to sustain. To say "labor gained control of the

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state" sounds more dramatic than to say "labor formed a government," but it is not clear from Korpi's usage that the statements differ in substance. I conclude that the introduction of the state into the analysis serves no clear purpose, and that the differences between Korpi's approach and those of Lipset and Lenski are more apparent than real.

A second apparent difference concerns the meaning of "class." As is evident from the earlier discussion, Lipset used the terms class, income group, and status group almost interchangeably; so did Lenski. In contrast, Korpi adopts an explicitly Marxist approach (which he distinguishes from the Leninist interpretation); he defines classes "to refer to categories of individuals delineated on the basis of their relations to the means of production" (p. 22). This generates two classes: wage-earners versus owners (including the self-employed). Thus, toward the end of his book, Korpi concludes:

> A major change, which has gradually broadened the interest base of a socialist policy, is that growing proportions of the economically active population have become wage-earners. . . . In the 1970s only about every tenth economically active male was self-employed. The remainder, over 90 percent, were wage-earners. An overwhelming proportion of the Swedish population therefore now finds itself *in the same class situation* (p. 212; emphasis added).

However, this conception of class does not inform the intervening analyses of the class basis of voting in Sweden. Instead, voters are classified into three levels (p. 87). Level I includes such occupational titles as secondary schoolteachers, judges, and big-business men; representative titles in Level II are office workers, lower-level schoolteachers, and nurses; and Level III refers to manual industrial and agricultural workers, along with lower-level service employees like postmen, firemen, and hospital workers. Further, Levels I and II are taken to identify the "middle strata" or "middle class," while Level III constitutes the "working class" or "workers." Thus, Korpi's empirical analyses focus on the manual/nonmanual distinction, which has nothing to do either with class as conceived by Marx or with the conclusion that 90 percent of the economically active male population of Sweden are workers. Indeed, it is difficult to generate a good theoretical basis for the manual/nonmanual distinction as the defining characteristic of social classes.[18] At the same time, of course, it is a common distinction, and indeed is central to much of Lipset's original analysis of the democratic class struggle. Again, the parallels

[18] For discussion on this point, see Mary R. Jackman and Robert W. Jackman, *Class Awareness in the United States* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), esp. chap. 1.

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between the Korpi and Lipset-Lenski approaches vastly outweigh any differences.[19]

What, then, does the democratic class struggle involve? The following common themes are emphasized by Lipset, Lenski, and Korpi.

1. Within the industrial democracies, universal adult suffrage has substantially reduced political inequalities by enfranchising low-income voters, who constitute a majority of the electorate.
2. These voters tend to support parties of the left, which seek to redistribute income in favor of low-income voters, and do so when in office.[20]
3. Parties of the left compete with parties of the right, which draw the bulk of *their* support from higher-income voters, and which protect the economic interests of their supporters when in office.
4. Failure of a party to pursue the class-defined economic interests of its constituents results in a loss of electoral support for that party.

Elections thus serve as the mechanism for the *democratic* class struggle.[21]

The primary emphasis of the argument is on the will of popular majorities; little attention is paid to specifying the exact institutional procedures that translate this will into public policy. To be sure, political parties are introduced as a critical mechanism, but the nature of the political competition in which they engage is not explained in any detail. Instead, the impression is left that the will of the majority is translated more or less automatically into public policy in a Lockean sense, almost "independently of institutional midwifery of any kind."[22]

This impression is misleading. The validity of the class-struggle argument hinges critically on a set of interrelated, if unspecified, assumptions about the nature of political competition and the electoral process. Most notably, the argument assumes that the industrial democracies are majoritarian, and that the veto capacities of minorities are limited. Without such an assumption, the fact that a majority of voters in any country

[19] Surprisingly—given the title of his book—Korpi makes no reference to Lipset's discussion of the democratic class struggle. The only allusion to Lenski is contained in one brief sentence (p. 186); Anderson and Davidson (fn. 5) are nowhere cited.

[20] Parties of the left are commonly understood to include all parties of the noncommunist left, and include Socialist, Social Democratic, and Labor Parties. For a recent classification of parties in the industrial democracies according to their location on a left-right ideological scale, see Francis G. Castles and Peter Mair, "Left-Right Political Scales: Some 'Expert' Judgments," *European Journal of Political Research* 12 (March 1984), 73-88.

[21] This process is clearly distinct from that involved in a *revolutionary* class struggle. Its origins can be traced to revisionist figures like Eduard Bernstein who, in the late-19th century, denied the inevitability of a Marxist class struggle and argued the case instead for an evolutionary or gradual form of socialism based on parliamentary procedures.

[22] The phrase is taken from Willmoore Kendall, *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1941), 128-29.

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has a low income would be irrelevant. The majoritarian assumption, in turn, implies a second assumption: that a responsible-party form of political competition is the modal form of competition in the industrial democracies, and furthermore, that parties are fundamentally motivated by programmatic concerns. The *substance* of party competition centers predominantly on a left-right continuum, and focuses on the economic interests that distinguish lower-income from higher-income voters. Consequently, parties are electorally rewarded or punished according to the degree to which they successfully implement their class-based programs.

Let us now consider the validity of these assumptions.

The Majoritarian Assumption

The majoritarianism that is a logical requirement for a democratic class struggle assumes the existence of a set of institutions that resembles Dahl's description of populistic democracy.[23] We know, however, that such a model is at odds with political institutions in the United States. Indeed, the system of checks and balances was designed explicitly to restrain majorities and protect minorities.[24] Moreover, requirements of extraordinary majorities (such as a two-thirds majority) for the passage of constitutional amendments and other issues obviously introduce a minority veto that undermines majority rule.[25]

For those who believe that this is a peculiarly American aberration, Lijphart's *Democracies* is useful reading. As indicated in his subtitle, Lijphart's purpose is to compare majoritarian democracy with its logical opposite, consensus democracy.

In its pure form, majoritarianism (also known as the Westminster model) has eight overlapping components. First, *executive power is concentrated in single-party, bare-majority cabinets* so that a small majority exercises substantial political power and a large minority is consigned to the opposition benches. Second, *cabinets control the legislature*. Third, where the legislature has two chambers (as in Great Britain), *bicameralism is asymmetric*, with almost all power located in the popularly elected lower house. This asymmetry is so pronounced that in practice it is difficult to distinguish from the unicameralism of the New Zealand parliament. Fourth, the Westminster model incorporates a *two-party system*, and fifth, the two parties compete almost exclusively on a *unidimensional left-right*

[23] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), chap. 2.

[24] See *The Federalist Papers*, especially Nos. 10 and 51 by Madison.

[25] Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1956), chap. 2.

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spectrum. Sixth, the model is based on a *plurality, single-member-district* system of elections, which tends to magnify legislative majorities and to reduce the effective number of political parties.[26] Seventh, government is *unitary and centralized*, which means that there are no geographic or functional restrictions on cabinet power. Finally, the Westminster model involves an *unwritten constitution and parliamentary sovereignty*. Since parliament can change even basic constitutional laws by simple majority, there are no formal restrictions on the majority party in the lower house.

Taken as a whole, Lijphart's description of the ideal-typical Westminster model makes explicit the institutional procedures that are implicit in the democratic-class-struggle argument. That this model is majoritarian is self-evident. As Lijphart shows, however, the model remains an ideal type: no case fits it perfectly. Only two countries (New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain) approximate it reasonably well (p. 19).[27] Most democracies diverge from the Westminster model in the direction of the consensus model.

Instead of placing emphasis on majority rule, consensus democracy in its pure form is a set of institutions "that emphasizes consensus rather than opposition, that includes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of being satisfied with a bare majority" (p. 23). Thus, the consensus model typically involves executive power-sharing, with grand coalitions of all of the major political parties. It places emphasis on the separation of powers, both formally and informally. The legislature is bicameral, and the relation between both bodies is balanced in a way that provides for minority representation. Further, the consensus model involves a multiparty system within which competition occurs on a variety of dimensions (religious, ethnic, etc.), not just along socioeconomic lines. At the same time, electoral systems are based on some form of proportional representation, which helps to generate multipartyism and to give expression to minority interests. In contrast to the Westminster model, consensus democracy rests on a federal, decentralized apparatus. Finally, it incorporates a written constitution, with provision for minority veto. Lijphart concludes that, taken as a whole, consensus democracy restrains majority rule by encouraging "the *sharing of power* between the majority and the minority . . . , the *dispersal of power* . . . , a *fair distribution of power* . . . , the *delegation of power* . . . , and a *formal limit on power* . . ." (p. 30; emphasis in original).

What are the implications of these ideal types for the class-struggle

[26] Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

[27] See also Leon D. Epstein, "What Happened to the British Party Model?" *American Political Science Review* 74 (March 1980), 9-32.

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interpretation of elections? Lijphart's empirical analysis of the established democracies indicates, first, that the majoritarian/consensual contrast is two-dimensional. One cluster of traits centers around the effective number of political parties, and also includes bare-majority cabinets, executive dominance, the number of issue dimensions, and the degree of electoral disproportionality. The other cluster reflects the degree of federalism as indexed by the degree of unicameralism, centralization, and constitutional flexibility.

Second, when democratic regimes are classified according to these two dimensions, we obtain the pattern shown in Table 1, which reproduces Lijphart's Table 13.3 (p. 219). The most striking feature of this table is that of the 22 democratic regimes included, only two (New Zealand and Great Britain) can unambiguously be classified as majoritarian (and only one—Switzerland—is unambiguously consensual). Further, majoritarianism is *not* the norm. Only one-quarter of the cases are majoritarian on one dimension and occupy an intermediate or majoritarian location on the other (New Zealand, Great Britain, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Ireland).[28] Moreover, although New Zealand and Great Britain are located in the northwest cell of the table, they cannot be said to fit the majoritarian model exactly. From this table, it is difficult to classify the constitutional protection of political minorities in the United States as an aberration.

The idea that majoritarianism is the norm is further eroded when one considers the incidence of minority governments (i.e., governments formed by parties that collectively control less than one-half of the seats in the national legislature, or in the lower house in bicameral settings). A recent analysis of minority governments in Western democracies since 1945 indicates that such governments are not uncommon. Fifteen countries have a history of at least one minority cabinet every 20 years. Of particular interest to the class-struggle argument is the fact that such cabinets are very common in Scandinavia. More than half the cabinets in Norway and Sweden have been based on parliamentary *minorities*; the relevant figure for Denmark is 87 percent.[29]

The fact that majoritarian institutional arrangements are not the norm in established democracies poses a major problem for the class-struggle interpretation of elections. Indeed, the evidence indicates that most democracies deviate from majoritarianism in varying degrees, in a manner calculated to restrain popular majorities—thereby providing some rem-

[28] Note, too, that four of these five countries have very small populations.

[29] Kaare Strom, "Minority Governments in Parliamentary Democracies: The Rationality of Nonwinning Cabinet Solutions," *Comparative Political Studies* 17 (July 1984), 199-226.

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TABLE 1
DEMOCRACIES CLASSIFIED BY THE EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEGREE OF FEDERALISM

		Degree of Federalism		
		MAJORITARIAN	INTERMEDIATE	CONSENSUAL
Number of Parties	MAJORITARIAN	New Zealand Great Britain	Ireland	Australia Austria Canada Germany United States
	INTERMEDIATE	Iceland Luxembourg	France V Norway Sweden	Italy Japan
	CONSENSUAL	Denmark Israel	Belgium Finland France IV Netherlands	Switzerland

Source: Lijphart, Table 13.3, p. 219.

edy to the "weak side" of democracy identified by Mill. To be sure, the class-struggle argument does not rest on some *explicit* view of institutional arrangements; as I have already suggested, it is predicated, at least implicitly, on a majoritarian view. If it were not, the fact that low-income voters constitute a majority of the population—a cornerstone of the arguments of Aristotle, Marx, and Mill—could be of no consequence. For whatever reason, the rationale behind constitutional arrangements in most advanced capitalist democracies would seem to stem from values not fully consistent with majority rule.

THE RESPONSIBLE-PARTIES ASSUMPTION

Along with the emphasis on majority rule, the class-struggle argument is predicated on the responsible-parties model. According to this model, two-party competition is optimal, and parties are *unified* and *disciplined* so that party members holding elective office are *collectively responsible* to voters. Each party takes a distinctive policy position that includes a known program. Indeed, this emphasis on policy distinctiveness is essential to the responsible-parties model. Programmatic concerns are seen as the fundamental motivators of political parties. Ranney summarizes the perspective well:

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> In a system of [responsible] party government the parties seek power, not as an end in itself, but in order that they may put their programs into governmental action. They therefore conceive of their job as having two aspects: winning elections in order to get power and using the power they win to carry out their programs. Thus each party organizes its forces with the unity and discipline necessary *before* elections in the campaigning activities necessary to win power and *after* elections in the governmental activities necessary to put their programs into law.[30]

Obviously, this model depends on majoritarian political institutions; indeed, proponents of responsible parties have always looked to the Westminster model for inspiration. They move beyond that model, however, in their insistence on the *programmatic* basis for political activity. Policy differences provide the basis for political competition. Proponents of the class struggle argument add the further proviso that this political competition occurs on a left-right dimension, with one party adopting a *distinctively* left-of-center position, and the other an equally distinctive right-of-center position.

How reasonable is this general set of assumptions? It is obvious that the responsible-parties perspective accepts the Westminster model as the modal democratic institutional arrangement, since coalition governments, decentralization, checks and balances, and provision for minority veto are inhospitable to responsible parties. From Lijphart's analysis, it is evident that responsible-party behavior is likely to be the exception rather than the rule. But let us ignore this for the moment and assume, counterfactually, that most democracies are relatively centralized, with most political competition occurring along a single dimension that distinguishes two major political parties.

That is the rather idealized world within which Downs developed his spatial model of electoral competition. He further assumed that party leaders and voters are utility maximizers. He defined a political party as a *team* that "seeks to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly contested election"; by team, he meant "a coalition whose members agree on all their goals instead of on just part of them." From these assumptions, Downs generated his fundamental hypothesis: "Parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies."[31] In other words, parties are fundamentally motivated by the goal of maximizing their political support. If they hold

[30] Austin Ranney, *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government: Its Origins and Present State* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954), 20-21; emphasis in original. Ranney devotes chapter 2 to an outline of the responsible-parties model.

[31] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 25, 28.

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office, they seek reelection; if they are out of office, they seek to displace the governing party.[32]

It is obvious that this argument turns the responsible-parties assumption on its head by denying that programmatic concerns are the principal end of political parties. Policy is relegated to the role of a means toward the end of maximizing political support. Moreover, Downs maintained that this situation occurs under the institutional conditions that *most favor* the responsible-parties model—where there is two-party competition along a left-right spectrum.[33] Is this a realistic description of party behavior?

In a recent analysis, Schlesinger concluded that it is. He compared the character of parties *as organizations* with business firms, interest groups, and public bureaus, to show that parties are a unique organizational form. First, like firms, parties maintain themselves through market exchange; interest groups and bureaus do not. Second, like interest groups and bureaus, parties produce collective goods; business firms do not. Third, like interest groups, parties compensate their participants indirectly; firms and bureaus do not. In view of this distinctive organizational configuration, the electoral test is the *only* criterion for party success—which is why parties attempt to maximize their electoral support.[34]

Acceptance of this hypothesis is damaging to the class-struggle interpretation of elections in several ways. First, that interpretation assumes that parties are programmatic representatives of class interests. Downs's hypothesis directly challenged this assumption:

> In our model, political parties are not agents of specific social groups or classes; rather, they are autonomous teams seeking office *per se* and using group support to attain that end.[35]

Second, the argument that parties seek to maximize their electoral support implies, in two-party systems, a process of *policy convergence* between the parties. In its original form, this convergence argument depended on a variety of additional assumptions, including a (symmetric) unimodal distribution of voter preferences, perfect information among candidates,

[32] This approach to parties is not unique to rational-choice spatial modelers. For example, Epstein defines a party as "any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental office-holders under a given label. Having a label . . . rather than an organization is the crucial defining element." Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies* (New York: Praeger, 1967), 9.

[33] Indeed, Downs has often been criticized for his single-dimensional spatial model, and for his primary emphasis on two-party systems. See, e.g., Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), chap. 10.

[34] Joseph A. Schlesinger, "On the Theory of Party Organization," *Journal of Politics* 46 (May 1984), 369-400.

[35] Downs (fn. 31), 97.

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and electoral equilibrium.[36] Subsequent work, however, has indicated that convergence occurs even when these assumptions are relaxed. Riker and Ordeshook concluded that convergence is likely even when the distribution of voter preferences is bimodal.[37] Indeed, Calvert has shown that there is pressure on candidates to converge in their platforms *even when those candidates are policy-motivated*, and even when they lack perfect information about the electoral impact of their programs.[38]

Recall that the class-struggle argument postulates that parties reflect class interests, that they are fundamentally programmatic, and that their programs are distinctive. The above considerations suggest that these conditions are unlikely to be met, even in two-party systems. To be sure, Downs and others have suggested that party programs may not converge completely, to the extent that the parties are concerned with surrounding their product with some aura of distinctiveness. But the argument does suggest that pressures toward policy convergence will be substantial.

Along with this process of convergence, the idea that it is the parties' and candidates' primary goal to maximize their electoral support implies that the policy positions they do endorse are likely to be *ambiguous*. Even if candidates had unlimited time and resources, there would be little incentive for them to become too specific on issues, especially on those that are potentially divisive. For one thing, such specificity exposes candidates to the risk of criticism that can readily consign them to a defensive strategy, thus making it more difficult to project a positive image. Perhaps more important, specificity on divisive issues is not a productive vote generator because *any* particular policy position will offend *some* set of voters. The better strategy is to concentrate primarily on consensual appeals that are general in their focus.[39] Consequently, candidates play down (and seek to avoid) discussion of details in policy areas like taxation, income maintenance, and health care, but devote considerable energy and time to convincing voters of their commitment to fairness, growth, and even the

[36] *Ibid.*; Otto A. Davis, Melvin J. Hinich, and Peter C. Ordeshook, "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," *American Political Science Review* 64 (June 1970), 426-48.

[37] William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), chaps. 11 and 12.

[38] Randall L. Calvert, "Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence," *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (February 1985), 69-95.

[39] Benjamin I. Page, "The Theory of Political Ambiguity," *American Political Science Review* 70 (September 1976), 742-52; Downs (fn. 31), chaps. 8 and 9. Downs also suggested that ambiguity is prevalent in multiparty systems: "Voters in multiparty systems are indeed faced with definite and well-integrated policy sets, but none of these sets will in fact govern them. Only coalitions can govern, and ambiguity and compromise are introduced on a *secondary level* whenever coalitions are formed" (p. 155; emphasis added).

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elimination of poverty. Thus, the emphasis of the British Labour Party in its (barely) successful 1964 campaign was on slogans like "Let's go with Labour and we'll get things done," and "Labour believes that the good life enjoyed by a few rich people must give way to a fuller life for us all."[40] Who could disagree?

In other words, the optimal strategy, to concentrate on symbolic appeals to shared goals, helps to project a positive stance and to minimize conflict. It also serves to simplify complex policy options and tradeoffs whose implications are often unclear even to specialists, not to mention the candidates themselves.[41] Such simplification is essential as voters process (and reduce) political information into a form that can be translated into a vote for a single candidate or simple preference ordering (or abstention)—which is, after all, a rather restricted range of alternatives. This does not preclude the possibility that candidates and parties will enjoy distinctive images. The Labour Party's slogans of 1964 were, in fact, slightly more populist in tone than those of the Conservatives. But the differences tend to be of degree rather than of kind, and offer little in the way of concrete policy alternatives.

Symbolic appeals are of special significance to the redistributive politics with which the class-struggle interpretation of elections is concerned. The idea of equality is complex and enjoys a wide variety of sometimes incompatible meanings.[42] It follows that promises to "reduce inequalities" can assume a multitude of contradictory forms and yet be characterized as "democratic." The most notable distinction for our purposes is that between equality of opportunity and equality of results.[43] The former refers to the process by which rewards are allocated (merit versus social background); the latter refers to the shape of the distribution of the rewards themselves. And meritocracy, with its emphasis on individual rights, is perfectly compatible with a highly unequal size distribution of, say, income.[44] In this connection, symbolic appeals are very effective.

[40] D. E. Butler and Anthony King, *The British General Election of 1964* (London: Macmillan, 1965).

[41] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964). Proponents of a symbolic interpretation of politics often suggest that their approach is incompatible with rational-choice perspectives. For example, Charles D. Elder and Roger W. Cobb, in *The Political Uses of Symbols* (New York: Longman, 1983), argue that the process is neither rational nor irrational, but instead "arational." Their use of the term is, however, quite unclear. Symbolic interpretations of politics seem perfectly consistent with the idea that political actors (voters, candidates, and others) are selfish utility-maximizers.

[42] See, e.g., Douglas W. Rae and others, *Equalities* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).

[43] See, e.g., Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order* (New York: Praeger, 1971); Christopher Jencks and others, *Inequality* (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

[44] For particularly interesting discussions on this point, see John H. Schaar, "Equality of

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Egalitarian impulses can be declared by parties and their candidates in a way that is highly consensual and ambiguous, and the issue is further confounded by the common equation of justice with equality.

The processes of convergence and ambiguity, along with the use of symbolic appeals, have consequences for voter preferences. Those preferences, after all, do not emerge in a vacuum. Instead, they mold *and are molded by* the policy stances and activities of political leaders. As V. O. Key put it, "The voice of the people is but an echo. The output of an echo chamber bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the input."[45] By adopting centrist, ambiguous, and symbolic appeals, both during and between election campaigns, elected officials have a major impact on the political agenda. That is, their rhetoric and activities help determine which issues belong on that agenda, and which do not. Further, on those issues that are placed on the agenda, elected officials help to determine the *range* of appropriate positions, so that on various issues some positions are defined as legitimate while others are regarded as off-limits.[46] I do not mean to assert that elected officials completely dominate the political agenda, but I do mean to suggest that they have a major hand in shaping it. And, because of the pressures for convergence and ambiguity in political discourse, that hand is a very conservative one which substantially favors the status quo by placing primary emphasis on centrist, consensual positions.

Finally, the status-quo bias is compounded by an inherent inequality of political power in capitalist democracies. Downs concluded that this inequality stems from the existence of uncertainty and the division of political labor—assuming, of course, that people act rationally. The disparity of influence is one that benefits producers at the expense of consumers, despite the fact that governments formulate policies to maximize votes and that consumers vastly outnumber producers.[47] Downs's distinction has a direct parallel in Olson's argument that while smaller groups may be relatively coherent and effective, larger groups will fall far short of providing themselves with meaningful collective goods.[48] In a similar manner, Edelman distinguished two broad types of political groups. The first is relatively small, well-organized, well-informed, and has specific

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Opportunity and Beyond," in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., *Equality*, NOMOS IX (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), 228-49; Edwin Dorn, *Rules and Racial Equality* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

[45] Key, *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 2.

[46] On agenda-setting, see Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[47] Downs (fn. 31), chap. 13.

[48] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), esp. chaps. 1 and 2.

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and clearly identified goals; the second is the polar opposite. Groups of the first type receive a disproportionate amount of the tangible rewards, while those of the second type receive rewards that are primarily symbolic.[49] Lindblom's discussion of "constrained volitions" in capitalist democracies underscored the same point. Although there are limits on the extent to which the public agenda and public demands can be manipulated, large corporate interests can and do mold the volitions of citizens in a centrist manner on the "grand issues."[50] More recently, Dahl has suggested that this form of political inequality is perhaps unavoidable in view of the existence (and encouragement) of independent organizations in pluralist democracies:

> Organized pluralism is a stabilizing force that is highly conservative in the face of demands for innovative structural change. Each of the major organized forces in a country prevents the others from making changes that might seriously damage its perceived interests. As a consequence, structural reforms that would significantly and rapidly redistribute control, status, income, wealth, and other resources are impossible to achieve—unless, ironically, they are made at the expense of the unorganized.[51]

This conclusion rests on two reasonable premises. First, it is always easier to thwart new policy efforts than it is to initiate them, and this introduces an inertia that clearly favors the status quo. Second, groups that benefit from the status quo (i.e., those with interests to protect) occupy the best strategic positions from which to engage in obstructive tactics. Dahl concluded that, beyond the political inequalities they perpetuate, independent organizations deform civic consciousness, distort the public agenda, and alienate final control.[52]

In all, then, the conservative effects of electorally induced party convergence and ambiguity coincide with and are reinforced by the status-quo bias of political inequalities that seem endemic to capitalist democracies. Again, the overall pattern is damaging to the class-struggle interpretation of elections, with its emphasis on the role of left-wing political parties as the programmatic and responsive representatives of the economic interests of low-income voters. Parkin described the dilemma well:

> Social Democrats have committed themselves to a political system which gives rights to the dominant class to prevent wherever possible the redistribution of class advantages. This commitment has proved to be at the

[49] Edelman (fn. 41), chap. 2.
[50] Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chap. 15.
[51] Dahl (fn. 14), 43.
[52] *Ibid.*, chap. 3.

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> expense of traditional socialist goals and principles relating to equality. . . . *This long-term stability in the reward structure of capitalist society must be understood, in large part, as a consequence of political pluralism*. The experience of Social Democratic governments has underlined the point that the rules of classic democracy do not in fact confer political equality on all. Political equality presupposes sufficient social and material equality to enable contending groups to utilize formal political rights in roughly the same degree. Where sharp social and material inequalities do exist, the provision of equal political rights in effect confers a major advantage on those who command the greatest resources to mobilize in defence of their interests.[53]

This general conclusion is not new. Although predicated on a rather different set of assumptions, Michels's famous iron law of oligarchy implies that, for organizational reasons, the primary goal of political parties becomes the attainment of office. In their nascent stages, political parties rely on ideology to help develop an organizational infrastructure, and this gives them an initial programmatic flavor. As the organization develops, however, the program is diluted and relegated to a secondary role because the party wants to moderate its appeal in order to maximize its chances of electoral success. This pattern of convergence to the center continues as the party comes closer to electoral victory, and is completed with that victory: "The socialists might conquer, but not socialism, which would perish in the moment of its adherents' triumph."[54] For this reason, Michels concluded that political history is not a struggle between economic classes, but rather is a struggle between contending political elites—that is, between competing office-seekers.[55]

Conclusion

When judged against an array of studies on the nature of democratic political competition, the democratic class-struggle interpretation is difficult to sustain because the assumptions on which it is predicated are seriously deficient. First, most capitalist democracies are not organized

[53] Parkin (fn. 43), 184-85; emphasis added. See also Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969). Oddly, Korpi classifies Parkin as an example of "mainstream . . . pluralist" thought (p. 184), according to which all groups have "roughly equal opportunities to mobilize power" (p. 8).

[54] Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York: Dover Books, 1958), 391. See also Michels, "Some Reflections on the Sociological Character of Political Parties," *American Political Science Review* 21 (November 1927), 753-72.

[55] Michels's conclusion was anticipated to some degree (and in fragmentary form) by Weber's suggestion that parties "are oriented toward the acquisition of social 'power,' that is to say, toward influencing a communal action no matter what its content may be." Max Weber, "Class, Status, Party," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 180-95, at 194.

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along the majoritarian lines of the Westminster model. Instead, as Lijphart's analysis nicely documents, most have adopted (in varying degrees) constitutional procedures designed to restrict majoritarianism and to protect the rights of minorities. Second, the responsible-parties model of political competition is also wanting. There is little reason to believe that parties are fundamentally motivated by programmatic concerns. Nor is there a compelling reason to believe that, within countries, they usually compete on a left-right continuum, with one party staking out a distinctively left-of-center position representing the economic interests of low-income voters, and the other adopting an equally distinctive right-wing position. Instead, parties are primarily concerned with maximizing their electoral support to gain (or maintain) office; as a result, their appeals are generally centrist and ambiguous, containing a substantial symbolic component.

This conclusion has several implications for the interpretation of elections. First, some analysts have claimed that the nature of political competition has changed in the last 40 years; although elections did reflect a class struggle in the years just after World War II, they no longer do so. Perhaps the best-known version of this argument is contained in Lipset's postscript to *Political Man*, which appeared in 1981. Lipset concluded that there has been a major shift in voter preferences stemming from changes in the shape of the occupational structure that seem to be common to all capitalist economies. Specifically, the proportion of national labor forces in blue-collar jobs has declined, the proportion in the service sector has increased, and affluence is more widespread. As a result, there has been a major decline in voting by class, and a concomitant increase in the prevalence of noneconomic, "postmaterialist" values. Elections have therefore decreasingly reflected a class struggle.[56]

If the argument of this essay is correct, such a view is misleading. On one hand, the constitutional procedures described by Lijphart have been in place throughout the period; on the other, the deficiencies of the responsible-parties model of political competition are not new problems that have arisen in the last 40 years. Temporal fluctuations in the class-vote relationship within countries have little intrinsic bearing on the general interpretation of elections. One cannot focus primarily on mass behaviors and attitudes without understanding the institutional and political context within which they are expressed. And if one does wish to argue that the class-struggle interpretation of elections was once accurate but is decreasingly so, how does one account for the fact, say, that the *first*

[56] Lipset, *Political Man* (fn. 4), expanded and updated ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 503-21.

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Labour Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1924 and from 1926 to 1931 was a centrist, Ramsay MacDonald?[57]

Second, it is often suggested that to deny the class-struggle interpretation of elections, with its emphasis on the role of left-wing parties, is to imply that politics does not matter. Some analysts go further in suggesting that to deny this interpretation of elections is to embrace a functionalist view whereby the shape of the social structure responds primarily to changes in the technological order in a consensual manner.[58] Such assertions are misplaced. The constitutional arrangements of capitalist democracies that typically restrain popular majorities and protect minorities did not somehow emerge by themselves. Instead, they have been politically crafted, and it should take no great leap of faith to understand that these arrangements were designed, in good part, by those who had interests to protect. Similarly, far from denying the relevance of politics, the argument that office-seeking considerations motivate politicians is fundamentally political. So, too, is the suggestion that the political inequalities that exist in capitalist democracies reinforce the status quo. It is more reasonable to conclude that the class-struggle interpretation of elections is misleading precisely because it has glossed over the more fundamental political processes that underlie constitutional arrangements and the nature of political competition in pluralist democracies.

In this connection, my conclusion about the class-struggle argument should not be taken to imply that specific policy choices cannot make a difference. Such choices *should* matter, of course, and my claim is more modest. There is little reason to believe that different parties will *consistently* offer *distinctive* sets of *specific* policy alternatives; clear policy choices will therefore generally be conspicuous by their absence. Nor am I asserting that voters are incapable of responding to changes in economic conditions. Voters clearly can respond to such changes (among other things), especially when they involve real disposable income. Such responses, however, are likely to take the form of retrospective voting, which is quite incidental to any class-struggle interpretation of elections.

Third, this analysis has a rather obvious bearing on the much-

[57] In August 1931, MacDonald dissolved the cabinet and then formed a new National (coalition) cabinet, which lasted from 1931 to 1935. He was expelled from the Labour Party in September 1931. For an account of these events, see, e.g., Henry Pelling, *A Short History of the Labour Party* (London: Macmillan, 1961).

[58] For recent examples of suggestions along these lines, see Francis G. Castles and R. D. McKinlay, "Public Welfare Provision, Scandinavia, and the Sheer Futility of the Sociological Approach to Politics," *British Journal of Political Science* 9 (April 1979), 151-71; Ann Shola Orloff and Theda Skocpol, "Why Not Equal Protection? Explaining the Politics of Public Social Spending in Britain, 1900-1911, and the United States, 1880s-1920," *American Sociological Review* 49 (December 1984), 726-50, at 729.

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discussed issue of American "exceptionalism." For those who believe that the majority-restraining constitutional arrangements of the United States are unique, Lijphart's book provides a useful corrective. No capitalist democracy allows the unfettered expression of popular majorities. Arrangements that, in varying degrees, restrain majorities are in fact closer to the norm, and hardly an exception. Beyond this, when politicians are viewed as vote-maximizers, American politics becomes less unusual, and the behavior of office-holders in other countries (including the Ramsay MacDonalds) becomes more explicable. Indeed, the idea that labor has gained control of the state when a party of the left wins an election sounds rather hollow when we take note of the historical record.

It is useful to remember that the domestic policy record of the Wilson and Callaghan Labour governments in the 1960s and 1970s was not radical—and these have been the only British Labour governments since 1951. Similarly, the economic policies of the German Social Democrats during the Brandt and Schmidt administrations can hardly be viewed as frontal attacks by working-class interests on the fabric of capitalism. The conservative and deflationary policies of the Mitterrand Socialist government in France are equally familiar.

This phenomenon is not restricted to the major West European democracies. For example, the economic policies of the present Socialist government in Spain are designed to hold down inflation, shrink the size of the public budget and state industry, and encourage investment by foreign concerns. Prime Minister Gonzalez, described as part of "a Socialist generation of 'whiz kids' unencumbered by ideology," is quoted as being fond of saying "I am a Socialist, but I am no fool."[59] In a parallel manner, the Labour government in New Zealand is now embarked on a program to reduce taxes and public spending, a goal approvingly described by *The Economist* as a "free-market experiment in Socialist sheep's clothing."[60]

Of course, one could argue that, along with the Democrats in the United States (and the Canadian Liberals), governments like these are also exceptions to the general trend implied by the class-struggle interpretation of elections. The problem is that the exceptions appear to be very common. Another response would acknowledge that governments like these have pursued rather centrist policies, but would assert that Sweden and, perhaps, Norway are somehow different. Indeed, most of Korpi's empirical material is drawn from the Swedish experience. But

[59] "Spain's New Team Backs Austerity," *New York Times*, August 12, 1985, p. 24.

[60] "A Labour Government Sets Things Right," *The Economist*, June 1, 1985, pp. 17-20. The program itself is described by the Hon. Roger O. Douglas, the Minister of Finance, in *Statement on Taxation and Benefit Reform 1985* (Wellington, New Zealand: Government Printing Office, August 1985).

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this response would also acknowledge that class-based politics have been the exception rather than the rule—which turns the original argument on its head. Moreover, the idea that Sweden and Norway are different does not seem to be a particularly accurate conclusion, since the class-struggle argument assumes majoritarian constitutional arrangements that are not manifested in either country. Further, if the validity of the entire argument is to rest on only one or two cases, it takes only one or two counter-examples to undermine it. If, like Korpi (pp. 195-99), we take the size distribution of income as one major indicator of the effectiveness of welfare states, the best available data suggest that this distribution is slightly more egalitarian in the Netherlands than it is in either Sweden or Norway. The differences are not major, and should not be overinterpreted.[61] Nonetheless, most analyses of Dutch politics place primary emphasis on religious, not class, differences. And while it is true that the Dutch Socialists have participated in many postwar cabinets, they have not been majority members in those cabinets. Nor have they ever come close to holding a parliamentary majority in the period. That is hardly the stuff of democratic class struggles.

Allegedly general arguments whose validity rests primarily on one or two cases are neither elegant nor convincing. It seems more reasonable to conclude that elections are not now, and have never been, an effective mechanism for a democratic class struggle.

[61] See Malcolm Sawyer, "Income Distribution in OECD Countries," *OECD Economic Outlook*, July 1976, p. 19 (Tables 10 and 11). Indeed, the Netherlands is generally counted as one of the welfare-state leaders on a variety of counts; see, for example, Harold L. Wilensky, Gregory M. Luebbert, Susan Reed Hahn, and Adrienne M. Jamieson, *Comparative Social Policy: Theories, Methods, Findings* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, Research Series Monograph No. 62, University of California, 1985), 80.

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